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1. INTRODUCTION: LAws DIRECTING LAWMAKING IN 2001 
Regular congressional lawmaking processes require a bill not only to 
obtain bare majorities in the House and Senate, but also to complete 
various deliberative steps along the way. These steps can complicate, 
delay, and sometimes totally block a bill's enactment. l Such deliberative 
steps include the amending process on the House and Senate floor, and 
the process of conference after initial House and Senate consideration, 
which requires the conference product to pass both chambers.2 
Especially in the last quarter-century, a common expectation is that 
major controversial bills of a non-consensus basis will face Senate 
filibuster. The filibuster threat forces these bills to garner supermajority 
support in the form of sixty votes for cloture in order to achieve 
passage.3 These deliberative steps have forced countless bills to 
moderate their positions toward consensus in order to achieve passage, 
or to fail to pass if not so moderated. 
Recently, a new development has come to the forefront that 
undermines some of the checks and balances of the deliberative process: 
the rise of structural laws that facilitate the enactment of otherwise 
controversial4 non-consensus bills by sparing them from some of the 
1 For a recent study of the contemporary enactment process, see BARBARA SINCLAIR, 
UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATNE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (2d ed. 2000). 
The constitutional minimums for enactment-bicameralism and presentment to the President-are 
set forth in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, c1. 2. SeeSaul Levrnore, Bicameralism: Wo'tenAre Two Decisions Beller 
Titan One?, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 145 (1992) [hereinafter Levrnore, Bicameralism]. 
2 See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1989) [hereinafter 
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE]. 
3 For a fine exploration of filibuster and cloture, see Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Tlte 
Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997). 
4 Of course, in early 2001 Congress moved major education and energy legislation which the 
President supported vigorously, as well as campaign finance reform and patients' bill of rights 
legislation which he somewhat supported. Like the tax cut, they involved strongly contested 
substantive issues. However, these bills were not moving through ~ongress so much on the 
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deliberative steps described above. The most important example of this 
phenomenon was President Bush's movement of a trillion-dollar 
controversial tax cut through Congress in early 2001. This measure 
passed without taking a consensus shape and without having the sixty 
Senate votes for cloture required to overcome determined resistance. 
The tax cut passed by the special means of invoking a law that facilitates 
the enactment process, over strong objections that such facilitation was 
not properly available for a bare tax cut.5 Similarly, also in 2001, the 
House moved to renew the major facilitating statute by which laws 
designed to implement future trade deals would receive "fast track" 
treatment.6 A final example from 2001 occurred when Congress 
disapproved a new workplace ergonomics rule, by invocation of a third 
such law for facilitating enactment of laws. That law facilitated the 
lawmaking process by making it much easier for Congress to disapprove 
a regulatory rule than would otherwise be the case.7 
In sum, each of three high-stakes struggles of 2001-budget, trade, 
and rule making review-occurred in the new cockpit of American 
lawmaking: laws about making laws. Hence, 2001 marked the epiphany 
oflaws about lawmaking, culminating a quarter-century evolution that 
the author has been privileged to observe as former Solicitor of the 
House of Representatives and as the author of the treatise on 
congressional procedure.s These laws about lawmaking now amount to 
a sub-constitutional structure by which Congress adjusts the process of 
lawmaking and thereby fine-tunes the overall operation of our legislative 
democracy. This article uses a generalizing perspective about these laws 
President's terms, so far from consensus, as to raise up the Senate resistance barriers such as the 
requirement of 60 votes for cloture. The term "controversial" is used for the tax cut bill, and not for 
these others, to focus on the qualities that would activate congressional barriers to enactment, like 
filibusters, if the barriers were not facilitatively lowered by the operation of laws about lawmaking. 
5 Economic Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA"), Pub. L. No. 
107-16,115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of26 U.S.C.). 
6 For background on fast track, see 1. M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLffICS (3d ed. 1995); 
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFfA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 799, 90S-06 (1995); 
Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Deuelopment oj United States Trade Policy, 27 CoRNELL INT'L 
LJ. 631 (1994) Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK.]. INT'L 
L. 143 (1992); Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOB. TRADE 45 
(1998). 
7 Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001), disapproving65 Fed. Reg. 68261 (2000). 
8 See Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel OffICeS: Dilemmas of Representing in Court the 
Institutional Congressional Clien~ 61 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1998) (describing function of office of 
Solicitor). 
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to decipher the mysteries of the actions of 2001 and to suggest reforms 
for improvement in the laws governing congressional deliberation. 
Specifically, the article focuses on certain particular controversies of 
the highest interest, primarily the facilitation of the trillion-dollar tax 
bill. The tax-cut controversy turned on whether the facilitating law-the 
Budget Act's reconciliation provision9-could properly be used only to 
facilitate deficit control legislation, or whether it could also be used to 
facilitate a mammoth bare tax cut. 10 That dispute had been five years in 
the making, and it was so intense that once the bill's proponents had 
won, they angrily fired the Senate Parliamentarian for his expression of 
cautionary views on the subject. It was the first time that the umpire of 
congressional procedure had ever been sacked for one of his calls. ll 
The dispute has major continuing significance, for Congress may well 
use the same reconciliation12 system again for major controversial tax 
bills in future years. 
Accordingly, Part II of this article starts with the background on the 
laws about lawmaking. Since the 1970s, Congress has created multi-
9 For recent important studies focused upon the budget process. see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE. JR. 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT. CAsES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISlATION: STATUTES AND THE 
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 417-83 (3d ed. 2001); AARON WILDAVSKY & NAOMI CAiDEN. THE NEW 
POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (3d ed. 1997); Elizabeth Garrett. The Congressional Budget 
Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Govcrnment, 100 COLVM. L. REv. 702 (2000) [hereinafter Garrett. 
Congressional Budget Process] ; Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule. Institutional Design of a Thayerian 
Congress. 50 DUKE LJ. 1277 (2001); Philip G. Joyce. Congressional Budget Reform: The Unanticipated 
Implications fur Federal Policy Making. 56 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 317 (1996); Charles Tiefer. Budgetized 
Healtlt Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress S 1995-19% Budget Battle, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 
411 (1996) [hereinafter 1995-1996 Budget Battle]. 
10 For studies of the process of tax lawmaking. see Elizabeth Garrett. Harnessing Politics: The 
Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process. 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 501 (1998) [hereinafter 
Garrett. Tax Legislative Process]; Michael]. Graetz. Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking. 95 COLUM. L. 
REv. 609 (1995); Daniel Linda A. Schwartzstein. Smoke and Mirrors: Tax Legislation. Uncertainty and 
Entrepreneurship. 6 CORNELL]' L & PUB. POL. 61 (1996); Shaviro. Beyond Public Choice and Public 
Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as IUustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s. 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1 
(1990). 
11 The termination is discussed in Charles Tiefer. Out of Order: The Abrupt Dismissal of the 
Parliamentarian Threatens to Rip Apart the Fragile Fabric of Senate Procedure, LEGAL TIMES. May 14. 2001. 
at 62. 
12 For studies of reconciliation (and the PAYGO system). see Elizabeth Garrett. Rethinking the 
Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process. 35 HARv.]. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998); Philip G. 
Joyce & Robert D. Reischauer. Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget REform, 29 HARv. 
]. ON LEGIS. 429 (1992); Anita S. Krishnakumar. Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: TheAnatomy 
of the 1995-96 Budget "Train Wreck." 35 HARV.]. ON LEGIS. 589 (1998);James A. Miller &James D. 
Range. Reconciling an Irreconcilable Budget: The New Politics of the Budget Process. 20 HARv.]. ON LEGIS. 4 
(1983). 
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stage budget, trade, and rulemaking review processes to manage its 
major responsibilities without wholesale delegation or abdication of 
authority to the Executive Branch.13 In doing so, Congress had to stay 
within the lines marked by the Supreme Court's decisions about the 
constitutional limits of laws modifying the lawmaking process, 
particularly Chadha (1983)14 and City of New York (1997).15 This article 
does not contend that either the ordinary, or the facilitated, procedures 
of Congress are unconstitutional; yet, while the struggles in 2001 were 
not over the constitutionality of the facilitation laws, this background of 
the history and jurisprudence in this area helps explain the path that 
was followed. 16 
Parts III through V analyze, and propose reforms regarding, the 
pertinent developments in 2001 regarding the laws about lawmaking for 
budget, trade, and rulemaking review, respectively. These parts assess 
how laws about lawmaking operate on the levels of power, structure of 
congressional deliberation, and meaningful symbolism. Part III 
describes the largest fiscal lawmaking event of our time: the passage of 
the Economic Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 
("EGTRRA"). This part details the dispute over whether the Budget 
Act's reconciliation process, traditionally seen as machinery for 
facilitating deficit con trol, could be used to enact mammoth tax cuts. 17 
It analyzes closely the specific events related to the bill's passage through 
13 LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR & SPENDING (2000). 
14 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
15 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). See Matthew Thomas Kline, Comment, The 
Line Item Veto Case and The Separation of Powers, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 181 (2000); Charles Tiefer, Congress 
in a Straitjacket? In Squashing Line-Item Veto, Supreme Court Says No to Lawmakers' Creativity, LEGAL 
TIMES,June 29,1998, at 23. 
16 For articles arguing the need after Chadha for laws about enactment processes, see Stephen 
G. Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. LJ. 785 (1984); Nick Smith, Restoration of 
Congressional Authority and Responsibility over the Regulatory Process, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (1996); 
Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 
18-20 (1984). 
17 There has been no published academic defense of the unexpected 2001 use of reconciliation. 
Therefore, opposing arguments have been drawn here from congressional sources and by 
adaptation here from recent well-articulated arguments for other congressional anti-tax and anti-
spending procedures and proposals. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE LJ. 483 (1995); John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARyL. 
REv. 365 (1999). These pieces are ably put in perspective by Elizabeth Garrett, A Fiscal Constitution 
with Supermajority Voting Rules, 4OWM. & MARyL. REv. 471 (1999). 
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the key last week of truncated conference processes in May 2001.18 It 
was at this point that reconciliation facilitated enormous and skewed tax 
cuts by a device that an observer termed "outright fraud."19 In short, 
this part describes how to steal a trillion. It then discusses why the 
Senate should reform budget reconciliation to prevent what may 
otherwise be an inevitable recurrence of 2001 's excesses. 
Part IV examines trade fast track developments of the past thirty 
years. In contrast to the purely domestic lawmaking exemplified by the 
Budget Act, the trade fast track facilitates the implementation of trade 
agreements with other countries, serving as a necessary part of the two-
level game in this context of international deal making.20 From 1974 to 
the present, the fast track has evolved as part of the process used by 
Congress to approve international agreements: from more reliance 
upon approval by Senate treaty-ratification to more reliance upon 
approval by enactment (by the House and Senate) of implementation 
laws. Specifically, the fast track statute facilitates the passage of such 
implementation laws.21 The fast track statute expired in 1994 without 
being renewed. In the ensuing half-dozen years, a high-stakes debate 
18 As to 2001, this part builds upon the perceptive contemporaneous account by Andrew Taylor, 
Law Designed Jor Curbing DefICits Becomes GOP Tool Jor Cutting Taxes, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REP. 770 (Apr. 
7, 2001). For a look back at key lawmaking steps during the past twenty years, see Michael]. Graetz, 
Tax Policy at the Beginning of the Clinton Administration, 10 YALE]. ON REG. 561 (1993); Charles E. 
McLure,] r., The Budget Process and Tax SimplifICation/Complication, 45 TAX. L. REv. 25 (1989); Bernard 
M. Shapiro, Presidential Politics and Deficit Reduction: The Landscape oJTax Policy in the 1980s and 1990s, 
50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 441 (1993); Kate Stith, Congress' Power oJthe Purse, 97 YALE LJ. 1343 (1988); 
Kate Stith, Reuniting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case oJGramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 593 
(1988). 
19 A lay account of passage, which critiques the procedure of passage in some detail even 
without touching on Senate reconciliation, is Elizabeth Drew, Bush s Weird Tax Cu~ N.Y. REvIEW OF 
BOOKS, Aug. 9, 2001, at 50. See also Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis-How to Read Tax 
Distribution Tables, 91 TAX NOTES 1747 (Mar. 26, 2001) (analyzing the distribution in the final 
version). For background on the nature of the proposals sped through, see Colleen E. Medill, 
Targeted Pension ReJorm, 27]. OF LEGIS. 1 (2001) (pension changes); Krisanne M. Schlachter, Repealof 
the Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Will It Happen and How Will It Affect Our Progressive Tax System?, 19 VA. 
TAX REv. 781 (2000); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339 (1994) 
(approaches to marriage benefits). 
20 For the classic paradigm in this context, see DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL 
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans et al. eds. 1993); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy 
and Domestic Politics: The Logic oJTwo-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988). 
21 For this evolution, see Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6; Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and 
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutionalinterpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221 
(1995);]ohn C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality oJ Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 
MICH. L. REv. 757 (2001). Again, the issue is not the constitutionality of what took place in 2001, 
but how the Constitution confines Congress and shapes its action through laws about lawmaking. 
2001] How to Steal a Trillion' 415 
raged between enthusiasts and skeptics over what form renewal should 
take. Year 2001, however, brought new developments. 22 New reasons 
for renewal came from the global economic downturn and the 
September 2001 terrorist attack. While these events encouraged 
Congress in 2001-2002 to pass a fast track bill to boost trade 
negotiations, the theoretical issues about the proper design of the 
renewed fast track mechanism remained unresolved.23 Part IV draws on 
the sometimes-overlooked procedural background in this context to 
explore how Congress may combine some aspects offast track treatment 
with some retained capacity to exercise, within limits, its own 
deliberative responsibilities overlegislating.24 It is an unusually creative 
opportunity in which Congress can craft its own future processes, almost 
as if the Constitution's Treaty Clause expired and Congress had to 
devise a new process of advice and consent to treaties. 
Part V turns toward special mechanisms in which laws direct 
lawmaking on particular issues. During 2001, the Congressional Review 
Act (CRA)25 exemplified the importance of laws about lawmaking by 
facilitating the nullification of the just-issued regulatory rule by OSHA 
for workplace ergonomics. The issue of rulemaking review again 
received emphasis in 2001 when the Supreme Court26 declined to revive 
the alternative rule making restraint of the non delegation doctrine. The 
diverse workings of the laws about lawmaking for particular issues can 
22 See Charles Tiefer. "Awngside" the Fast Track: Environmental and Labor Issues in FTAA. 7 MINN. J. 
GLOB. TRADE 329 (1998) (presenting the prior debate). 
23 For the substantive suggestions. see Jack I. Garvey. A New Evolution for Fast Tracking Trade 
Agreements: Managing Environmental and Labor Standards Through Extraterritorial Regulation. 5 UCLA]. 
INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 1 (2000); Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade. Labor Rights. and 
Societal Values. 22 U. PA.]. INT'LEcON. L. 61 (2001). 
24 See Michael A. Carrier. AU Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond, 29 GEO. 
WASH.]. INT'LL. & ECON. 687 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh. Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade 
Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha. 18 N.Y.U.]. INT'L L. & POL. 1191 (1986) [hereinafter Koh, 
Congressional Controls]; Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective 
on the Proposed United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE]. INT'L L. 193. 207-10 (1987). 
25 The leading discussion from within Congress of the Congressional Review Act is Morton 
Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking?: A Brief Overview. 
Assessment. and Proposalfor Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 1051 (1999). For examinations from other 
angles, see EsKRIDGE, JR., FRICKEY & GARRElT. supra note 9, at 491-92; Steven Balla. Legislative 
Organization and Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 424 (2000); Daniel 
Cohen & Peter L. Strauss. Congressional Review of Agency Regulations. 49 ADMIN L. REv. 95 (1997). For 
the act's legislative origins, see Cass R. Sunstein. Congress. Constitutional Moments. and the Cost-Benefit 
State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247. 277-82 (1996). 
26 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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further be illuminated by examining the law for military base-closing. 27 
This law, which was expounded by the Supreme Court not long ago,28 
contains its own provision for specifying the . process by which 
congressional enactments can nullify just-issued regulatory rules. 
Drawing on the examples of the CRA and base-closing, Part V speculates 
about whether, in theory, a special lawmaking mechanism could negate 
a potential problem with campaign finance reform legislation, that is, 
the problem of facilitating the enactment of statutory revisions after the 
Supreme Court had selectively struck down certain provisions of a 
campaign finance bill.29 
Finally, the Conclusion contains speculation on whether and how 
laws about lawmaking can serve, in general, the discourse of the civic 
body. While some of 2001 's events show the downside of laws about 
lawmaking, on the whole, laws about lawmaking constitute a 
development in legislative mechanisms that already has yielded 
significant benefits. 
II. BACKGROUND: FROM THE RULEMAKING CLAUSE 
TO CHADHA AND CITY OF NEW YORK 
A. The Barners to Enactment 
Article I, section 7, clause 2 of the Constitution lays down a lean 
minimum lawmaking process. The Framers, in the Great Compromise, 
set up a Congress with two chambers: a House apportioned by 
population and a Senate with equal suffrage for each State. All 
legislation would require bicameral approval,3o The Framers also gave 
the Presiden t a veto power, subj ect to supermaj ority requiremen t of two-
thirds of each chamber to override. Constitutional bicameralism and 
supermajority veto-override requirements operate as barriers to 
27 See Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by Commission, 62 U. CoLO. L. 
REV. 331 (1991). 
28 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). 
29 See Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1751, 
1755-59 (1999) (noting that case law reflects constitutional vulnerability of campaign finance 
provisions); Rep. Harold E. Ford,Jr. & Jason M. Levien, A New Horizon fOT Campaign Finance Reform, 
37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 312-13 (2000) (discussing prospects for enacting campaign finance 
reform). 
30 For a recent critique of the Senate's effects, see Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The 
Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13J.L. & POL. 21 (1997). 
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enacunen t. 31 More closely examined, bicameralism creates two barriers: 
(1) the requirement of majorities willing to vote for enacunent in two 
differently apportioned chambers; and (2) the coordination 
requirement, which requires that the two chambers attain exact 
concordance on all the details of a single bill, notwithstanding the 
pitfalls exacerbated by the two chambers' separate operations.32 Other 
than that,33 the Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution provides that 
"Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings .... "34 From 
one perspective, barriers that slow down new legislation provide 
protection from precipitate or lobby-pushed action by fostering 
deliberation and achievement of consensus. From another perspective, 
they impede the will of the majority, and thereby produce gridlock.35 
As congressional procedure evolved, it has come to include other 
major aspects that create or affect barriers in the path of enacunent. 
First, the system of political parties produces majority and minority 
parties organizing the House and Senate. This has increasingly meant a 
government divided36 between Presidents of one party and chambers of 
Congress organized by a majority of the other, as in 1981-92, 1995-2000, 
and after the first six months of200l.37 Second, the Senate developed a 
procedure of filibusters-extended delays by debate and amending-
31 See Levrnore, supra note 1, at 155. 
32 See id. at 153. 
33 For the purposes here, the different procedures for constitutional amendments, treaties, 
nominations, expulsions, and impeachments, and the few legislative process specifics of Article I, 
like the Quorum Clause, the Voting Clause, and the Origination Clause, are not especially material. 
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
35 These various barriers, or veto gates, slow down the enactment of some new legislation that 
potential bare majorities on the House and Senate floors might vote for and enact. 
36 For the last fifty years, the government has usually been divided. That is, the President has 
much more often than hitherto faced an opposition party in the majority in one or both chambers 
of Congress. See CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY 25 (1994) (observing that 
Republican presidents faced Democratic chambers of Congress in the thirty-eight years from 1955 to 
1992 a total of twenty-six years or 68 percent of the time, almost five times the rate of divided 
government from 1897 to 1954). Between 1992 and 2000, the govemmentwas divided 75 percentof 
the years (Democratic president, Republican chambers in 1995-2000). The Senate switch in June 
2001 suggested that for Presiden t Bush's first Congress (2001-2002) the figure would again be about 
75 percent. 
37 In the past two or three decades, the two parties in Congress have become somewhat more 
homogeneous internally and somewhat stronger in their internal unity, including unity in defeating, 
when vote-<:ounts make this feasible, proposals of Presidents of the opposite party. See generally 
KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS (1998); DAVID R. MAYHEW, DMDED WE GoVERN: PAR1Y 
CONTROL, LAWMAKJNG,ANDINVESTIGATIONS, 1946-1990 (1991) (analyzing whether gridlock results 
more from divided government or from some other cause). 
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which often can be overcome only by a supermajority vote of sixty for 
cloture. This has increasingly meant that it takes sixty unified votes in 
the Senate for action, not fifty-one. 38 The sixty-vote requirement may 
potently operate as a barrier to controversial domestic legislation even 
when the government is not divided, as in 1977-80, 1993-94 and in the 
first six months of 2001. Even in May 2001, a trillion-dollar 
controversial bill would need sixty Senate votes unless its supporters 
would make the compromises to gain it consensus acceptability, or, 
unless it could move through the Senate by a lawmaking system 
substitute for cloture. 
Third, each chamber organizes itself by both a system of standing 
committees and a floor control system for bills reported out of 
committee. The committee and floor agenda system organizes the 
movement-including the holding back-of bills, and structures the 
processes of discourse, such as hearings, meetings, reporting, floor 
debates, and floor amending.39 This system also underlies the 
conference committee's method for the resolution of House-Senate 
differences necessitated by Article 1's bicameral coordination 
requirement. When the two chambers have different majority parties, as 
in 1981-86 (Democratic House, Republican Senate), and again after 
June 2001 (Democratic Senate, Republican House), each chamber's 
majority party can operate its agenda system differently, which is an 
38 See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE (1997); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3. In the last quarter-century since 
this pattern truly solidified, the need to obtain cloture or to compromise away the opposition party's 
ability to filibuster has become an increasingly general requirement to enact any major controversial 
legislation, albeit not a universal one. From 1917 to 1975, it required two-thirds of the Senate, or 67 
when 100 Senators were present, for cloture. From 1937 to the mid-1960s, filibusters occurred only 
on selective issues, above all civil rights. It was not really until after 1975 that the current pattern 
began to jell: cloture's availability with 60 votes, coupled with a frequent need for cloture on a wide 
range of issues. See CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 696-706. Even today, by no means 
are all issues likely to be filibustered and to require cloture. The determination of what is subject to 
filibuster-for example, whether a campaign finance bill will be filibustered to death by its 
opponents (as by minority Republicans during post-<:onference Senate consideration in 1994) or 
not during initial Senate consideration in 2001, involves a complex Senate discourse. 
39 The floor and committee agenda system facilitates enactment for the bills favored by that 
chamber's majority party, and, conversely, impedes disfavored bills, particularly in the House and to 
some degree also in the Senate. Quantitative political scientists actively study and debate just how 
much the agenda system changes outcomes. The literature is voluminous and sometimes highly 
technical. See, e.g., KREHBIEL, supra note 37. 
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especially effective tool against controversial legislation favored by the 
other party-subject, again, to the coordination oflawmaking systems. 40 
Congressional rules or laws that affect enactment procedure-such as 
the laws about lawmaking studied in this article-not only lower the 
extra-constitutional procedural barriers to enactment, but they also even 
can slightly alleviate some of the constitutional strictures. For 
example,41 bicameralism requires not just majorities in each chamber, 
but timely coordination on all details. The stringency of this 
requirement is somewhat alleviated, however, by the conference 
committee method. Laws about lawmaking further alleviate that 
coordination problem by either expediting post-conference 
consideration, as Budget Act reconciliation does, or establishing 
channels on which there will be no differences on details between 
chambers, as the CRA does.42 And, the laws about lawmaking can 
preclude Senate filibusters and thus obviate the need for sixty votes for 
cloture, before and after conference. Conversely, laws about lawmaking 
can raise, rather than lower, extra-constitutional barriers to lawmaking. 
In this way, they are similar to some aspects of the budget process, such 
as the "PAYGO" system that deters deficit-increasing spending or tax 
cuts. The impeding of legal change is often described as the 
"entrenchment" effect. 43 
To illustrate concretely in 2001, the Senate passed its version of the 
tax cut bill on May 23 with major differences from the House's version. 
40 In these situations, the party influence on the agenda system creates an additional barrier 
because it accentuates the likelihood of operation of the bicameralism barrier. With the two 
chambers organized by opposing parties, for any particular bill, one chamber or the other is that 
much more likely either not to pass a bill or not to achieve timely coordination of a final version 
with the other chamber. 
41 For another example, lawmaking by omnibus legislation--combining large bills together for 
processing through bicameral consideration and presentment-may sometimes produce standoffs, 
but it also sometimes facilitates bargains involving multiple major items together getting through 
the various veto gates, especially the constitutional one of presidential presentment. See CHARLES M. 
CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POUTICS OF NEGATIVE POWER 240-42 (2000) 
(describing the successful effect of packaging and repackaging on veto bargaining). 
42 For example, normally opponents of a conference committee report can try to filibuster it to 
death in the Senate, as Senate Republicans did to campaign finance reform in 1994. However, a law 
about lawmaking can preclude such a filibuster, as the Budget Act precludes filibusters for 
reconciliation bills. See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 38, at 192-94. The 2001 tax cut reconciliation 
bill went to conference on May 23, finished conference on May 25, was passed by the House that 
day, and by the Senate the next. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text. 
43 See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 
HASTINCSCONST. L.Q. 185 (1986); Michael]. Klarman, MajaritmianfudicialReuiew: TheEntrenchment 
Problem, 85 GEO. LJ. 491 (1997). 
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The differences concerned the allocation among different types of tax 
cuts of literally hundreds of billions of dollars.44 Notwithstanding 
contemporaneous turmoil,45 by treating the bill as appropriate for the 
reconciliation procedure, the Senate hastened through with virtually no 
deliberation a conference product involving the allocation of mind-
boggling sums by May 26, only three days later. By invoking a law about 
lawmaking, Congress skipped the ordinary issues of bicameral 
coordination on controversial matters and enacted a huge tax cut in the 
blink of the nation's eye. 
B. Delegation and its Discontents46 
Sometimes Congress can accomplish in one step the creation of a 
body of law, requiring no further work necessary to make the law 
operative, such as delegation or its alternative.47 In contrast, from the 
New Deal in the 1930s through the major domestic enactments of the 
1960s and early 1970s, major categories of enactments depended more 
than ever upon delegation for the creation of implementing bodies of 
law.48 The 2001 Supreme Court decision in Whitman v. American 
Trucking Associations, 49 reversing a D.C. Circuit revival of the 
nondelegation doctrine, serves as a recent reminder that delegation 
remains both significant and necessary. 
Congressional manifestation of some discontent with delegation 
started, as explored in INS v. Chadha, 50 with legislative vetoes-provisions 
that typically allow one or both chambers of Congress to veto 
44 The events in this paragraph are discussed in Part III-A-3. See infra notes 152-55 and 
accompanying text. 
45 On May 24, Senator Jim Jeffords (R-Vt.) announced he was leaving the Republican Party, 
changing Senate majority control, and throwing previous procedural arrangements into potential 
turmoil. 
46 This title has been used before. See Harold]. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. 
L. REv. 710 (1994). 
47 For example, the enactment of narrowly-worded criminal laws typically accomplishes all or 
most of the requisite creation of that particular body oflaw. Thereafter, courts and parties may have 
to interpret the enactment, but the enactment itself suffices, without a need for a successor 
enactment or the promulgation of regulations to effectuate the initial lawmaking impulse. 
48 When Congress told the President to negotiate reciprocal tariff reduction agreements with 
other countries, told OSHA to make rules about workplace hazards, or told the states they could 
receive federal assistance to provide Medicaid to the indigent, large further bodies of law would 
come into existence in ensuing decades without the absolute necessity, and sometimes without any 
need at all, for follow-up congressional action. 
49 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
50 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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presidential or agency actions taken pursuant to delegated authority.51 
In 1939, the first statute with an enactment-facilitating procedure was 
also the first, effectively, to launch the legislative veto.52 Numerous 
other provisions like this followed. 53 
By the mid-1970s, the congressional mood subtly suggested 
reservations against going further in terms of reliance upon delegation. 
Concerned about excessive executive power,54 Congress now sought to 
maintain its core responsibilities, such as establishing fiscal policy and 
implementing trade agreements.55 It felt some discontent with 
accumulated delegations of regulatory authority.56 In trade affairs, 
Congress had struggled with the Johnson and Nixon administrations, 
withholding from them renewed authority to make trade agreements57 
until the Trade Act of 1974. 
Most important, in fiscal affairs, 1974 saw the culmination of a battle58 
over what commentators call the "Fiscal Constitution"59 in Congress' 
51 See id. at 969 (White,]., dissenting). 
52 In 1939, President Roosevelt received authority to reorganize the government's agencies 
subject to disapproval by resolutions of the Houses of Congress that could be enacted after a limited 
Senate debate, the first statute to provide an enactment-facilitating procedure. SeeBINDER & SMITH, 
supra note 38, at 185-86. The 1939 act was foreshadowed by similar provisions a decade earlier, 
under President Hoover, but those provisions did not facilitate the enactment of vetoes. See also 
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969 (White,]., dissenting). 
53 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969-70 (White,]., dissenting). 
54 This was captured in the complaint about the "Imperial Presidency." See ARTHUR 
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). This was partly in terms independent of 
party-for example, as to war powers, it involved a complaint that the (Democratic) Johnson 
Administration had lured the (Democratic) Congress into authorizing the Vietnam War by passing 
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on bogus information. There was also an element relating to party: 
divided government, a phenomenon that had been quite the exception before 1947 and had again 
been the exception in the 1960s, now seemed a recurring phenomenon, so that a Congress which 
delegated or abdicated vast powers took its chances with their use by an Administration of the other 
party. See generally FISHER, supra note 13 (providing a review of the ebb and flow of congressional 
abdication) . 
55 See generally JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND REsURGENCE OF CONGRESS (1981). 
56 This was partly business's approach to fight back against accumulated health, labor, and 
environmental statutory mandates. The cause for nondelegation also received support through the 
broad push for deregulation of pricing in competitive sectors like transportation or energy supply. 
57 The rest of this paragraph is based on DESTLER, supra note 6, at 71-73, and BINDER & SMITH, 
supra note 38, at 185-86, 188-90. The details are discussed further infra in Section IV. 
58 See FISHER, supra 13, at 115-122. 
59 The fiscal constitution may be considered the implementation structure regarding spending 
and taxing in the Constitution, statutes, and rules of the budget process. See Kenneth Dam, The 
American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 271 (1977); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, 
Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE LJ. 1277, 1299 (2001). 
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passage of the Congressional Budget Act ("Budget Act") of 1974.60 
Pursuant to the Budget Act, Corigress would set its annual budget goals 
in a budget resolution, which was then passed by a facilitated process.61 
In various ways the Budget Act assured that Congress would be infonned 
about how proposed appropriations and legislation would fit the 
budget. The Act also impeded budget-violating actions by poin~ of 
order. Not initially, but more often in later years, the 1974 Act's 
provision for "reconciliation" procedures came into play, particularly 
when the budget resolution contained "reconciliation instructions" that 
could procedurally facilitate the enactment of a deficit-reducing bil1.62 
When Congress enacted the Budget Act in 1974, it did not envision 
reconciliation as an effective procedure even for spending cuts, less for 
tax increases, and not at all for changes in the opposite direction from 
deficit reduction, such as for bare large tax cuts such as the one that was 
made in 2001.63 
These facilitative laws came to be joined by various other laws about 
lawmaking, here grouped together simply as the category of special 
mechanisms consisting mostly of either approval or disapproval 
mechanisms.64 In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that a legislative veto 
lacking bicameralism and presentment to the President was 
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha. 65 While curbing provisions for 
legislative review, 66 Chadha did not, of course, affect enactment-
60 Pub. L. No. 93-344,88 Stat. 297 (1974). 
61 The congressional budget process is described in ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: 
POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 105-240 (rev. ed. 2000); CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 
849-1010. See also BINDER & SMITH, supra note 38, at 192-93 (describing the enacunent of the 
expediting procedure of the budget process). 
62 Reconciliation in the Senate is covered by section 310(e) of the CBA, 2 U.S.C. § 641 (e). 
63 See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
64 These are collected in the section, "Congressional Disapproval" Provisions Contained in Public 
Laws, in CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
105th Cong., 2d Sess. §1130 (1999). The trade fast track itself could be considered a complex 
approval mechanism, since the presidential proposal for trade agreement implementation is 
submitted for congressional approval by a facilitated process. An approval mechanism consisted of a 
statute providing that a specific kind of proposal, when subsequently made, could be put into effect 
by an enacunent-facilitated congressional action. In contrast with the trade fast track, which put 
implementation bills of considerable length and sophistication before Congress, an approval 
mechanism could be quite simple, even specifying the form of a joint resolution of approval as but a 
single laconic sentence sanctioning a proposal. 
65 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
66 The legislative veto was only curbed, by no means ended. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Vela: 
Invalidated, It Suroives, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (1993). 
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facilitation systems that still required complete bicameralism and 
presentment. Thus, Chadha left Congress with limited options to pass 
legislation on subjects that require further m~or implementation 
decisions over future years (other than delegating power away),67 and 
made the remaining constitutional approach-facilitative laws about 
future lawmaking-even more important.68 
The evolution during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations 
of the Budget Act and Trade Act procedures will be discussed in Parts II 
and III; it suffices here to say that important laws were passed via the 
special procedures provided by those two acts. In 1995-96, Congress 
enacted the Congressional Review Act, which operated as a disapproval 
mechanism for agency rules. 69 The following year, in 1996, Congress 
enacted a bill taking a different approach to the legislative process - the 
line item veto.70 In 1998, in City of New York,'1 the Supreme Court struck 
down the line item veto, finding the President's unconstrained item-
cancellation power to be invalid as an impermissible delegation of 
lawmaking authority. Like Chadha, by narrowing Congress's options for 
multi-stage processes, City of New York increased the importance of the 
constitutional mechanism oflaws about making laws. 
67 Congress retained the option of one-step all-encompassing initial enactments, but too often 
this was ill-suited for making law over time in light of external developments, political reactions, and 
the difficulty of resolving all impasses about all the possibilities that might later arise. Congress 
could just act initially and hope to act again at a later time if necessary, but given the many veto 
gates in the ordinary enactment process-highly visible in the 1980s and 1990s eras of divided 
government and frequent filibuster-this was not a confidence-building approach. 
68 Unlike legislative vetoes, such laws satisfied Chadha because the later congressional process 
must, and would, obey the constitutional minimum requirements oflawmaking-bicameralism and 
presentment to the President. 
69 When agencies proposed major rules, they were required to provide notice to Congress, 
which then had a limited period to enact ajoint resolution of disapproval. If not disapproved, the 
rules became effective. The mechanism drew its efficacy from how it channeled the consideration 
of disapproval of a major rule. A disapproval mechanism closely resembled a legislative veto, and 
often replaced such a veto after Chadha. In 1990, Congress enacted the military base·dosure act 
discussed below, which operated by a disapproval mechanism. Typically a disapproval mechanism 
statute provided that after an executive action, Congress had a period of time to enact ajoint 
resolution which would disapprove, that is, kill, the action. 
70 This authorized the President to cancel any specific appropriation item in whole or in part, 
subject to Congress's power subsequently to revive the item by re-enactment. See, e.g., Neal E. 
Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Ac4 47 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 1605 
(1997); Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto 
Ac4 20 CARDozo L. REv. 877 (1999); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Future of the Item Veto, 83 IOWA L. 
REV. 79 (1997). 
71 Clinton v. City of New ¥ork, 524 U.s. 417 (1997). 
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The five years prior to 2001 set the stage for the enactments of that 
year largely by bequeathing unresolved legislative issues to the next 
administration.72 In 1997, President Clinton sought a renewal of trade 
fast track authority, but disputes over labor and environmental issues 
stood in the way of his being granted such authority by the Congress.73 
In these years, the Republican congressional majority developed a tax, 
trade, and regulation-restraining agenda, awaiting a period when its 
efforts might not face a presidential veto. However, even then, such 
measures would still need a path over the other enactment barriers in 
Congress, particularly those in the Senate. 
C. Power, Discourse, and Symbolism 
The rise of laws about lawmaking creates a need to identify the 
general categories in which facilitation of lawmaking works. Three 
broad categories of how such laws facilitate enactments warrant 
identification: the laws' effects on power, the structure of discourse, and 
meaningful symbolism. First and foremost, lawmaking laws affect power. 
Specifically, they can create enhanced power to enact, by easing the way 
over barriers in the enactment process that arise from the combination 
of the constitutional minimum for lawmaking and the additional 
deliberative aspects of congressional procedure. For example, instead of 
needing sixty Senate votes for cloture in the absence of consensus, even 
a controversial reconciliation bill or CRA disapproval resolution needs 
only fifty-one because the law itself provides the equivalent of cloture.74 
Laws about lawmaking also shape congressional discourse and serve a 
meaningful symbolic role. For example, committees create a universe of 
congressional discourse by their hearings and meetings on bill 
amending.75 Senate floor procedure creates another context of 
significant discourse by allowing bills to pass only when discussion, 
72 The congressional approval of the prerequisite for China's accession to the wro in 1999 was 
an exception to the trade inactivity. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 was an exception to the tax 
inactivity. Of course, these were not insignificant measures, but there was still pressure for more 
sweeping action in these areas in the years leading up to 2001. 
73 See LM. Destler & Peter]. Balint, The New Politics of American Trade: Trade, Labor, and the 
Environment8,12 (1999). 
74 See ESKRIDGE,JR., FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 9, at 492 (regarding the 2001 disapproval of 
the ergonomics rule, "[b 1 ecause of the protective rules governing floor debate, the Democrats in 
the Senate could not threaten to filibuster the resolution, as they could have a traditional bill 
overturning the regulations"). 
75 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER]' DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS (3d ed. 
1997). 
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sometimes extended in duration, has brought about sufficient consensus 
for the bills to escape death by filibuster. Conversely, lawmaking 
procedural arrangements have meaningful symbolic effects in holding 
out long-term prospects for ultimately achieving objectives that might 
not be reached or effectuated any time soon.76 Delegations to agencies 
affect power, deliberation, and symbolism by facilitating the creation of 
new law, changing the way it gets debated, and holding out prospects of 
eventual, if not near-term, action. To sum up by analogy, so do laws 
about lawmaking. 
III. FACILITATING THE CONTROVERSIAL 2001 $l.3 TRILLION TAX CUT 
President Bush faced a large challenge in moving EGTRRA, his tax 
cut bill, through the Senate. Since the Republican Party had lost more 
Senate seats than it gained in the 2000 elections, Bush found only fifty 
Senators in his party when he took office, a sharp drop from the 
previous year. Initially, this led to an unprecedented Senate power-
sharing arrangement by the fifty-fifty parties, and, after six months, to a 
change of majority party.77 While public polls did not show antagonism 
to tax cuts, they did show more support for devoting surpluses to other 
needs.7s Although the country could not anticipate the terrorist attack 
of September 11, 2001, those other needs, even in early 2001, included 
more funds for defense. 
76 Some commentators associate the tenn "symbolic" as to law or politics with merely imaginary 
distractions. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 16-18 (1964) (associating the 
tenn with the functions of myth and ritual). Here, the concept is of meaningful symbolism in 
stepwise government action, which holds out the vision or hope of ultimate success when concrete 
realization cannot occur in the initial step. The first great essay on symbolism in modern 
government memorably discussed how new institutions or processes could, by comforting traditional 
symbolism, bridge the time until results. THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GoVERNMENT (1935). 
For a sophisticated contemporary treatment of symbolism as effective political focal points, see Eric 
A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998). 
77 See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Bush Lacks the Ability to Force Action on Hil~ WASH. POST, July 26, 2001, 
at AI. Because the chief focus on this point is the tax cut's passage, this paragraph adapts Sheldon 
D. Pollack, Republican Antitax Policy, 91 TAX NOTES 289,295 (Apr. 9, 2001): "Ironically, the future of 
the antitax wing of the Republican party became considerably more uncertain following the 
November 2000 elections .... [TJhe electoral outcome could hardly be interpreted as a victory for 
Republicans or the antitax movement--or even for Bush himself ... ." [d. 
7S Andrew Taylor, Tax Fight Energizes Democrats, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 465, 466 (Mar. 3, 2001) 
(discussing "polls that appear to show only soft public support for tax cuts ... only 22 percent of 
those polled said tax cuts were their highest priority for the budget surplus, ahead of education, 
health care and strengthening the Social Security System"). 
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To be sure, the President had won election after campaigning on his 
clear call for a tax cut, and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
projections of budget surpluses continued to support that call. 
However, the ultimate CBO budget scoring cost of EGTRRA, $1.3 
trillion, large enough on its own terms, was an underestimate. After 
setting aside the distortions of its scoring method, such as its omission of 
interest costs on continuing debt, the tax cut could cost the Treasury 
anywhere from $1.8 trillion to over $2 trillion in its first decade.79 Sober 
international observers put the figure at $2.5 trillion.80 If extended 
thereafter, analysts estimated the costs "would balloon to $4.3 trillion in 
the following 10 years."81 Moreover, CBO projections of surpluses 
employed rosy economic scenarios that were in the process, even at the 
time, of being reduced due to the economic downturn.82 It 
subsequently became clear that the tax cut bill promised a decade of 
deficits to follow. 83 
The President's tax cut proposals, particularly the phasing-out of the 
estate tax's top rate and the marked reduction of the top two income tax 
brackets, involved forfeiting the progressive ability-to-pay principle.84 
The controversy over the effects of the cut suggested that the bill would 
79 Transcript ofGephardt Remarks on Patients' Bill of Rights, New York Times Poll, Campaign 
Finance Reform, U.S. NEWSWlRE,June 21, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library. 
80 In its annual report on the U.S. economy, the IMF warned that "the actual budget effect of 
President George Bush's proposed tax cuts would be at least $US2,500 billion." Luke Collins et al., 
IMF Warning Rallles US Dollar, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Aug. 16,2001, at 1. 
81 Patti Mohr, The Tax Bill-Sunset Provision Leaves Tax Bill on Insecure Footing AJter 2010, 91 TAX 
NOTES 1648 (2001) (citing estimate by Center on Budget and Policy Priorities). 
82 Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale have published a series of essays taking issue with the 
CBO estimates and calculating their own budget projections. See Alan]. Auerbach & William G. 
Gale, Perspectives on the Budget Surplus, 53 NAT'L TAX]. 459 (2000); Alan]. Auerbach & William G. 
Gale, Tax Cuts and the Budget, 90 TAX NOTES 1869 (2001). 
83 Daniel]. Parks, Will a New Era oJDeficits Be Bush's Budget Legacy?, 60 CONGo Q. WKLV. REP. 280 
(Feb. 2, 2002). 
84 For the extent to which the final version forfeited progressivity, see Martin A. Sullivan, 
Economic Analysis-How to Read Tax Distribution Tables, 90 TAX NOTES 1747 (Mar. 26, 2001). For 
recent literature on the controversiality of such measures, see JOEL SLEMROD, TAX PROGRESSMTY 
AND INCOME INEQUALITY (1994); William G. Gale &Joel B. Slemrod, Lifo and Death QyestionsAboutthe 
Estate and Gift Tax, 53 NAT'L TAX]. 889 (2000); Vada Waters Lindsey, The Wuiening Gap Under the 
Internal Revenue Code: The NeedJor Renewed Progressivity, 5 FLA. TAX REv. 1 (2001); Krisanne M. 
Schlach ter, Repeal oj the Federal Estate and Gift Tax: WillIt Happen and How Will It Affect Our Progressive 
Tax System?, 19 VA. TAX REv. 781 (2000); Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary: Inequality, Wealth, and 
Endowment, 53 TAX L. REv. 397, 399-400 & n.13 (2000). A 1994 survey found that 60-66% of those 
surveyed favored progressive tax rates. See Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, 
Fairness, and Compliance, 16 L. & PoL'v27, 44 (1994). 
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have a difficult time obtaining Senate passage. This was borne out later 
by the ties or near-ties in actual Senate voting on key amendments 
discussed below. The voting pattern on key amendments indicates that 
regular procedures, which require a Senate consensus rather than a bare 
majority for controversial measures, would have compelled the tax bill to 
undergo major changes, if not a complete overhaul, in order to garner 
the votes necessary to pass the Senate. The bill, however, was able to 
pass through a facilitated path created by the use of budget 
reconciliation. 
A. Reconciliation Tax Cutting in 2001 
Because the explanation for the tax cut's passage depends on the key 
role of Budget Act reconciliation, this part first discusses the role of 
reconciliation from 1974 to 2000. It then shifts to the procedural details 
and substantive results in 2001. 
1. 1974 through 2000: Reconciliation for Deficit Control 
Congress enacted the 1974 Budget Act in response to a preceding 
seven-year budget war in which congressional failure to control budget 
deficits had armed Presidents to criticize Congress.85 The Act 
established a system to adopt annual budget resolutions with targets and 
to control deficits primarily by holding down appropriated and 
entitlement spending to meet those targets. 86 In 1974, Congress had a 
great deal of recent experience with needing deficit control through 
facilitating spending reduction, not much experience with needing 
deficit control through tax increases, and absolutely no experience 
whatsoever with needing to facilitate spending increases or tax cuts.S7 
85 This is the fundamental starting point for all analysis of the Budget Act's intent. ALLEN 
SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING AND TAXING (1980) [hereinafter CONGRESS 
AND MONEY]; CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 856-58; Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of 
Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, supra note 12, at 391-92. 
86 For the Budget Act procedures, see SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY, supra note 85, at 168412 
and CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2. 
87 From World War II to the mid-1970s, the progressive income tax rates had the effect, whether 
in growth or inflationary periods, of producing large tax revenue increases without further changes. 
Congress did not need to enact tax increases except during the Korean War, and when it wanted to 
enact either various tax refonn bills, or the stimulative tax cuts in 1962, 1964 and 1971, it did not 
need facilitating procedures. For more on the dynamic of this period, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE 
DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 16-25,111-19 (1997); C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX 
DECADE: How TAXES CAME TO DOMINATE THE PUBLIC AGENDA 13-38 (1992). 
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The original Act contained its little-noticed reconciliation procedure 
in section 310. While "reconciliation" was a somewhat cryptic term,88 it 
had been used to describe the procedure used by the President's budget 
bureau for forcing down spending proposals. 89 This procedure begins 
when "reconciliation instructions" are placed in a budget resolution. 
These instructions call for a "reconciliation bill" to be voted upon by the 
House and Senate under procedures that facilitate the bill's enactment. 
The reconciliation bill is then used as the means by which the actual 
budget is brought into line with pre-established goals. One author 
noted that reconciliation only contemplated "spending cuts or tax 
increases," not spending increases or tax cuts.90 Its design suggested it 
was barely suitable to control deficits by spending cuts, even less 
intended to control deficits by tax increases,91 and simply not intended 
88 The text of section 310 uses the word "reconciliation" cryptically, with no definition. The 
word itself has this derivation: "In its narrow sense, reconciliation is the method used to balance a 
personal checking account, and this connotation is indeed the sense of the Budget Act procedure 
with respect to bringing the parts of the budget into a proper relationship to the whole." HOWARD 
E. SHUMAN, POLITICS AND THE BUDGET: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
CONGRESS 242 (3d ed. 1992). However, one cannot attribute to Congress the silent intent to favor 
the overcoming of prized Senate procedures by reconciliation in the form of facilitating spending 
increases or tax cuts. The rule on filibuster and cloture, Senate Rule XX, is perhaps the most salient 
and sensitive of all the Senate rules. Any large exception would be highly controversial. A large 
exception for the opposite of deficit reduction-for spending increases or tax cuts-would have 
been particularly controversial. Congress did not silently intend such a particularly large 
controversial exception. AsJustice O'Connor said recently in another context (that of enactments 
affecting Congress itself), it is especially difficult to impute to Congress the intent silently to 
"fundamentally change" a process that "would profoundly affect Congress" itself. Department of 
Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 342-43 (1999) (plurality 
opinion). 
89 
This procedure was proposed by Charles Schultze in testimony before the 
House Rules Committee. It is borrowed from the Budget Bureau itself, which 
uses similar directions from the president to the various bureaus and agencies 
to bring the parts of the president's budget in line with the agreed-on totals 
before it is sent to the Congress. 
SHUMAN, supra note 88, at241 (citing Schultze's testimony in "JSC, Improving Congressional 
Budget Control Hearings, 93-1 [1973], 18Jan. 1973, pp. 2-17; and House Rules Committee, 
Budget Control Act of 1973 Hearing on H.R. 7130,93-1 [1973], pp. 311-336). 
90 See Krishnakumar, supra note 12, at 617 (quoting former House Budget Committee Chairman 
Leon Panetta). Originally designed in the 1974 BudgetAct, reconciliation was the means by which 
the House and Senate could instruct their committees at the end of the budget procedures to come 
up with spending cuts or tax increases to bring into balance the spending proposals of individual 
committees and the overall binding targets of the second budget resolution. SeeSHUMAN, supra note 
88, at 242. 
91 Not only would the 1974 Act not have intended reconciliation for other than deficit control, 
but the 1974 Act as a whole also did not act much upon tax legislation, even for that purpose. "For 
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to facilitate bills unrelated to deficit reduction, such as bare spending 
increases or tax. cuts.92 Other provisions,93 as well as the budget 
process's first years from 1975 through 1980, confirmed this intent.94 In 
other words, the 1974 Budget Act as a general targeting mechanism was 
policy-neutral, allowing for "higher or lower spending [or taxes], bigger 
or smaller deficits."95 However, the Act's reconciliation procedure was 
designed and intended only to facilitate deficit control, not to diminish 
the Senate's consensus requirements for controversial bills such as 
spending increases or tax cuts. 
In 1981, the White House changed party hands, and President 
Reagan pushed through two major bills: an omnibus budget 
reconciliation act (OBRA) containing large spending cuts (both real 
various reasons, the 1974 Budget Act lacked the tools regarding taxes that it had for spending .... 
Referring back to the legislative history of the 1974 act ... tools to control tax legislation were not 
proposed by the Joint Study Committee; they were proposed by the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee, but were dropped in the Senate Rules Committee." CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra 
note 2, at 901 & n.145. 
92 The design, purpose, and background of the original Budget Act do not reflect a 
congressional intent to create a filibuster-proof way of pushing through spending increases or tax 
cuts having nothing to do with deficit reduction. That act provided for two annual budget 
resolutions, one in the fall, one in the spring, with reconciliation instructions on the second. See 
WILDAVSKY & CAIDEN, supra note 9, at 79. Reconciliation obviously was not intended in 1974 as 
guidance for the year's major legislating, for the design of the 1974 Act provided for reconciliation 
to come late-only on the second resolution. The second resolution created, in general, the 
possibility of enforcing what might have been ignored in the first resolution or responding to radical 
changes since then, but was too late in the year to be a blueprint for the year's major legislating. 
Reconciliation was just a part of the second resolution's late-adjustment role, and so reconciliation 
was not itself, in general, viewed as significant. "Surprisingly, the framers of the 1974 Act did not 
foresee the rise of reconciliation acts .... " Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the 
Party-in-Govcrnment, supra note 9, at 718. Reconciliation could only be expected, at that late point in 
the year, as a last-<litch mechanism to address a problem that had arisen since the first resolution, 
namely, that the anticipated deficit for the next fiscal year had grown. CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, 
supra note 2, at 857, 884. 
93 One of the Act's original provisions forgotten today, section 301 (b)'s deferred enrollment 
provision, underlines the connection of reconciliation to the prior spending bills of the year. It kept 
appropriations and new spending bills from being enrolled until reconciliation and set up the 
clearly-intended possibility that a reconciliation resolution-rather than a bill-would cut those not-
yet-enrolled spending bills. CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 884 n.95. The whole 
machinery of deferred enrollment and reconciliation resolutions focused upon the cutting of 
spending. 
94 See CONGRESS AND MONEY, supra note 85, at 321,326,389-90. Congress used reconciliation on 
spending in 1980, when it made the innovation, notwithstanding the 1974 Act, to have the 
reconciliation instructions for spending cuts on the first budget resolution rather than the second. 
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 885 & nn.98-99, and authorities cited. 
95 Garrett, Tax Legislative Process, supra note 10, at 508 (quoting SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY, 
supra note 85, at 73). 
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and illusory), followed by a large tax cut bill. That year, reconciliation 
evolved dramatically, facilitating the spending cut OBRA through a 
reengineered two-step budget process - a spring budget resolution with 
reconciliation instructions followed by a deficit control OBRA.96 Even 
with such evolution, however, the bare tax cut bill enacted after the 
OBRA was not itself in any way, shape or form a reconciliation bill.97 
While 1981 established the flexibility of reconciliation to facilitate deficit 
control spending cut bills, in no way did it support what occurred in 
2001, that is, facilitation, by reconciliation, of a bare tax cut bill itself. 98 
In a different vein, the 1981 spending-cut OBRA came to the Senate 
floor containing major sections unrelated to budget savings.99 Then-
Minority Leader Byrd (D-W. Va.) vigorously criticized this, and the 
Senate later adopted and strengthened a rule forbidding such 
extraneous provisions in reconciliation bills - the Byrd Rule. IOO The 
Byrd Rule serves as a great model of reform for reconciliation, 
specifically for reform in reaction to the excesses of 2001. 
After 1981, the unpaid-for tax cut resulted in an exploding national 
debt, so Congress enacted a series of deficit-reducing reconciliation 
96 For discussions of reconciliation in 1981, see Joyce, supra note 9 and sources cited in note 9. 
97 As Senator Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.) pointed out in 2001, the Senate devoted a full twelve days 
in 1981 to debating that tax cut bill, with no procedural constraints, and had the bill not achieved 
consensus status due to the prior spending cuts paying for it, the minority party could readily have 
filibustered it and insisted it receive 60 votes for cloture. 147 CONGo REc. S1535 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 
2001) (statement of Sen. Byrd). As a practical matter, reconciliation for the spending cut bill 
indirectly facilitated the tax bill, since it was argued that the spending cut bill paid for a tax cut. 
However, there is no comparison between 1981, where a reconciliation spending bill assertedly paid 
for a non reconciliation tax cut bill, and 2001, where the tax cut bill itselfwas given the reconciliation 
procedure. 
98 SeeJoyce, supra note 9, at 319. Controversial legislation without the backing of reconciliation 
could not easily get past enactment barriers. This was shown by how anti-busing legislation was 
effectively filibustered for eight months from 1981 to 1982 and, despite much support, never 
became law. CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 738-40. 
99 For these, "extraneous provisions" was the technical description, but "sweeteners" was the 
vernacular term. See, e.g., Charles E. McClure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax 
Simplification/Complication, 45 TAX L. REv. 25, 76. These helped get the reconciliation bill adopted, 
even with its unpalatable cuts in spending programs like health care for indigent children, by the 
lobbying support for those "sweeteners." See 1981 CONGo Q. ALMANAC 262-63 (describing the bill's 
"so-called 'sweeteners' -additional funding for popular programs such as the Export-Import Bank 
and educational impact aid"). 
100 2 U.S.C. § 644 (1997). See also Garrett, Congressional Budget Process, supra note 9, at 720 and 
sources cited in note 84. 
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acts. 101 Congress also enacted the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, and, 
the major and revenue-neutral Tax Reform Act of 1986.102 In 1990, the 
first Bush administration joined Congress in a bipartisan package of tax 
increases, spending cuts, and tough budget enforcement procedures 
known as the Budget Enforcement Act. 103 This launched bipartisan, real 
deficit control, in part through requirements that spending increases 
and tax cuts be paid-for, known as the "PAYGO" system.104 The Budget 
Act's evolving reconciliation procedure involved much flexibility, but 
still confirmed that all of reconciliation's potent facilitation applied to 
deficit control, not unpaid-for tax cuts or spending increases. 105 
In 1993, the White House again changed party hands. During the 
next Congress, the Republicans successfullyl°6 filibustered and thereby 
defeated numerous controversial bills sought by the President, although 
the Democrats held both the White House and a majority of each 
101 SeeSTEUERLE, supra note 87, at 57-172. "AI; Congress suuggled to reduce the federal deficit 
in the 1980s and 1990s, [Senate] debate limits were continued as a vital part of mechanisms 
designed to enforce spending and deficit limits." BINDER & SMITH, supra note 38, at 192. 
102 The 1986 Tax Refonn Act was a bipartisan deal trading reduced tax rates in return for 
compensating increases in other respects. It mattered greatly that the 1986 act was revenue-neutral, 
and did not involve the kind of revenue policy-swing in either direction-net revenue increases or 
decreases-sought by new Presidents with support predominantly from just their own party in 1981, 
1993, or 2001. Garrett, Tax Legislative Process, supra note 10, at 509. A favorable account of its 
passage is JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & AlAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH (1987). For a 
debate about public choice criticism of the 1986 act compare Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. 
McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well? Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y. U. L. REv. 891 
(1987) (skeptical public choice criticism) with Shaviro, supra note 84, at 64-110 (skepticism about 
the public interest criticism). 
103 See STEUERLE, supra note 87, at 17~4. 
104 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1997). See Garrett, Tax Legislative Process, supra note 10, at 509-11. 
105 147 CONGo REc. S1532-34 (daily ed. Feb. IS, 2001) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (cataloging 
provisions from Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the Byrd Rule, and the Budget Enforcement Act, 
reflecting reconciliation's purpose offunctioning within deficit control). 
106 
Health care refonn, telecommunications refonn, lobbying refonn, and 
other measures were affected by Republican obsuuctionism, but, the 
Republicans believed, the Democrats and President Bill Clinton would be 
blamed for their failure to fashion legislation that could survive the legislative 
process even if Republican tactics were the immediate cause for the death of 
the measures. As it turned out, the ineffectual Democrats did seem to be 
blamed for the "mess in Washington" in the 1994 elections, in which they lost 
control of both houses. 
BINDER & SMITH, supra note 38, at 148. 
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chamber of Congress. l07 Specifically, the Republican filibustering 
defeated President Clinton's opening agenda item: a fiscal stimulus 
bill. lOB This was possible because in 1993-as in 1981, as throughout the 
1980s, but unlike in 2001-no one envisioned reconciliation to facilitate 
fiscal bills unrelated to deficit control. 109 
To reduce the deficit, President Clinton did push through a 
controversial tax rate increase for top tax brackets, with support solely 
from his own party.110 Professor Krehbiel, a leading quantitative 
political scientist, discusses in his seminal 1998 study how controversial 
legislation in Congress moves notwithstanding long periods of gridlock. 
A change in the White House party as in 1981, 1993, and 2001 removes 
one supermajority barrier, the veto, III but some other mechanism-for 
these purposes, reconciliation in 1981, 1993, and 2001-must deal with 
107 The measures killed by the Senate minority party filibuster included bills on striker 
replacement, campaign finance reform, and lobbying disclosure. See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 38, 
at 135; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3. 
108 The vigorous assertion of filibuster righ ts in that Congress dates from the killing of President 
Clinton's economic stimulus bill by a March 31, 1993 "letter signed by all 43 Republicans pledging to 
oppose the bill." RICHARD E. COHEN, CHANGING COURSE IN WASHINGTON: CLINTON AND THE NEW 
CONGRESS 128 (1994). 
109 Apart from the compromise of 1997, scholarly commentary now recognized that 
"reconciliation often reflects the preferences of the majority party leadership and can produce 
radical, uncompromising proposals which boast the support of only the barest congressional 
majorities." Krishnakumar, supra note 12, at 620 (a perceptive study applying both congressional 
procedure and median voter theory to reconciliation). 
110 Attributing this to reconciliation may sound like it slights President Clinton's enormous 
political effort and majority party discipline in 1993,just like attributing the 1981 spending cut bill 
or the 2001 tax cut bill to reconciliation may sound like slighting President Reagan's and President 
George W. Bush's enormous political efforts and the discipline of their parties. Political efforts and 
discipline will put together a majority of Senate votes for non-consensus legislation, but it will not 
put together the 60 votes needed for cloture. Only reconciliation overcomes organized Senate 
minority party resistance to non-consensus measures absent 60 votes in support. 
III Pivot point analysis describes this in terms of mapping the preferences of the Members of 
Congress, and the vetoing President, onto a linear scale, with the supermajority requirement for 
override creating a very wide expanse on that scale marking stability or gridlock. In terms of pivot 
point analysis, this situation might be mapped on the spectrum as that President Clinton had a 
preference to the left of the median legislator in 1995-2000. Since it would take a two-thirds 
supermajority to overcome a Clinton veto, action could occur only in two situations. Either existing 
law must be so far to the right that a majority of the legislators, although they are more rightist than 
the President, themselves want to change the law to the left (very unlikely) or existing law must be so 
far to the left that two-thirds of the legislators will vote for a change, overcoming his veto (almost as 
unlikely). Otherwise, existing law falls in the very wide expanse between the preference of the 
median legislator and the preference of the President (the veto pivot), and stability or gridlock 
occurs. See KREHBIEL, supra note 37, at 118-44. 
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the Senate filibuster barrier.ll2 He concludes that reconciliation's 
"simple-majority parliamentary situation was a key to Democrats' hard-
fought victory in the 1993 budget process," as it was to the Republicans' 
spending cut victory in 1981 and to their tax cut victory in 200l. His 
conclusion rests on his belief that, in 1993, opposition "Republicans 
undoubtedly would have filibustered the Clinton-Democratic 
reconciliation bill if they had been permitted to do so. But they weren 't, 
so they didn't."ll3 In other words, President Clinton had no unlimited 
exemption from filibusters for fiscal bills; his fiscal stimulus bill fell to 
Senate filibuster; his tax increase passed, because, as a bill for deficit 
control, it could be facilitated by reconciliation. 
Mter Republicans won the 1994 congressional elections and became 
the majority party in the House and Senate, the new majority sought in 
the next three Congresses to use the channel of reconciliation bills for 
tax cuts either within, 114 or without, the rubric of deficit reduction. The 
Republican Senate majority of 1996 sought reconciliation-facilitated tax 
cut bills,l15 and obtained a ruling of the Senate Parliamentarian in favor 
of flexible use of reconciliation for tax cuts; as will be seen, this ruling, 
opposed as contrary to the Budget Act and barely upheld by a party-line 
vote, was not treated in 2001 as one to be followed. ll6 That same 
majority, in 1999-2000, now supported by projections of surplus that 
112 The cloture rule creates a wide expanse on the preference spectrum marking stability or 
gridlock. This occurs between the preference of the median voter and the preference of the last 
needed legislator to make up a 60-vote majority for cloture, called the filibuster pivot. When 
existing law falls in the wide in-between space between the preference of the median legislator and 
the preference of the filibuster pivot, no change will get enacted, and stability occurs. See id. at 93-
117. Ordinarily, that would give some stability to fiscal policy swings, even during changes in the 
\Vhite House party such as those in 1981, 1993, and 2001. However, reconciliation eliminated the 
cloture pivot, and hence, eliminated the stability. 
113 fd. at 204 n.25. Professor Sinclair makes the same point: "[T]he president's program [in 
1993] would never have passed were it not for the special procedures .... Most important, of 
course, was the budget process . . .. Budget rules [gave] the budget resolution and the 
reconciliation bill protection against a filibuster and amendments in the Senate that is enonnously 
advantageous." SINCLAIR, supra note I, at 182-83. 
114 President Clinton signed into law in 1997 a compromise package reflecting reconciliation's 
flexibility within the broad rubric of deficit control, which used major spending cuts to pay for a cut 
in the capital gains tax. 1997 CONGo Q. ALMANAC 2-30. For accounts of the act, see DANIEL]. 
PAlAZZOLO, DONE DEAL?: THE POLITICS OF THE 1997 BUDGET AGREEMENT (1999); SINCLAIR, supra 
note I, 20413; Robert D. Reischauer, Light at the End of the TunnelorAnothermusion? The 1997 Budget 
Dea~ 51 NAT'L TAX.]. 143 (1998). 
115 Tax Plnn Falls with Budget Package, 1995 CONGo Q. ALMANAC 2-66; Republicans Spar over Budget 
Plnn, 1996 CONGo Q. ALMANAC 2-21. 
116 142 CONGo REc. S5415-20 (daily ed. May 21, 1996). 
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relaxed the PAYGO discipline,ll7 passed reconciliation tax cut bills that 
President Clinton vetoed but that served as models for the following 
Congress. ll8 By the end of this period, the availability vel non of 
reconciliation had become the all-important procedural consideration 
in passage of tax cuts potentially approaching the trillion-dollar range. 
On the one hand, the Budget Act had only intended reconciliation for 
deficit or debt1l9 reduction, and in twenty-five years, only deficit 
reduction had been enacted by it. 120 On the other hand, Senate 
Republicans had developed over a course of years the argument for tax 
cut reconciliation. 
117 For a description of PAY GO discipline as to tax cuts, see Garrett, Tax Legislative Process, supra 
note 10. PAYGO discipline relaxed with the entry into the era of projected budget surpluses for 
several reasons. First, President Clinton proved willing to end-run PAYGO, signing acts for both 
fiscal 2000 and fiscal 2001 that discarded PAYGO rules against spending increases. ESKRIDGE,]R., 
FRICKEY & GARREll, supra note 9, at 441-42; Victoria Allred, PAyeO Goes by Wayside, 59 CONGo Q. 
WKLY. REp. 96 Oan. 13, 2001). Second, the PAYGO statute's text speaks of itself only as a barrier 
against enactment of deficit increases, 2 U.S.C. § 902, although that may leave ambiguities in 
practice. Unlike Budget Act aspects enforced by Congress, PAYGO is enforced by the Office of 
Management and Budget's anticipated sequesters of certain vulnerable spending programs if the 
PAYGO-scored new spending or tax cuts were enacted. To the extent that PAYGO has ambiguities 
regarding its application, President Clinton was willing to invoke it to restrain across-the-board tax 
cut proposals even in the face of optimistic predictions of budget surpluses; President Bush would 
not be so willing. See SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, supra note 61, at 69-70,140, 153. So, at the 
time of President Bush's election, the talk of PAYGO restraint on tax cut bills virtually stopped. 
118 See 1999 CONGo Q. AlMANAC 6-16; Lori Nitschke, Reconciliation BiU: Last Chance far a GOP Tax 
Victory?, 58 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 2073 (Sept. 9, 2000); Lori Nitschke, Hasty Conference, Certain Veto 
Face Senate-Passed Tax Cut Bil~ 57 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 1853 Ouly 31, 1999). 
119 This article uses the shorthand of "deficit reduction" for what the Budget Act intended as 
the sole purpose of reconciliation. For this article's purposes, "deficit reduction" also includes the 
situation of spending cuts or tax increases that occur during a time of surplus and, hence, 
technically do not have a deficit year to affect, but do reduce the national debt accumulated by the 
deficits of past years. Looking overall at the 1974 Act, it could be argued that the tools of spending 
cuts or tax increases apply not just to reducing the debt during deficit years, but during surplus years 
as well. That is nothing like the stretch involved in using reconciliation for the opposite purpose, of 
ending up with a larger debt than otherwise by forcing through spending increases or tax cuts. The 
debate over whether reconciliation can be used for debt reduction in time of surplus is reminiscent 
of the debate over whether PAYGO might still impede unpaid-for spending increases or tax cuts 
even in time of surplus. Some thought so, but the Bush Administration did not view PAYGO as 
impeding the 2001 tax cut. See SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, supra note 61, at 153-54 (expressing 
the view that such spending increases or tax cuts may be impeded by PAYGO). 
120 Congress had enacted reconciliation deficit reduction in 1981 followed by tax cuts, and had 
enacted packages of reconciliation spending cuts and reconciliation tax cuts in 1997. The two 
. houses had passed tax cut bills in the late 1990s only to see them vetoed, but never had an unpaid-
for tax cut become law by the facilitation of reconciliation. 
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2. 2001,' Reconciliation Outside Deficit Control 
As discussed, EGTRRA was going to be controversial. The following 
examination of the enactment process in 2001 shows how EGTRRA 
became law through the use of reconciliation, and the nature of the 
product that resulted. 
The tax legislating process of 2001 began with a general debate in 
January and February as President Bush's campaign proposal for a large 
tax cut developed into a budget and tax proposal that was expected, in a 
vague way, to be attempted through reconciliation. 121 At the early date 
of February 15, Senator Byrd reacted with a detailed, powerful address 
to the Senate disputing strongly the propriety of reconciliation. As 
Senator Byrd noted, in 1974 he personally "was deeply involved in the 
preparation of the Senate version"122 of the Budget Act, among his other 
uniquely strong credentials for expounding the Act's original and 
evolved intent.123 Senator Byrd declared that "there is no reason 
whatever to consider the President's tax cut proposal as a reconciliation 
bill," and "what I believe most Senators [feel] in their hearts ... [is that] 
forcing deficit reduction on committees ... should be the sole reason 
for using the highly restricted vehicle called reconciliation."124 
121 See Loll Says $ 1.6 Trillion Tax &li£jWill Pass Senale; Democrats Offer Alternative Plan, 2001 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 33-1, Feb. 16, 2001, at 2, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT me. 
122147 CONGo REc. S1532 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2001). 
123 This included his successful leading of the Senate to impose the rule against extraneous 
material in reconciliation bills which bears his name, the "Byrd Rule." His February 15 address 
recites the Byrd Rule's background. See 147 CONGo REc. S1532. His role as major reviser of what 
became the 1974 Act was exactly the way he described it in 2001, and had long been noted for just 
how extraordinary an episode it was in the history of congressional procedure. See CONGRESSIONAL 
PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 857-58 & nn.24-25. "The debate limits established in 1974 ... were the 
handiwork of Senator Robert Byrd, who has been the Senate's leading champion of minority rights 
under Rule 22 [the cloture rule] in recent decades." BINDER & SMITH, supra note 38, at 192. The 
details of Senator Byrd's action are discussed in SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY, supra note 85, at 67-
70. Reconciliation was entirely the product of the bill's revision in a special subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration chaired by Senator Byrd and operating under his 
personal direction. "Rules and Administration converted the first budget resolution to a target and 
added an optional reconciliation procedure to the second resolution. n [d. at 69 (emphasis added). It must 
also be recalled that of all the Senators of the period from the 1970s to the 2000s, Senator Byrd 
easily had the deepest and strongest interest in Senate procedure, so that more than any other 
Senator, he could rightly say that he personally knew the intent in the drafting of a provision which 
had thus been incorporated under his personal direction. In other contexts, such claims as to 
intent may be discounted. In Senate procedure, they are credible-just as, per the discussion below, 
Chairman Domenici' s argumen ts on the other side have added credibility from his own long history 
of relationship to the budget process. 
124147 CONGo REc. S1534 (daily ed. Feb. 15,2001). 
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Senator Byrd's disquisition was a grand treatment of the crucial 2001 
issue. He cited and quoted extensively from the primary record of 
congressional lawmaking and from respected secondary sources. This 
included his insider account of controversial presidential fiscally-
impacting lawmaking initiatives of the past, notably President Reagan's 
1981 (successful) tax cut and President Clinton's (unsuccessful) 1994 
health care bill, neither of which received reconciliation facilitation. 
Byrd rebutted the assertion that the 1996 Parliamentarian ruling and 
ensuing tax cut bills justified what was now, in 2001, being proposed.125 
In terms of Senate procedure, the next steps after Senator Byrd's shot 
across the bow of reconciliation involved the presentation of his 
procedural case, and bill proponents' presentation of their opposing 
case about reconciliation's availability, to the Senate Parliamentarian. 126 
Quietly, that is what ensued in the following month. 
Meanwhile, President Bush's more detailed proposal in late February 
not only failed to make consensus-seeking concessions about the bill's 
scale or allocations, but it also clarified one major issue in a way that 
increased the bill's controversial nature and ultimately bequeathed a 
large issue to future legislators. As the tax policy world knew, the 
burdensomely-complex individual Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) 127 
will increasingly hit an expanding class of millions of middle income 
taxpayers found predominantly in certain high-tax states with literally 
hundreds of billions of dollars of unanticipated, arguably unfair, and 
complexly-administered tax liability.128 President's Bush proposal as 
refined in February, and enacted in May, exacerbated the expanding 
125 The reasoning is expounded below. Senator Byrd's illumination of history was that in 1994 
"President Clinton also pressed me to allow his massive health care bill to be insulated by 
reconciliation's protections .. " I said to the President. .. 'I cannot in good conscience allow the 
rule to be abused.' [M] y view prevailed .... It is time for this abuse of the reconciliation process to 
cease." 147 CONGo REc. S1535 (daily ed. Feb. 15,2001). 
126 For a full description of how the Senate Parliamentarian advises the Senate Chair in its 
rulings on procedural issues, see CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 503-13. The Senate 
Parliamentarian's role in the 2001 reconciliation issue is discussed below. 
127 For an introduction to the AMT's complexities, see Daniel Shaviro, Tax Simplification and the 
AltemativeMinimum Tax, 91 TAX NOTES 1455 (2001). 
128 Some key AMT floors, unlike those of the regular income tax, are not indexed for inflation, 
so that taxpayers with nominally increasing but actually static middle incomes will increasingly come 
under the AMT in years to come. In addition, cutting the rates for the regular individual income 
tax, but not the cutting the AMT, intensifies the biased way the AMT hits middle income taxpayers 
in some states while not hitting higher income taxpayers in other states. All this was reported from 
the beginning by sophisticated observers. See Warren Rojas, Washington Scrutinizes Bush Tax Plan, 90 
TAX NOTES 1438 (2001). 
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scope and unfairness of the AMT's impending impact, which was 
something the bill's proponents ,downplayed.I29 
Following the President's budget proposal, the House enacted the 
mainI30 proposed legislation to cut top bracket rates, using a highly 
restrictive procedure, and following the irregular practice of passing the 
bill before a budget resolution. I31 On March 28, the House adopted a 
budget resolution, providing for $l.6 trillion in tax cuts over ten years, 
the sum President Bush had proposed.132 
In the Senate, the chair of the Senate Budget Committee, Senator 
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.), brought his party's version of the budget 
resolution directly to the Senate floor without giving the minority party 
the committee meeting it requested, as he saw no benefit in convening 
129 See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis-Like Gasoline on a Fire, House Bill Fuels AMT's 
Problems, 90 TAX NOTES 1443 (2001). As Treasury Secretary 0 'Neill testified when confron ted with 
the AMT problem, "'I'm leaving that to you,' O'Neill told lawmakers. 'I have not provided for [itl 
.... '" Warren Rojas, O'Neill Faces Off Against Democrats on Budget, Tax Cuts, 90 TAX NOTES 1279 
(2001). 
130 The House enacted other tax cut bills later with marriage benefits and pension changes, but 
proponents of the President's bill, having devoted so much of the projected surplus to the top 
bracket cuts, argued successfully that they must fend off attempts at progressivity in those aspects on 
grounds of necessary economy. For later enactment of other pieces, see Lori Nitschke, Alleviation of 
"Maniage Penalty" Hits Bipartisan High Note in House, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 709 (Mar. 31, 2001) 
(describing passage ofH.R. 6 on March 29). The various piecemeal measures could not possibly fit 
within the administration budget. See ill. (noting also that President Bush proposed a tax break for 
double-income couples, while the House bill, reflecting the attitude of "social conservatives," would 
distribute the tax break to single-income couples). For a discussion of how pension proposals of the 
kind enacted subsidize the well-off and undermine pension equitability, see Medill, supra note 19, at 
32-36. 
131 As this bill illustrated, regular House procedure, unlike regular Senate procedure, allows the 
majority party to impose tight floor procedural controls without (or in this instance, prior to) 
reconciliation instructions, which is why this article, in focusing upon reconciliation, focuses on the 
Senate. However, even for the House's procedure, it was striking that the bill let the minority party 
offer only a single amendment to the massive-scale bill, and that "[tlhe House passed the 
President's $1.6 trillion tax cut ... pretty much intact on March 8, long before there was even a 
budget resolution on which it was supposed to be based." Drew, supra note 19, at 52; 147 CONGo 
REc. H809 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2001) (adoption of Economic Growth and Tax Relief Actof2001, H.R. 
3, 107th Cong. (2001)-this was not a reconciliation bill, as reflected by a bill title without the word 
"reconciliation" in it); Heidi Glenn, Patti Mohr, & Warren Rojas, Ro.te Cut Bill Clears House as 
Bipartisanship Dissolves, 90 TAX NOTES 1431 (2001). 
132 House floor consideration of the budget resolution followed the customary highly structured 
and restricted procedure of votes on several full-length substitutes, all doomed to lose to the 
majority party's proposal. Seel47 CONGo REc. H1271 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (adoption ofH.R. 
Con. Res. 83, 107th Cong.); Daniel J. Parks, Bush's Budget Now Before the Senate, Where Moderates Wzeld 
the Critical Votes, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REP. 711 (Mar. 31, 2001). 
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his completely polarized committee.133 On the Senate floor, when the 
key substantive amendment was offered, four Republican moderates, 
including Senator Jim Jeffords (R-Vt.), provided the winning votes to 
reduce the size of the tax cut target by $448 billion, down to $1.187 
trillion, with half the difference for debt reduction, and half for 
increased education spending.134 Since Senate Democrats had proposed 
a tax cut target of $900 billion, that floor amendment "nearly splits the 
difference between what Bush wants and what Senate Democrats have 
proposed. "135 
Meanwhile, following the all-important quiet discussions about 
whether reconciliation was available for tax cut bills, it had become 
known that Senate Parliamentarian Robert Dove "had raised some 
questions as to whether or not a tax bill was eligible for 
reconciliation."136 More precisely, Senator Byrd's critique apparently 
convinced the Parliamentarian as a matter of parliamentary law. 137 This 
meant that the Senate Chair, who rules as the Parliamentarian advises, 
would not be able to declare reconciliation instructions in order for the 
tax cut. l38 The Senate Parliamentarian, who had considered more 
deeply the implications of his 1996 ruling now that these had become 
tangible, did not regard it as a precedent to follow in 2001. 139 
133 See Warren Rojas, A Fork in the Budget Road, 90 TAX NOTES 1741 (Mar. 26, 2001). 
134 147 CONGo REc. D313 (Apr. 4, 2001) (relating the amendment making a reduction "in the 
share of tax relief given to the wealthiest one percent of Americans"); Heidi Glenn, Patti Mohr, & 
Warren Rojas, The Real Game Begins: Senate Clears $ 1.187 TriUion Tax Cut, 91 TAX NOTES 183 (2001). 
135 Daniel J. Parks, It's The Day of the Centrist As Bush Tax Cut Takes a Hit, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REP. 
768,769 (Apr. 7, 2001). 
. 136 Warren Rojas, Bush Budget Rolls Through House; Senate Budget Bar Keeps Rising. 91 TAX NOTES 
15, 19 (2001). 
137 
"It appears [the Parliamentarian] reflected very carefully on what Sen. 
Byrd has said and came to a conclusion; [Senator] Nickles' chief of staff, Eric 
Ueland, said of Dove. "The legislative history as interpreted by Bob [Dove] is 
that you can only give reconciliation protection to a bill or bills that increase 
taxes, decrease mandatory spending or make changes in the public debt." 
Andrew Taylor, Law Designed for Curbing Deficits Becomes GOP Tool for Cutting Taxes, 59 CONGo Q. 
WKLY. REP. 770, 771 (Apr. 7, 2001). 
138 The Senate Parliamentarian "indicated" that if a point of order had been made against 
Senator Domenici 's proposal for reconciliation instructions for multiple tax cut bills, he would have 
"declined to rule and asked the Senate to decide.' Id. 
139 This drove Chairman Domenici to contemplate such eccentricities as moving the House 
budget resolution through the Senate instead ofa Senate resolution. 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY6~I, 
Apr. 2, 2001, at3, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file; 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 64-1 (Apr. 3, 2001) at 2, 
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file ("A Republican Senate Budget Committee aide said Dove had 
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Not wanting the Senate Chair to rule as the Parliamentarian would 
advise, Chairman Domenici essentially walked away from the 1996 
precedent and the late 1990s tax cut bills by leaving reconciliation 
instructions out of the budget resolution he placed before the Senate 
initially. With both parties' tacit cooperation, he steered a course that 
avoided an ugly open display of sheer partisan muscle overcoming 
procedural regularity. He offered such instructions as an 
amendment,14O thereby incorporating tax cut reconciliation instructions 
by a route that did not cause the Senate Chair expressly to disconfirm 
the applicability of precedent. Senator Byrd reiterated his opposition to 
reconciliation tax cuts in a debate with Chairman Domenici, but neither 
he nor anyone else made a point of order. 141 The reconciliation 
instructions were incorporated on a 51-49 vote virtually on party lines, 
with Senator Jeffords (R-Vt.) feeling obliged with some misgivings to give 
his procedural vote to his party, even though a bill decidedly not shaped 
to his liking could now pass in the Senate with just a bare majority.142 
indicated that he might oppose extending reconciliation protections for the $ 1.6 trillion tax cut to a 
Senate bill but that his authority did not cover the House's rules governing reconciliation."). The 
Senate does not question the procedural validity of provisiolls placed by the House in one of its 
vehicles. Hence, the allusion is to the kind of step taken in extremis as a shield from expected 
undesired rulings about a Senate (rather than House) measure by the Senate Chair. 
140 Taylor, supra note 137, at 771. "Fearing that Senate Parliamentarian Bob Dove would rule 
against it, Domenici said his budget does not include reconciliation instructions for the president's 
tax bill, although he expects to introduce an amendment addressing reconciliation during the 
budget debate." Senate Kicks OJ! Budget Debate, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 64-1, Apr. 3, 2001, LEXIS, 
Fedtax Library, TNT file. "Domenici was forced to pursue this auxiliary course on reconciliation 
after the Senate parliamentarian took notice of a Democratic challenge to the use of limited 
protections for Bush's $1.6 trillion tax cut and threatened to rule against Republicans. n 2001 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 67-1, Apr. 6, 2001, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file. 
141 As the press noted after interviewing the principals, "[bly declining to force a futile party-
line vote, Byrd spared his party from squarely establishing a precedent about reconciliation in favor 
of Republican tax cutters. n Taylor, supra note 137, at 771. The highlight of the debate on the 
Domenici amendment for reconciliation instructions consisted of the speeches by Chairman 
Domenici, 147 CONGo REc. S3499-3501 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2001), and by Senator Byrd, id. S2502-04. 
The Senate adopted the budget resolution the next day. 147 CONGo REC. S3696 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 
2001) (adopting H.R. Con. Res. 83, 107th Cong. as amended). 
142 Senator Jeffords had criticized the tax cut's size, wanting instead a fund for special 
education, which the White House rejected. See Senate Kicks OJ! Budget Debate, 2001 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 64-1, Apr. 3, 2001, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file, at 5. That may have been the decisive 
moment in the Senate's changing hands at the close of passage of the tax bill. On the Domenici 
amendmen t, fifty Republicans and Senator ZeU Miller (D-Ga.) voted for it, and forty-nine Democrats 
voted against it, avoiding the need for the Vice President to break a tie. 147 CONGo REC. S3516 
(daily ed. Apr. 5, 2001); For the Record: Senate Vote 75, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 799 (Apr. 7, 2001). 
Proponents did drop much-<:riticized plans to move other tax provisions, such as tax breaks for small 
businesses, in a second reconciliation bill, which apparently would have exceeded the Senate's 
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The conference on the budget resolution specified the final tax cut total 
of $l.35 trillion, which the two chambers adopted.143 
In an extraordinary action, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-
Miss.) discharged the Senate Parliamentarian, apparently due primarily 
to his refusal to support reconciliation for the tax cut bill, although 
other lesser budget procedures were mentioned as well.144 The 
Parliamentarian had previously not been considered subject to partisan 
dismissal by din t of his office, his distinguished career spanning decades, 
and his long record of demonstrating ample previous sensitivity to 
Republican concerns.145 Ironically, Majority Leader Lott was "not likely 
to have better luck with [his successor as Parliamentarian, Alan] Frumin, 
who associates say is more skeptical of reconciliation-related shortcuts 
than was Dove."146 Although the floor action on the budget resolution 
and the discharge of the Parliamentarian were public acts, few outside 
the Senate really understood them, for Senate budget procedure can be, 
frankly, arcane. However, within the Senate, what had happened was 
understood. Notwithstanding the shared view of the former 
Parliamentarian and Senator Byrd, that the reconciliation precedents 
should not be followed for EGTRRA, the bill would now receive 
reconciliation treatment and could move by only fifty-one votes, not 
sixty. What remained was to see what legislative product would result 
from this. 
Having received its marching orders from the budget resolution to 
produce a tax cut of $l.35 trillion over ten years, the Senate Finance 
Committee soon reported its tax cut bill with the support of the ranking 
minority member, Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.},147 and faced acute 
tolerance for the use of reconciliation. See Daniel]. Parks, It s The Day of the Centrist As Bush Tax Cut 
Takes a Hi~ 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 768, 769, 772 (Apr. 7, 2001) 
143" [A] small but influential group of Senate Democrats led by Louisiana'sJohn B. Breaux ... 
got almost exactly what it wanted on a tax cut figure ... [a] $1.25 trillion figure for tax cuts in 2002-
2011 and ... [$100 billion] that the group proposed for economic stimulus." Daniel]. Parks, Budget 
Deals Ungainly Pause Is Inches From the Finish Line, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 999, 1000 (May 5, 2001). 
144 See Charles Tiefer, Out of Order: The Abrupt Dismissal of the Parliamentarian Threatens to mp Apart 
the Fragile Fabric of Senate Procedure, supra note 11 (discussing the discharge). 
145 See id. 
146 Andrew Taylor, Senate's Agenda to Rest on Rulings of Referee Schooled by Democrats: Lou s Firing of 
GOP Parliamentarian Spotlights the Critical Role of Filibuster-Skirting Procedures, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 
1063,1064 (May 12, 2001). 
147 Senate Finance Chairman Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) devised the bill ratified afterwards in a 
committee markup in negotiations with Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.), who did not, despite his 
ranking position, have his party's backing. Lori Nitschke & Bill Swindell, Grassley-Baucus Tax 
2001] How to Steal a Trillion 441 
pressure for change on the floor from almost the entire minority plus 
several moderate majority party members. President Bush's supporters 
used fully the procedural clout of reconciliation at this poinL148 This 
allowed them to maximize the benefits going to the very highest 
brackets, and avoid seeking consensus with Senate moderates, as they 
must for non-reconciliation controversial bills. Among other key 
amendmen t votes, 149 Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) moved for the top 
39.6 percent bracket's relief to be reduced by 1 percentage point and to 
use the proceeds for more middle-income taxpayers to receive the 
reduced 15 percent rate. Four Republican moderate defectorsjoined 
him, and dramatically, his amendment failed on successive days by the 
tie votes of 49-49 and 50-50.150 That is, the bill's backers were, and could 
be, perfectly content with a bare 50 supporters in key amendment test 
votes excluding even so prominent a Senator of the President's own 
party. Reconciliation reduced the role of such Senate moderates, and 
the bill passed the Senate and went to conference on March 23.151 
Blueprint Headsfor lWugh-and-Tumble Markup, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 1069, 1070 (May 12, 2001) (at 
a Democratic Caucus in the Senate, "a handful of key senators including Daschle repeatedly shot 
down Baucus' pleas"); Lori Nitschke, Scaled-Down Version of Bush Tax Plan Taking Bipartisan Form at 
Senate Finance, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 1003 (May 5,2001). 
148 The Presidents' supporters' dependence upon the procedures of reconciliation showed 
when they faced what they termed, and some observers characterized as, "what amounted to a 
Democratic filibuster." Heidi Glenn, Conferees Race to Complete Tax Bill, 91 TAX NOTES 1475 (2001). 
Reconciliation limits debate time and limits the amendments in order to germane ones, but does 
not limit the number of germane amendments, and does not limit the total amount of time spent 
on roll calls, at fifteen minutes apiece, for those amendments. "[AJfter five hours of voting on 
stacked amendments" on May 21, when backers thought the work on the bill done, "Democrats 
returned the next day offering amendment after amendment with no end in sight .... Lott called it 
'filibuster by amendment,'" [d. at 1475-77. Absent reconciliation, there could clearly have been a 
genuine filibuster which only the stricter rules against dilatory tactics after 60 votes for cloture would 
have ended. 
149 In one key test vote, Senator Jean Carnahan (D-Mo.) offered an amendment to shift some 
tax reduction to middle-income taxpayers, losing by only 48-50. 147 CONGo REC. S5218-20, S5249 
(daily ed. May 21,2001). 
150 147 CONGo REc. S5224-25, S5256 (dailyed. May 21,2001), id. at S5419-20 (daily ed. May 22, 
2001); Lori Nitschke, Tax Cut Deal Reached Quickly as Appetite for Battle Fades, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 
1251, 1255 (May 26,2001). 
151 147 CONGo REc. S5522 (dailyed. May 23,2001). As for Senate moderate influence, see 1995-
1996 Budget Battles, supra note 9 at 437; id. at n.98. The handful of Senate Democrats, notably 
Senators Baucus and John Breaux (D-La.), who supported the tax cut bill did so in return for $100 
billion in benefits starting at the lowest income levels that became advance refund checks mailed 
out in 200l. A bloc of moderate majority party members, Senator Olympia Snowe (R-Me.) 
prominent among them, sought successfully to make the child tax credit refundable, so that families 
with children who filed income tax returns could fully receive it. For the moderates' key pre-
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3. The Misguided Product of the Reconciliation Conference 
Reconciliation not only freed bill supporters to sail ahead by a bare 
Senate floor majority and hence to yield during Senate passage on few 
points toward consensus, but it also let them take back some of those few 
points by dint of a startling conference product. As to "how to steal a 
trillion," May 23-26 was an all-important period: the conference and 
enactment of its product. Scholars have noted and criticized the 
dangerous way reconciliation truncates the Senate debate on potentially 
momentous conference reports,152 anticipation of which unleashes the 
conference to an extraordinary extent. Mter the Senate finished floor 
consideration, it could appoint a stacked conference committee to push 
the bill in extraordinary directions, because even a 50-50 Senate with 
equal party memberships on standing committees could, and did, stack 
a reconciliation conference committee. 153 
The stacked conference committee operated in a procedurally 
abnormal way154 at incredible speed, finishing in two days and placing its 
conference letter, see Senate Passes $1.35 TriUionReconciliation Tax Bill, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAV 101-1, 
May 24, 2001, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file. 
152 
Of all the restrictions on debate over parts of the budgetary process, the ten-
hour debate limit for conference reports on reconciliation strikes us as unduly 
restrictive of the rights of the minority. Given the likelihood that a 
reconciliation bill can differ significantly when it emerges from a House-
Senate conference and that it can include legislation (as well as budgetary) 
decisions, limiting debate to ten hours fails to give the minority a reasonable 
amount of time in which to raise flags about the majority-adopted decisions of 
the conference report. 
BINDER & SMITH, supra note 38, at 213-14. 
153 Although the power-sharing 50-50 Senate had equal representation on standing committees, 
"[l]ooking ahead to conference, [Majority Leader] Lou said Republicans would enjoy a one-seat 
majority in the House-Senate budget conference. [Minority Leader] Daschle said that because of 
budget rules favoring the majority, the conference split would be four Republicans to three 
Democrats." Senate OKs $1.2 TriUion Tax Cut, Sets Up Budget Standoff, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAV68-1, 
Apr. 9, 2001, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file. That is, ordinarily, the fifty Senators in the minority 
could enforce their rights to equal representation on all committees by filibustering the floor 
motions relating to bills, and this would be true of the motions for going to and from conference. 
However, reconciliation treatment meant such motions as to a reconciliation conference did not 
face this threat. 
154 That conference did not hold formal meetings, only informal ones made up of a few 
Members. The ranking minority member of House Ways and Means, Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) 
complained that he was left out of those meetings. See Heidi Glenn, Both Praised and Criticized, Tax 
BiUAwaits Bush 's Signature, 91 TAX NOTES 1643, 1646 (June 4, 2001). As with the foregoing of other 
steps during the 2001 budget process, it was evident that reconciliation's potency meant the bill's 
fate in no way depended upon such deliberation-promoting steps as letting all members participate 
in the meetings. 
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conference report before the House for adoption on May 25. The 
report was before the Senate, under the juggernaut of reconciliation 
procedures limiting debate to ten hours, the next day.155 The stacked 
conference and post-conference of May 23-26 must have set records for 
the speed of distribution of each billion dollar sum to top bracket 
individuals, the enormous amount of money so distributed, and the 
exclusiveness of the small number of Members making these decisions. 
The entire process occurred in violation of the Budget Act's intent that 
reconciliation only be used for deficit control bills. 
Reconciliation allowed the conference committee to resolve the bill's 
substantive issues in a one-way direction. Tension arose because, on one 
hand, President Bush had not relented on what he had hoped to do 
with $l.6 trillion in cuts. On the other hand, to garner even a bare 
majority of the Senate to vote for the budget resolution required that 
the tax cut be capped at $l.3 trillion. Moreover, to get that bare 
majority to defeat amendments had required concessions that would 
benefit taxpayers below the top bracket. After all, the previous year, 
when tax cutters actually had more Senate voting strength, the Senate 
had passed a version much more moderate than what the President now 
sought. 156 The conference committee resolved this tension wholly 
toward benefits for top-bracket taxpayers, by a series of steps 
substantively in a class by themselves, and made procedurally possible 
only by reconciliation. 
First, the conference simply helped itself to ten percent greater tax 
cuts than the budget resolution or the Senate bill had approved, by an 
obscure scheme. Ail the figures in the budget resolution and the 
corresponding Senate tax bill had involved ten years through 2011, since 
the budget process and reconciliation use a ten-year window.157 
However, the conference committee took ten years' cuts in nine years. 
It "wrote in sunset language that would repeal the entire bill in 2010, 
allowing a somewhat deeper rate cut than the Senate bill while still 
155 For passage of the conference report, see 147 CongRec. H2844 (dailyed. May 25,2001); id. 
at S5796 (daily ed. May 26,2001). 
156 See Lori Nitschke, Reconciliation Bill: Last Chance for a GOP Tax Victory?, 58 CONGo Q. WKLY. 
REp. 2073 (Sept. 9, 2000). 
157 For the Byrd Rule's requirement of60 votes to alter revenue beyond a 10-year period, see 2 
U .S.C. §644 (2002) (" [AJ provision shall be considered to be extraneous if ... it decreases, or would 
decrease, revenues during a fiscal year after the fiscal years covered by such reconciliation bill."). See 
also Patti Mohr, The Tax Bill~unset Provision Leaves Tax Bill on Insecure Footing After 2010,91 TAX 
NOTES 1648 Qune 4, 2001). 
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staying under the overall ceiling .... "158 In other words, the tax cut 
nominally met its ten-year ceiling of$1.3 trillion, but took an extra $130 
billion or so over the first nine years and then seemingly let rates zoom 
all the way back to pre-legislation levels for that tenth year. This is like a 
dieter who contends he is obeying a rigorous schedule when having 
dessert at every meal for nine days by postulating that the tenth day will 
be calorie-free. Given that the budget resolution and the Senate bill had 
in no way contemplated the fiction that the year 2011 would be a time 
zone warp of pre-EGTRRA rates, even jaded and cynical observers 
expressed amazement about this "outright fraud[]."159 Unlike some 
budget maneuvers, the cliff-like sunset provision involved not merely a 
debatable justification of what the House and Senate agreed upon, but 
an additional loss of a real $130 billion by the Treasury on a scale 
beyond what even a bare majority of Congress had agreed. 
Second, the conference phased out the bill's limited relief for the 
ultra-complex AMT the year after the 2004 election. 160 Because the 
AMT will soon sweep in middle class taxpayers on a grand scale, it will 
lead to a skewed geopolitical distribution of tax cut benefits. This 
imbalance may be beyond repair without resort to another 2001-style 
facilitation of enormous Treasury-loss tax cutting. 161 Since more than 
half of what the AMT renders newly taxable consists of deductible state 
and local taxes, the AMT disproportionately applies in the high tax 
158 Lori Nitschke, Tax Cut Deal Reached Quickly As Appetite for Battle Fades, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REP. 
1251,1252 (May 26,2001). The sunset provision is § 901 ofEGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 
150 (2001) (codified in several locations, including 26 U.S.C. § 1053 note (2001». 
159 A long-time Washington commentator who is a self-declared sympathizer for deep tax 
cutting commented: 
A whole series of outright frauds have been employed to massage the 
figures. . .. (When I first read that the arithmetic had been done this way, I 
assumed I had missed something. Whatever the conference had done, it 
could not have done that) . ... Presto: The cost of 10 or fewer years' worth of 
tax cuts is spread over 11 years, at a savings (entirely imaginary) of hundreds 
of billions of dollars. The imaginary savings is then spent on extra cuts. 
Amazing. 
Clive Crook, How to Take a Flawed Tax BiU and Tum It Into afoke, 33 NAT'LJ. 1707, 1708 Uune 9, 
2001) (emphasis added). 
160 The exemption was increased for taxable years beginning in 2001-2004. Section 701 of 
EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38,148 (2001) (codified at 26 U.S.c. § 55). For discussions 
of the AMT, see supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. 
161 SeeWarrenRojas, Long-TcrmAMTReformLooksHighly Unlikely, 91 TAX NOTES 1823 Uune 11, 
2001) (explaining that it will be difficult to pass any change in the AMT ). See also Lee A. Sheppard, 
News Analysis-No Tax Cuts for the Gore States, 91 TAX NOTES 1480, 1482-85 (May 28, 2001) (describing 
the disparate geographical im pact of the AMT) . 
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states like California, New York, and other states that voted against 
Governor Bush in the 2000 presidential election. A tax commentator 
calculated how the conference's phase-out of AMT relief would nullify 
tax cuts in certain states, under the acerbic but astute title, "No Tax Cuts 
for the Gore States."162 The Senate, with its sensitivity to the states' 
balance, would normally resist such skewing through the conference 
mechanism 163_for example, by Senators from California and New York 
and other high-tax states exercising their post-conference rights to 
debate the final version at length-but reconciliation procedures 
precluded this. 
Third, the conference committee resolved the tension between 
President Bush's desires regarding the allocation of tax cuts and what 
the Senate had voted by phasing in some cuts late and by phasing out 
some early. Fair adherence to what the Senate had voted on in 2001 
would have balanced the effects of phasing in and phasing out between 
the top brackets and the other brackets. Instead, a commentator readily 
concluded that "[a] timeline of the 10-yearwindow suggests the new law 
retains tax cuts for those at the upper end of the income spectrum while 
phasing in or phasing out the other tax cuts targeted to those generally 
in the lower brackets."164 To paraphrase an old saying, as the result of 
conference, the rich got richer, and the rest got phased in or out. The 
conference phased in early estate and gift tax relief ($138 billion) 
targeted to the very richest165 and $420 billion in income tax rate 
reductions solely (not primarily, but solely) to the top brackets.166 
162 Sheppard, supra note 161, at 1480. 
163 The bill as reported by the Senate Finance Committee had phased out the A.1\1T relief on 
December 31,2006. Tax Cut Mark Takes Hits from Both Sides, Clears Finance, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 
95-1, May 16,2001, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file. Thus, the conference had phased outAMT 
relief (for middle-class taxpayers in high tax states) a year earlier than the Senate, to pay for even 
more benefits for top-bracket taxpayers. 
164 Heidi Glenn, Both Praised and Criticized, Tax Bill Awaits Bush's Signature, 91 TAX NOTES 1643, 
1646 (June 4, 2001). 
165 Starting in 2002, reductions in the top tax rate on gifts and estates would begin phasing in, 
going to the wealthiest, besides other provisions for increasing exemptions to $1.5 million and 
higher, some of which helps only the estates of multi-millionaires. See Victoria Allred, Tax Package's 
Timetable, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 1306, 1307 (June 2, 2001) (year-by-year changes); Heidi Glenn, 
Both Praised and Criticized, Tax Bill Awaits Bush's Signature, 91 TAX NOTES 1643, 1646 (June 4, 2001) 
(year-by-yearchanges). These provisions are §§ 511, 521 ofEGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, U5 Stat. 
70-72 (2001) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §2001, 2010). 
166 The marginal tax rate cuts-the 39.6 percent bracket to 35 percent, the 36 percent bracket 
to 33 percent, the 31 percent bracket to 28 percent, and the 28 percent bracket to 25 percent-
phase in by 2006. Glenn, supra note 164, at 1646. 
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Meanwhile, it cut back concessions to middle-income taxpayers. For 
example, the higher education deduction phases out in 2005 for a total 
cost under $10 billion. 167 It phased in slowly the married taxpayer 
benefits, diluting further that relatively meager relief, which had been 
drawn in any event the way conservatives sought,168 rather than reducing 
the marriage penalty for middle- and low-income two-~arner families. 169 
A sudden development distracted public attention, so that just as few 
observers had followed the triumph of reconciliation and the 
Parliamentarian's discharge, few paid full attention to what happened in 
conference. On May 23 and 24, as reconciliation sped the tax bill off 
the Senate floor and through conference, Senator Jeffords announced 
that he would leave the Republican Party, causing it to lose Senate 
majority control. Of course, many factors went into Jeffords's party 
change, but it is no exaggeration to pay specific attention to the tensions 
of the massive tax cut reconciliation launched in early April as the 
Senator began contemplating his movepo As he explained public1y,l7l 
167 Section 431 ofEGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 66-67 (2001) (codified at 26 U.S.c. 
§222). 
168 "Because it is being phased in so slowly, the alleviation of the 'marriage penalty"'-which 
helps more middle-income taxpayers-"will cost just $63.3 billion in the next decade, 5 percent of 
the total." Daniel]. Parks with Bill Swindell, Tax Debate Assured a Long Life As Bush, GOP Press for New 
Cuts, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REP. 1304, 1309 (June 2, 2001). The bill provided some relief to married 
couples with a single very high earner not experiencing an actual tax rate penalty by getting 
married, and correspondingly provided even less to couples with two moderate-earners who were 
experiencing such an actual penalty. The provisions are §§ 301-02 ofEGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 
115 Stat. 53-54 (2001) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 63). 
169 For background on the distributional effect of these marriage benefits as compared with 
alternatives that would have helped low- and middle-income two-eamer families more, see RobertS. 
McIntyre & Michael]. McIntyre, Fixing the "Marriage Penalty " Problem, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 907 (1999); 
Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REv. 
1,55-58 (2000); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339 (1994). 
170 "It was during the tax debate that Daschle and Minority Whip Harry Reid, D-Nev., opened 
conversations withJeffords." Mike Christensen, Anguished Transformation.from Maverick to Outcas~ 59 
CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 1242, 1246 (May 26, 2001). 
17l Senator Jeffords explained his party change in the form of a televised address in Vermont, 
amplified by a brief press conference. In the short address, he devoted this paragraph to the 
tension between agenda loyalty and the substantive budget: 
[Ilt is only natural to expect that people like myself, who have been honored 
with positions of leadership, will largely support the president's agenda .... 
Those who don't know me may have thought I took pleasure in resisting the 
president's budget or that I enjoyed the limelight. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. I had serious substantive reservations about that budget, as 
you all know, and the decisions it set in place for the future. 
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the tension on the budget between his substantive views and his party 
loyalty172 caused him to change parties. Tax cut reconciliation 
procedure thus had the dramatic side effect of contributing to the 
Republicans' loss of Senate control. 
B. After the 2001 Tax Cut: Reforming Budget Act Reconciliation 
This section begins with the reasons why it is still timely to reform 
Budget Act reconciliation. It then turns to the debate over the uses of 
reconciliation and how to make reforms. 
1. The Coming Pressure for Further Tax Cuts by Reconciliation 
At first glance, budget reforms after the events of 2001 might seem 
like taping up the barn door after not only the farm animals, but also 
everything else that might be there, present and future, have been 
taken. The tax cuts pushed through by reconciliation were scored as 
$1.3 trillion, and, as noted above, will in reality have a much larger effect 
on the Treasury.173 With realistic economic projections, and an 
economic downturn combined with the response to the terrorist attack, 
previous imaginings of persistent surpluses must now be deemed 
Senator Jeffords Addresses Press: Will Leave Republican Party, become Independen~ athttp://www.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/0105/24/bn.01.html (May 24, 2001) (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). His brief press 
conference afterwards devoted these comments to the tax cut: 
[T]hat is why in the budget process, I stood up and said, no, we can't give all 
this money back. We have too many high priorities--education, number one 
.... But I could not, after that, see the direction of the budgetary process-
and you know I stood up against that, and we succeeded in getting some $300 
billion extra to spend. But it's not being directed under the budget process to 
education. 
Id. at 5. As Elizabeth Drew commented, what happened with the tax cut in the budget resolution 
"angered Ueffords's] more intemperate Republican colleagues and was one of the episodes that led 
to his resignation from the Republican Party." Drew, supra note 19, at 52. 
172 On the budget resolution and the tax bill, Senator Jeffordsjoined repeatedly, on substantive 
amendment votes such as the McCain and Carnahan amendments, with the minority. Yet, so long 
as he stayed in his party, he considered himself obliged out of party loyalty to vote with it on 
procedural questions-above all, in this period, as to using reconciliation. "On party-line votes this 
year,Jeffords has sided with a majority of voting Republicans .... Many of those votes came on the 
tax cut package (H.R. 1836) and the fiscal year 2002 budget resolution (H.R. Con. Res. 83)-despite 
his disagreements with portions of both measures." Jeffords' Switch Unlikely to Mean A Change in Voting 
Habits, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 1244 (May 26,2001). 
173 Senator Kent Conrad (D-N.D.), the new Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, stated 
in the debate on the tax cut conference report the "estimate that this bill, when combined with the 
real budget reflecting what will actually be spent over the next 10 years, will be raiding the Medicare 
trust fund by $311 billion and raiding the Social Security trust fund by $234 billion." 147 CONGo 
REc. S5790 (daily ed. May 26,2001). 
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implausible. Discussing the reform of the reconciliation procedure for 
tax cuts may seem so late as not to be worth bothering about, 
particularly as it might be years before Senate reforms could actually 
occur. 
If undertaken, however, such reform could be significant in 
upcoming years. EGTRRA's striking schedule of phase-outs, omissions, 
and sunsets will create powerful drives in the 2000s to renew tax cut 
reconciliation, so much so that even cool neutral observers anticipate 
such cuts. 174 EGTRRA's limited AMT relief phases out at the end of 
2005. That in itself will boost the AMT-paying taxpayer population from 
5.3 million to 13 million, with a projected increase by the decade's end 
to nearly thirty-six million largely middle-class families. 175 This large and 
influential bloc will likely demand relief from a new tax burden that is 
not only unwelcome, biased in some weird ways, and geographically 
skewed, but also contains a level of complexity never intended for the 
middle class.176 The 2001 tax cut accomplished almost no tax 
simplification agenda. Moreover, when the 2001 tax cut also built in a 
cliff-like sunset provision for the entire bill after nine years, it created a 
veritable magnet for more tax cut reconciliation proposals. Tax cut 
proponents predicted annual efforts "to pass a new 10-year budget 
reconciliation resolution that would clear the way for an extension of 
the tax bill beyond 2010."177 Those who want tax cuts-from Democrats 
representing high-tax states facing a large AMT load to Republicans 
from conservative states vowing to renew expiring tax cuts-will want to 
push reconciliation to its procedural limit so that they can accomplish 
174 In their annual report on the U.s. economy, the IMF's directors said the actual cost [of 
EGTRRA) was likely to be larger than the headline figure. The higher figure was likely because 
Congress would probably be forced to extend some tax reductions that are formally due to expire 
within the next 10 years and spending would also probably exceed the limits. Gerard Baker, IMP 
Calls for Rethink over Bush Tax Cut, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 15,2001, at 1. 
175 Daniel J. Parks with Bill Swindell, Tax Debate Assured a Long Life As Bush, GOP Press for New 
Cuts, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 1304, 1305 Oune 2, 2001) 
176 For discussions of the AMT's complexity, see supra notes 127-29. As an example of the 
AMT's peculiar bias, it particularly affects families with many children because of what it does 
regarding personal exemptions. It will not make much sense that California or New York middle 
income families with the financial burdens of raising many children should receive no tax relief 
while high income Texas individuals or couples with no children receive a great deal, but that is the 
projected effect in a few years because of how the AMT treats families depending on their state 
income taxes and the number of their personal exemptions. 
177 Patti Mohr, The Tax Bill-Sunset Provision Leaves Tax Bill on Insecure Footing After 2010,91 TAX 
NOTES 1648 Oune 4,2001) (citing the manager for legislative affairs at the National Federation of 
Independent Business). 
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their objectives with a bare majority, as in 2001, rather than needing 
Senate consensus or 60 votes. 178 Reforming reconciliation, late, even 
very late, could prove historically to be much better than never. 
2. Why and How to Reform 
Reconciliation should occur only for deficit control (including, in 
times of surplus, debt reduction). This section starts with the arguments 
on both sides as to existing law, that is, the arguments about whether 
reconciliation was abused in 2001. It then develops further arguments 
about what Congress should do henceforth by way of reform. 
First, as to the existing law leading up to 2001, Congress neither 
intended the 1974 Budget Act to have,179 nor did it find a persuasive 
reason in 1981 180 or at any other time in the quarter-cen tury thereafter 
validly to institute, reconciliation for any reason other than deficit 
178 Reform is needed as much as it was after 1981, when, in reaction to the reconciliation 
excesses on the spending bill, Senator Byrd persuaded the Senate to adopt the Byrd Rule, 
forbidding the use of reconciliation as a vehicle for extraneous provisions. The Senate has retained 
it despite how much harder it has made it for both parties to get their cherished projects passed. See 
supra note 157. Notably, the Senate retained the Byrd Rule even though it painfully constrained 
Democrats in 1993 from various projects, including attempting to pass health care reform as a 
reconciliation bill. It constrained Republicans in an equally painful way from getting through 
projects in the mid-1990s and from tax cuts in 2001 beyond ten years' duration. For a description of 
the use of the Byrd Rule through 1996, see 1995-1996 Budget Battk, supra note 9, at 437-38. Similarly, 
in the BEA of 1990, President Bush made a bipartisan deal for PAyeO procedural reforms 
constraining new spending and tax cuts, responding with courage to the decade of exploding debt 
by putting the budget on a route out of deep deficits. SeeWILDAVSKY & CAlDEN, supra note 9, at 150. 
The nation should indeed account itself fortunate that leaders of quite divergent substantive views 
propounded, and stood by, those previous rounds of reconciliation procedure reforms. 
179 Congress decided in 1974 only that end-{}f-year deficit reduction by way of spending cuts or 
tax increases deserved that authorization. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. An 
argument on the other side raised in the debate preceding the 1996 precedent, was an asserted 1975 
precedent, when Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, adverted to 
reconciliation for a tax cutting bill. See 142 CONGo REC. S5416 (daily ed. May 21, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Domenici). Several Senators who had actually been present in 1975, or in 1980 when the first 
real use of reconciliation occurred, knocked down the purported precedent. It did not involve 
actual reconciliation instructions or a bill actually entitled and dealt with as a reconciliation bill, but 
only a unanimous-(;onsent verbalization by Chairman Long, whose verbalizations relating to the 
budget process could often be unserious. [d. at S5419 (statement of Sen. Hollings); id. at S5420 
(statement of Sen. Exon). Neither Allen Schick's book-length overall treatmentoflate 1970s budget 
process, SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY, supra note 85, nor the shorter but procedurally-focused 
treatment in CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, mention even the thinnest corroboration 
for the 1975 bill to be a reconciliation precedent. It is a myth. 
180 While the extraordinary evolution of reconciliation in 1981 confirms reconciliation's great 
flexibility for deficit control, the Senate majority's decision in 1981 to use reconciliation only for the 
spending cut bill and not for the tax cut bill strongly confirmed the boundary between proper and 
improper use of reconciliation. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. 
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control or debt reduction. Reconciliation constitutes a powerful 
incursion into regular Senate procedure, such that the Senate would not 
countenance it without an express consensus-based decision. For the 
quarter-century after 1974, Congress never enacted into law a 
reconciliation package other than one fitting the deficit control 
rubric. 181 
The precedent upon which Senate Republicans relied for their 
interpretation of the Budget Act, a 1996 ruling by the Chair in favor of 
broad use of reconciliation that was upheld by a party-line vote,182 did 
not warrant following in 2001. Senator Byrd's analysis on this point has 
merit. The 1996 ruling, on which later actions were built,183 occurred 
long after the practices of the 1974 Act had already been established, 
and it was distinguishable on its facts. 184 Moreover, it had indicia of a 
precedent that should not be followed, such as firm and unyielding 
rejection along party lines, lack of contemporary visibility or a 
parliamentary pedigree, 185 and, above all, inconsistency with the fabric 
of Senate procedure. 186 
181 AI; described above, Congress had enacted reconciliation deficit reduction followed by tax 
cuts in 1981. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. It had also enacted, in 1997, packages of 
reconciliation spending cuts and reconciliation tax cuts. Seesupranote 114. Congress, however, had 
never enacted only tax cuts without any deficit reduction. 
182 The ruling is discussed in BINDER & SMITH, supra note 38, at 193. 
183 The Senate passed reconciliation tax cut bills in 1999 and 2000 that were not part of deficit 
or debt control. These bills were not enacted because of vetoes by President Clinton, and they did 
not even receive distinct rulings or discussion about reconciliation, being viewed by both sides as 
coming in the wake of the 1996 ruling. Senator Byrd acknowledged their existence but dismissed 
their procedural propriety. 147 CONGo REC. S1534. 
184 Although broad statements were made on the Senate floor, in fact the 1996 tax cut 
reconciliation instruction was coupled with spending cuts in an overall deficit reduction package-
unlike 2001. The 1996 tax cut bill is discussed in 1996 CONGo Q. ALMANAC 2-21. It was part of a 
repeated but fruitless effort in 1995-96 by the newly elected Republican congressional majority to 
enact a large-scale upper-bracket tax cut. 
185 Proponents of tax cut reconciliation also pointed to 1999, when a tax cut bill passed the 
Senate pursuant to reconciliation instructions, before being vetoed by President Clinton. See supra 
note 118 and accompanying text. However, the 1999 incident did not involve a ruling of the Chair 
and amounted simply to an extension of the 1996 ruling. 
186 The 1996 incident contrasts in this regard with the switch in 1980-81 to the use of 
reconciliation on the first budget resolution. When President Reagan's spending cut program went 
through Congress in 1981 on the basis of reconciliation, it was an enonnous, even revolutionary, 
procedural innovation. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. There were aspects of it that were 
recognized as procedural abuses, and were overruled over time, such as by the Byrd Rule. However, 
the core step of using reconciliation on the first resolution to push very large legislative packages 
through Congress of spending action (in 1981) and, later, either tax increases or 
contemporaneously paid-for tax cuts, did survive and establish itselffinnlyas a precedent. Thatcore 
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In 2001, Senate Parliamentarian Dove stood righdy against following 
it.187 The combination of the majority's avoidance on April 5, 2001, of 
actually invoking the 1996 precedent, and the Senate's party-line 
adoption of the 2001 reconciliation instructions, tacidy cautioned 
against treating the 1996 precedent as one to be followed. Then, the 
abrupt, uncustomary, and inappropriate termination of the 
Parliamentarian, soon followed by the change of party control in the 
Senate, suggests that the events of2001 not only failed to reinforce those 
of 1996 as supporting such use of reconciliation, but also warrants 
viewing such use of reconciliation henceforth as unsupported by 
preceden t. lB8 
Some may doubt the legal importance of parsing the Budget Act's 
intent or the Senate's precedents in this way. Apart from general and, 
for this article's purposes, uninteresting contentions that analysis of 
statutory application is a waste of time absent judicial involvement 
because politics excludes law,189 it could be argued that this particular 
area oflaw contains such irresistible power politics as to negate analysis 
of rules. 190 Nevertheless, the Senate has hitherto treated budget 
processes, for all their high stakes and partisan polarization, as worthy of 
step built on what a Congress controlled by the other party had done in 1980, and it conformed to 
the 1980 rationale that reconciliation existed for deficit reduction, so it could not be asserted to be a 
merely partisan abuse of the Budget Act. 
187 As noted, the successor Parliamentarian is not known as a believer in extension of 
reconciliation. See supra note 146. He is held in high regard by both parties, and his view thus 
credibly further undermines the argument for broadened reconciliation. SeeHelen Dewar, Successar 
to Ousted Senate Parliamentarian Named, WASH. POST, May 9, 2001, at A23. 
188 One side might say that 2001 did establish a further precedent to add to 1996 or 1999. The 
other might say that not only were these abuses of reconciliation, but also that the party change in 
2001, attributable in part to this overextension of a procedure, amounts to a repudiation. A 
balancedjudgment would regard the use of reconciliation in this context as signaling the need for 
reform like the Byrd Rule rather than a tug-of-war of views about how the precedents now stand. 
189 Many observers may question whether it makes any sense to analyze something like the 
Budget Act at all outside of court decisions. If this article paused to discuss the general 
jurisprudential question about the meaning of analysis oflegal questions outside the courts, it could 
spend as much or as little time as felt useful on that eternal question. Numerous previously cited 
books and articles regarding the processes of lawmaking, including the author's thousand-page 
treatise on congressional procedure, reflect the meaningfulness of the subject in general. See 
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2. 
190 That is, if taX cutters with fifty-one votes could use reconciliation in 2001 outside deficit 
control, then taX cutters could use reconciliation again the same way when next they have fifty-one 
votes. Even if the Senate followed Senator Byrd's position as long as it had a Democratic majority, 
then, when the chamber next changes party control, the new majority could repeat 2001. It is 
possible, then, that what happened in 2001 would ultimately become accepted as Senate procedure. 
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having effective rules that are followed. Frankly, making budget process 
reform work in the future may require some accommodation of the 
intense commitment of many Senators to tax rate cutting by combining 
a clarification of reconciliation's use only for deficit or debt reduction 
with a tolerant concept of how "deficit reduction" packages can include 
paid-for AMT relief and other tax rate cuts. 
First, however, must come the analysis of why to clarify 
reconciliation's use only for deficit or debt reduction. Two lines of 
argument exist in support of tax cut reconciliation outside of deficit 
reduction: (1) the "special worthiness" argument, which deems tax cuts 
especially worthy offacilitation; and, (2) the "even-handed" argument, 
which treats reconciliation for tax cuts as symmetric with reconciliation 
for tax increases within the Budget Act's flexibility and policy-neutrality 
and flexibility. The special worthiness argument employs familiar 
antitax themes: that facilitating by reconciliation the will of even a bare 
Senate majority to cut taxes is democratic, naturally right, and 
economically sound.191 Only by reconciliation tax cuts, this argument 
goes, can the taxpayers keep their money rather than have Congress 
dissipate it through spending.192 
The second, "even-handedness" line of argument notes how the 
majority can use reconciliation for tax increases, and seeks procedural 
symmetry for tax cuts, based upon the flexibility and policy neutrality of 
the budget process. 193 No a priori reason exists in the Budget Act to 
191 The following discussion is adapted loosely from the articles by McGinnis and Rappaport, 
supra note 17, and the sources they cite. These articles expound the view that structural problems 
with government generally, and with the current American federal government particularly, allow 
special interest groups to have an excessive capability to keep government too large, spending too 
high, and therefore taxes too high. 
192 The arguments go roughly like this: Nothing could be less democratic than frustrating the 
will of the majority (that is, by denying the facilitation of reconciliation) in order to keep taxpayers 
surrendering more of their own income or property to the government. Economic models may 
demonstrate that income tax cuts would boost the nation's system of enterprise and hence rebound 
to the welfare of all. This is particularly true of cutting the top income tax brackets or finalizing the 
end of the estate tax, both of these being leveling taxes focused on relatively small numbers of 
relatively productive individuals. In contrast, leave the money in the Treasury, and organized 
special interests will take it out in spending as a form of rent-seeking that uses their excess political 
power. Moreover, the larger spending means a needlessly larger, more intrusive federal 
government. 
193 Senator Domenici unveiled this line of argument in 1996 and reiterated it in early 2001, 
both times as Chairman of the Budget Committee and as a long-standing budget proceduralist. 
Domenici served as the counter-point to Senator Byrd in the procedural debate on this issue. The 
following discussion is adapted loosely from Senator Domenici's statements in 1996 and 2001. 147 
CONGo REC. S3499-501 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2001); 142 CONGo REC. S5415-16 (daily ed. May 21,1996). 
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privilege tax. lawmaking in one direction over the other; in a 
representative democracy, the majority prevails on such questions. 
Concretely, if a reconciliation tax. increase on a bare party-line majority 
was sauce for the goose after the election of 1992, such a reconciliation 
tax cut was sauce for the gander after that of 2000-and would be sauce 
for the gander henceforth. 194 
The counterarguments to allowing reconciliation outside of deficit or 
debt control proceed as follows. First, the asserted "special worthiness" 
argument appeals narrowly to those with particular ideological anti-tax 
premises. Tax cuts by themselves do not sufficiently induce steps to pay 
for themselves. Historically, for example, after 1981,195 tax. cuts did not 
bring about spending control. Moreover, tax. cuts that simply distribute 
the contents of the Treasury without inducing any compensating 
economies are hardly distinguishable from spending. 196 
The more interesting line of argument is the second, assertedly for 
"even-handedness" between tax. increase reconciliation and tax cut 
reconciliation. Fundamentally, this mistakes the procedural difference 
between the Budget Act's flexibility and policy neutrality as to targets, 
and the restrictive circumstances under which one can resort to various 
potent procedures, from points of order to reconciliation. The Budget 
Act is flexible and policy neutral only about its merely aspirational 
194 As for the pattern of the past, Congress may have enacted only reconciliation deficit-<ontrol 
packages into law from 1980 to 2000, but that was during an era of deficits. In an era of impending 
surpluses in 1996-2000, the Senate did pass reconciliation tax cuts (that these were vetoed proves 
nothing). 
195 The experience during and after 1981, when a massive tax cut led to a decade ofexploding 
public debt, illustrates the limits of the procedural premises for facilitating tax cutting first and then 
hoping for thrifty policy to follow thereafter. This plan is akin to deciding to eat double desserts 
early in the day and hoping for a calorie-free dinner-time. In 1981, no attempt was made to use 
reconciliation for the most enormous of all tax cuts; even the arch-proponents of tax cuts in 1981 
sought compensating spending cuts priorto voting for tax cuts. They did not suggest that it was the 
role of reconciliation first to speed through tax cuts and then to hope afterwards for spending 
control. 
196 The counter-argument is loosely drawn from Garrett, A Fiscal Constitution with Supcrmajority 
Voting Rules, supra note 17, at 496-502 (criticizing a proposed budgetary definition of spending that 
does not include tax expenditures). Notwithstanding the rhetoric that tax rate cuts let (high-
bracket) taxpayers just keep "their" money, while spending causes "their" money to go to others, 
either way, the fisc has less, and the high-bracket beneficiaries of the legislation have more. U.S. tax 
levels are low by world standards, and the progressive income tax, for all its critics, has not yet struck 
the population as inferior to whatever alternative Congress would enact to pay for government. 
Since the debacle of 1980s supply-side economics, economists confine their case for tax cuts to a 
discussion of particular cuts in a particular economy, eschewing the suggestion that all tax cuts, 
especially those paid for piling up more federal debt, are good for the economy. 
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targets, while frequently reserving its binding intervention into floor 
procedure for certain types oflegislation such as disfavored bills for new 
entitlement spending. Congress may rightly trust its fallible mechanisms 
for projecting surpluses, with their artificial scoring and rosy scenarios, 
for the low-impact step of setting annual targets, but not for the high-
impact step of forcing through, by reconciliation, fiscal lawmaking by 
bare majorities. 197 Only boosting the Treasury, not draining it, has won 
consensus acceptance as a goal. 198 Moreover, Budget Act reconciliation 
recognizes the dysfunctional asymmetry in congressional action 
preferences. Namely, Congress prefers changes that result, through 
spending or tax cuts, in more rather than less debt. To counteract that 
asymmetry, the BudgetAct provides procedures that facilitate deficit and 
debt reduction, not the opposite. This collective action asymmetry in 
preferences199 supports the Budget Act's procedural restraints on 
appropriated and new entitlement spending, and on tax cuts as well.20o 
These go through by reconciliation only when coupled with measures to 
pay for them, harnessing opposing action preferences. 
Having explained why Congress should hold the line against 
reconciliation outside deficit or debt control, there are reasons to define 
broadly what deficit control is, as a way toward a consensus procedural 
197 Surplus projections may justifY some mild encouragement of action, but they do not warrant 
harnessing the potent engine of reconciliation to push through spending increases or tax cuts. 
They simply do not justifY the skipping of deliberative mechanisms that can subject optimistic 
projections to skeptical scrutiny. 
198 Congress can set any targets in the budget process to which a majority aspires each year. Its 
long-term goals, however, do not take the profound step of annually rearranging its structural 
channels for lawmaking, such as the Senate's requiring consensus or cloture for fiscal lawmaking. 
The Senate has not released legislation from its regular consensus requirements for any long-term 
goal other than debt reduction. This was clearest in the deficit era of the 1980s and 1990s, the era 
of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and PAYGO, when Congress created additional impediments to 
spending increases and tax cuts. In times of surplus, the rigid PAYGO disciplines enforced by 
sequestration arguably do not apply. So, tax cut bills may face no additional barriers such as 
threatened sequestration or points of order. However, Congress has not affirmatively facilitated 
reconciliation for tax bills. 
199 There is obvious asymmetry in collective expression of preferences: those who would benefit 
from spending or tax cut enactments, and the Senators who represent them, will apply themselves 
more intensely to political action in their favor, while those who simply do not benefit, and some of 
the centrist Senators who decide on the basis of the balance of collective preferences, do not apply 
themselves with the same intensity to resisting spending increases or tax cuts. 
200 The top bracket concretely received enormous benefits from the 2001 tax cut and provided 
the majority party's drive for moving the law. While most of the population may have received little 
benefit from it, and may ultimately experience adverse indirect effects of the Treasury loss, the 2001 
law did not directly, concretely, and immediately cost them anything, and they did not much resist. 
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rule. 201 First, practical reform, to be effective, must define deficit 
control broadly enough to facilitate occasional rate cuts as part of a 
package, or else complete Republican opposition will preclude much 
chance of reform at all. The Republican Party has made tax rate cutting 
its cynosure,202 and the budget process has become the foremost party-
defining arena. 203 Budget process reform that is perceived as providing 
no hope for tax rate cuts may not prove possible to adopt and 
maintain.204 Conversely, Republicansjoined in pushing through major 
tax laws in 1986 and 1997 that cut tax rates for upper-bracket taxpayers, 
while maintaining revenue-neutrality in 1986 and providing deficit 
reduction in 1997.205 
So, while the first principle of tax cut reconciliation after 2001 
requires that it occur only in the context of deficit reduction, the deficit 
reduction can occur by a mixture of spending cuts and revenue 
changes.206 As past bills suggest, especially the 1986 Act, a vehicle like a 
deficit reduction package could serve for tax simplification or reform, 
and the spending cuts that go into the mix could include reduced 
appropriations. 207 
201 See Garrett, Tax Legislative Process, supra note 10, at 514-26 (evaluating the benefit of 
budgetary PAYGO requirements for proponents of rate cuts to put forth offsetting spending 
decreases or tax expenditure decreases). 
202 See Sheldon D. Pollack, Republican Antitax Policy, 91 TAX NOTES 289 (Apr. 9, 2001). 
203 The budget process has evolved since 1974 to become the foremost party-distinguishing 
system for legislating in the Congress, with party members voting loyally on budget votes and the 
public obtaining clarity and responsibility from the parties' differentiated positions. See KREHBIEL, 
supra note 37, at 186-224. See generally Garrett, Congressional Budget Process, supra note 9. 
204 By con trast, the Byrd Rule treated a particular excessive misuse of reconciliation in 1981; the 
rule made reconciliation harder to pass, but not too much harder; both parties, not just one party, 
could see that the rule produced its great beneficial effect through some frustration of whichever 
party used reconciliation; so, as budget process reform, it serves as the great model. In particular, 
for those who might consider Senator Byrd's commitment to limited use of reconciliation no more 
than a convenient partisan stance, in 1993 his position that the Byrd Rule precluded using 
reconciliation to move health care reform-his President's central agenda item-amounted to an 
incalculable vexation to his own party. Mter 2001, both parties must agree to future vexations to 
reap some reconciliation reforms that make sense. 
205 For discussions of these two bills, see supra notes 102, 114. 
206 As long as the total or net would result in less debt than otherwise, that can include tax cuts 
and, specifically, tax rate cuts. Tax rate changes like those of 1986 and 1997 could occur again. 
Understandably, the most intensely anti-tax Senators would not trade in the use of reconciliation for 
these harder routes to tax rate cutting. Reform does not depend on a complete lack of opposition, 
as much as on support from the responsible center. 
207 If Congress has enacted all its appropriations for the year, and these reflect real savings, that 
justifies with some confidence a corresponding amount of tax rate cuts. It might be possible to fold 
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The probability of enacting such reforms depends upon what the 
Senate allows by reconciliation, that is, whether it allows a bare, of ten-
partisan majority to override the usual structural barriers to passage ofa 
bill. Some tax cut proponents may think that their proposal is so 
appealing that it will achieve consensus without making up the cost with 
either spending cuts or revenue increases elsewhere. This could be true, 
for example, for an extension of the end-of-2005 expiration date for 
AMT reductions. Getting a consensus to extend that expiration date 
may prove easier than obtaining fifty votes to identify compensating 
spending cuts or tax increases. If so, and assuming that no other budget 
disciplines apply,208 proponents of such measures should push through 
their tax cuts the old-fashioned way-without reconciliation. 
IV. TRADE FAST TRACK RENEWAL: LAws 
ABOUT TwO-LEVEL LAWMAKING 
President Bush came to office in 2001 facing the challenge his 
predecessor had attempted to resolve as to the central machinery of 
international economic affairs, namely, needing a renewal of the 
expired trade agreement negotiating authority. Whereas the Budget Act 
of 1974 remained in full effect when President Bush took office, the fast 
track provisions of the Trade Act of 1974, which facilitated the 
implementation of trade agreements, had expired in 1994 without 
renewal. 
Congress considers a renewal law pursuant to its general lawmaking 
procedures, without facilitation. Trade fast track renewal in 2001-2002, 
for example, had nothing in the way of facilitating rules or laws to help 
it pass the Senate; indeed, it faced the somewhat daunting situation that 
control of the Senate agenda processes lay in the hands of potentially 
unsympathetic Senate Democrats beginninginJune 200l. On the other 
this in with some kind of biennial appropriating that justifies with some confidence a two-year tax 
rate cut. 
208 PAYGO is scheduled to expire in 2001. If renewed, it would presumably apply, as it did in 
2001, to allow new tax cut measures in the event of surpluses. IfPAYGO is renewed and the tax cut 
proposals exceed the applicable near-term surpluses, then tax cut proponents would have to come 
up with compensating spending cuts or tax increases anyway to the extent needed to satisfY PAYGO 
disciplines, regardless of whether they seek reconciliation treatment. However, that does not 
obviate the significance of reforming the availability of reconciliation. As the years beyond 2011 
come into the Budget Act's ten-year window, the projected surpluses for those years, which could 
not be tapped in the 2001 exercise, will tempt many to use reconciliation, if not reformed, in the 
form of reconciliation bills containing long-term tax cuts. 
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hand, President Bush could draw strength for the renewal effort simply 
from the example of the previous history of the Trade Act, even if the 
expired act had no parliamen tary power to facilitate. History reflected a 
degree of congressional acceptance of fast track's distinctive character. 
And, after the terrorist attack of September 2001, the need for 
bipartisan compromise on international economic measures further 
supported renewal. 
Previous work has discussed the trade fast track as an approach to the 
two-level game United States leaders must play, with domestic enactment 
processes at one level and interaction with foreign nations at the other 
level. Fast track channels the process of congressional approval and 
implementation of trade agreements, so the President can negotiate 
with other countries that might otherwise balk ifimplementation faced a 
completely unchanneled congressional process with unrestricted 
amending. The first subsection of this part addresses the background 
and issues of the 2001 fast track renewal debate. The second discusses 
the less-well-known procedural alternatives to the law about lawmaking 
in the trade context. 
A. The Quest in 2001 for Fast Track Renewal 
1. Background 
In 1967-74, the President's previously-delegated authority to negotiate 
tariff-lowering agreements not only lapsed but also reached the limit of 
its usefulness. Congress applied its general distrust of unchecked 
delegation to the Executive Branch's domestic implementation of 
agreements lowering nontariff barriers.209 To break the stalemate, 
Congress enacted the 1974 Trade Act as a law about the lawmaking of 
trade agreement implementation. In the Trade Act, Congress granted 
for a limited period, and could periodically renew, a delegation to the 
President of authority to negotiate trade agreements in consultation 
with Congress. Mter negotiation, the President would submit to 
Congress implementing bills, which the House and Senate would 
consider without amendments or delays, in single up-or-down votes. 210 
209 From 1934 to 1967, Congress delegated authority to the President to negotiate tariff-
reduction agreements with other countries. During this time, the President established, with 
congressional approval, the postwar framework of international trade agreements under the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT"). This paragraph is a summary of the fuller 
background in Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast Track, supra note 22, at 335-38. 
210 19 U.S.C. § 2191(£), (g). 
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This would reassure negotiating partners that the two houses of 
Congress would not throw their agreements open to floor amending 
and thereby largely undo the negotiations. 211 
Congress renewed the trade fast track authority several times from 
the Trade Act's passage in 1974 through 1994, making a number of 
procedural adjustments.212 The Trade Act and the Budget Act stand in a 
class by themselves as far as their multi-decade, multi-stage evolution and 
the actual use of their procedures for the enactment oflegislation of the 
highest significance. From the 1970s to the early 1990s, the trade fast 
track provided the basis for the negotiation and implementation of the 
Tokyo Round of the GAIT, agreements with Israel and Canada, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") with Mexico and 
Canada, and the Uruguay Round that replaced the GATT with the 
World Trade Organization ("WTO").213 After obtaining congressional 
approval of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round in 1993-94,214 President 
Clinton faced m~or challenges on trade agreements twice in his second 
term. The first was his unsuccessful quest for fast track renewal in 
November 1997. The second was his successful quest to approve what 
211 In contrast to budget reconciliation, which Congress did not, in 1974, envision as mattering 
much, the 1974 fast track emerged from Congressional-Executive discussions and a Congress that 
clearly envisioned facilitating a controversial implementation bill at the end of the contemporary 
global trade talks, the Tokyo Round. The express background of the fast track Congressional-
Executive negotiations over the 1974 legislation is discussed in DESTLER, supra note 6, at 72-74; see 
also 4 MICHAEL j. GLENNON, THOMAS M. FRANCK, & ROBERT C. CAssIDYjR., UNITED STATES FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS 1-38 (1984). 
212 This paragraph is summarized from the fuller background in Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast 
Track, supra note 22, at 33840. Renewals of the fast track are discussed in DESTLER, supra note 6, at 
75 (renewal in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 to 1988), 92-96 (renewal in the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act ofl988), 100-103 (extension from 1991 to 1993 by presidential request and 
congressional defeat of disapproval), and 221 (renewal from 1993 to 1994 for the Uruguay Round 
agreements). 
213 Authorization or approval of implementation bills for these agreements is discussed in 
DESTLER, supra note 6, at 73-76 (1979 approval of the Tokyo Round agreements), 86 (1984 special 
authority for the Israel agreement), 97 (1989 implementation bill for the Canada agreement), 227 
(1993 implementation bill for NAFTA) , and 254 (1994 implementation bill for the Uruguay Round 
agreements). NAFTA, especially, posed very serious challenges for obtaining congressional 
approval. President George H.W. Bush negotiated NAFTA but simply could not obtain approval on 
its original terms. 
214 SeegencraUySHARYN O'HALLORAN, POLITICS, PROCESS,ANDAMERlCANTRADEPOuCYI3g.175 
(1994) (NAFTA); Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast Track, supra note 22, at 33g.340 (NAFTA); and Charles 
Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOB. TRADE 45, 64-65 (1998) 
(Uruguay Round). 
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was necessary for China's accession to the wro in 2000.215 The 
November 1997 defeat in particular, by prolonging the lapse in authority 
that began in 1994 and that President Bush inherited in 2001, 
underlines the difficulty of developing a fast track mechanism 
acceptable to Congress for increasingly controversial trade agreements. 
2. 2001-2002 
In 2001-02, President Bush sought trade fast track renewal with two 
chief sets of negotiations in contemplation.216 For some time, the 
worldwide participants in the WTO had discussed holding a new 
negotiating round, which would be the first since the Uruguay Round 
agreements that Congress implemented in 1994. After the new round 
was not launched at the Seattle meeting in 1999, it was slated for launch 
at a meeting in Qatar in November 200l.217 The other set of 
negotiations concerned a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas 
("FTAA"), which might, from the U.S. perspective, expand the NAFTA 
trade connection with Mexico to a hemispheric arrangement. President 
Bush gave this proposal strong support in 2001 at the Quebec summit of 
chiefs of state that set an FTAA negotiating schedule. 218 The September 
215 These four efforts of President Clinton's two terms have received much study by political 
scientists. and they provide an important background to the analysis of the trade fast track renewal 
debate in 2001 and the alternatives for the future. See generally ROBERT E. BALDWIN & CHRISTOPHER 
S. MAGEE. CONGRESSIONAL TRADE VOTES: FROM NAFTAAPPROVAL TO FASf TRACK DEFEAT (2000) 
(covering NAFTA. Uruguay Round. and fast track nonrenewal). The two second-term congressional 
processes are covered. See also Charles Tiefer. Adjusting Sovereignty: Contemparary Congressional-
Executive Controversies About International Organizations. 35 TEX. INT'L LJ. 239. 257-58 (2000) 
(discussing the second-term congressional process in the context of the 1997-98 fast track 
nonrenewal); Charles Tiefer. Sino 301: How Congress Can Effectively Review Relations with China aJter 
WTO Accession. 34 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 55. 56 n.2 (2001) (discussing second-term congressional 
processes in the context of determining U.S. policy of trade with China). 
216 Other negotiations are also important. such as those with the Asian nations. but the 
culmination of Asian negotiations is so far off, as to set FTAA and the next WTO round of 
negotiations in a class by themselves. 
217 There had been some anticipation that the meeting in Seattle in 2000 would launch that 
round. but in Seattle a consensus for initiation eluded the negotiators. See Lori Nitschke. Trade 
Winds From Seattle Will Soon Sweep Capitol Hill, 57 CONGo Q. WKLY. REP. 2983 (Dec. 11. 1999). On the 
United States's part, President Clinton was not at that time going to relinquish his position as to the 
necessary place of labor and environmental issues in the talks-though this is by no means the only 
problem faced at the time in launching the round. See Lori Nitschke, The Street Politics oJTrade. 57 
CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 2924. 2925 (Dec. 4,1999). 
218 See Summit oj Americas Affirms Negotiating Schedule Jor FTAA, 18 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) 666 
(Apr. 26. 2001). Even President Clinton had supported preliminary negotiations towards a FTAA. 
President Bush's strong support accorded both with the general leanings of Presidents. and of his 
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2001 terrorist attack strengthened the President's interest in trade 
agreement authority, since he believed that the United States would 
have a leadership role in international economic policymaking and 
might eventually bolster the sagging global trade system, albeit not 
necessarily in time to directly affect the global economic downturn. 
Domestically, in 2001, fast track renewal faced a difficult challenge 
that served as the background to this article's analysis of fast track 
alternatives. The election of 2000 did not boost prospects for 
congressional renewal of fast track authority.219 Furthermore, the 
economic downturn of 2001 raised the traditional specter that the 
vulnerable constituencies in the nation would be less willing to give away 
their chance to check trade rule changes that could visit hardships 
unevenly upon them. To achieve the authority renewal that had been 
defeated in 1997, President Bush and his party's congressional 
leadership in 2001 had alternative approaches to the central political 
question: whether to make lesser, or greater, concessions to agreement-
skeptics on the key substantive issues of environmental and labor 
concerns.220 The alternative of starting the campaign for fast track 
renewal221 with lesser concessions appealed to Republican circles 
unsympathetic to particular labor and environmental causes.222 
party, toward such free trade agreements. His support also stems from the importance of 
hemispheric economic affairs to his Gulf Coast political base. 
219 The Senate election results, ultimately leading to a Democratic majority Senate inJune 2001, 
raised new complications for fast track renewal. Meanwhile, the blocs of House members whose 
skepticism had defeated fast track renewal in the previous two Congresses lost no ground. The 2000 
elections mirrored the 1998 elections in this regard, in which "[t]here was not even a trace of a 
Republican gain on the trade issue." Eric M. Uslaner, The Democratic Party and Free Trade: An Old 
Romance Restored, 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 347, 360 (2000). 
220 The centrality of these issues in the 1997 defeat, and their continuing centrality, is discussed 
in Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast Track, supra note 22, at 34M9. 
221 Accordingly, in May 2001, after hearing the concerns publicly articulated by Senator 
Grassiey, the senior Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, the Administration released an 
annual trade agenda downgrading labor and environmental concerns as merely an option, rather 
than with specific support. See President Sends Trade Goals to Congress, Proposes "Toolhox" for Labor, 
Environment, 18 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) 767 (May 17, 2001). And, in summer 2001, the House 
Republican leadership introduced a fast track trade renewal bill stripped of the limited concessions 
on labor and environmental issues that had been made in 1997-98, but had at that time been 
insufficient for renewal. See House Republican Leaders Unveil TPA Trade Legislation for President Bush, 18 
INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) 920 (June 14, 2001). 
222 Business had taken a hard-line stance in 1994 against concessions on labor and 
environmental issues which undermined at that time the effort to renew fast track. See DESTLER, 
supra note 6, at 245. Mter the 1994 election produced congressional Republican majorities, a 
similar hard-line stance in 1995-96 by the majority party leaderships at that time had again 
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On the other hand, President Bush knew he must ultimately reach 
Members whose support for trade fast track would depend upon 
procedural concessions to Congress. 223 With the flip from Democratic 
president and Republican Senate in 1995-2000 to the opposite after June 
2001, the new Senate majority, if they renewed fast track authority, 
would be ceding their legitimate agenda control rights to a President of 
the other party who could use those rights to promote the goals of his 
own party's interest group constituencies.224 The new Senate majority 
party manifested coolness towards no-concessions fast track by 
postponing committee reporting on trade fast track renewal, and in the 
first committee hearing on the subject. 225 That new majority would have 
the opportunity, denied their party in either chamber in the previous 
three Congresses, to afford a hearing to the arguments regarding the 
inadequacy of labor and environmental concessions. 
Mter the terrorist attack, the administration's desire to move a fast 
track bill through Congress led to a House version initially circulated on 
September 25 in the House by Chairman Bill Thomas (R-Cal.) of the 
House Ways and Means Committee. The bill circulated by Rep. 
Thomas, by its very limited but concrete procedural concessions, 
undermined an attempt to renew fast track. Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast Track, supra note 22, at 343-
46. It was the relaxation of that stance that allowed the 1997 attempt at renewal to nearly succeed. 
See id. at 346-49. Starting in 2001, Republicans could expect more unity within their own party. The 
factor of partisan distrust of President Clinton as an agreement negotiator was no longer an 
obstacle, as now the agreement negotiation would be by President Bush. 
223 In the House, the Democratic Leader, Rep. Dick Gephardt (D-Mo.), had given President 
Clinton key support or at least neutrality in his trade agreement efforts that had sufficed for 
approval of the Uruguay Round and China WTO access, and for coming close, although without 
success, in the 1997 fast track renewal attempt. Eric Schmitt, Gephardt Says China Trade Bill WillErode 
U.S. Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2000, at AlO ("Mr. Gephardt ... will not make the China trade 
vote a litmus test of party loyalty or lobby his colleagues."); Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast Track, supra 
note 22, at 347-48 (listing past Gephardt stances). Such centrist leadership would no longer have 
the argument to make to its own members that they would be entrusting the authority to a President 
of their own party who presumably could be counted upon to use such authority without forgetting 
their environmental and labor concerns. 
224 Other countries may be wary of making difficult concessions in negotiating if they have to be 
concerned about the threat of Congress amending the agreement to provide for even greater 
concessions from those countries. International negotiating dynamics in which U.S. representatives 
do not have real authority to reach deals fall somewhere between highly problematic and completely 
unworkable, especially when the negotiations become multilateral, as in the rounds ofWTO and 
FTAA talks. 
225 See Trade Promotion Authority May "SliP" into Next Year, Senate Finance Chair Says, 18 INT'L 
TRADE REp. (BNA) 883 (June 7, 2001). 
462 Journal of Law & Politics [VoI.XVII:409 
clarified the issues.22? This House version renewed trade fast track for 
agreements until 2005 and created a bipartisan Congressional Oversight 
Group suggesting the congressional majority and minority would 
perhaps have some consultative role (although creating a group in itself 
guarantees very little). This version also enunciated some objectives 
having to do with labor and environmental issues and enforcement, 
albeit not particularly strong ones. It had one procedural mechanism, a 
crude derailing mechanism that would allow the House and Senate by 
disapproval resolution to preclude facilitation of an agreement 
implementation bill. The issues surrounding such terms of renewal are 
not the same as those regarding EGTRRA, insofar as they concern the 
terms of renewal of an expired law, not action pursuant to a still-
operative one. Nonetheless, once again, these issues raise interesting 
questions of analyzing the terms of operation of a law about lawmaking. 
In December, the House passed that fast track renewal bill, by the 
razor-thin vote of 215-214.227 The bill was quickly reported out of 
committee, although in 2002, Senate Democrats sought to link its 
consideration to revival of trade adjustment assistance.228 The weak 
support for the bill in the House, coupled with continuing skepticism 
about the trade agreements for which the authority would be used, 
suggested that passage of the fast track renewal bill would yet leave room 
for controversy and change in years to come.229 In particular, Congress 
might revisit the terms for fast track treatment of bills to implement 
future trade agreements. 
B. Possibilities for Compromise About the Process of Fast Track Lawmaking 
With the above background, the arguments follow straightforwardly 
about the trade fast track procedure as a process that at least modifies, if 
not completely overcomes, the congressional procedures of agenda 
control, debate, and amendment. Proponents of trade fast track 
emphasize that the benefits of trade agreements distinguish those 
agreements from normal legislation, for which the political process 
appropriately declines to relax its structures of deliberation over the 
226 See, e.g., Robert B. Zoellick, Countering Terror With Trade, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, alA35. 
The following discussion is based on Outline of Draft TPA Compromise Bill, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 
1536 (Sept. 27, 2001). 
227 Gebe Martinez, After One-Vote Victory in House, Fast-Track Bill Lands in Senate, 59 CONGo Q. 
WKLY. REp. 2917 (Dec. 8, 2001). 
228 John Maggs, Back From the Dead, 34 NAT'L. J. 304 (Feb. 2, 2002). 
229 See Charles Tiefer, A Bit Too Fast a Track, NAT'L Lj., Dec. 17, 2001, at A21. 
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content of controversial bills.230 Since the enactment of the 1974 Trade· 
Act, the strongest argument in favor of the trade fast track has been the 
unacceptability to other nations of Congress taking up approval of 
implementation with open-ended amending. As far as alterations in 
trade fast track that further bring in labor and environmental subjects, 
those urging limited concessions in the September proposal emphasize 
how both foreign nations, and American businesses, object to excessive 
attending to labor and environmental issues.231 
Those skeptical of renewing fast track without greater concessions on 
labor and environmental issues emphasize the large risks of such trade 
agreements. A fast track blank check turns over power, including the 
distribution of patronage to favored groups and interests and the 
imposition of burdens upon of disfavored ones, from Congress to the 
President. Trade agreements and their implementation domestically 
can have a considerably adverse effect, as well as a major foregone 
opportunity for beneficial effect, on environmental and labor concerns. 
Skeptics also argue that such agreements can inflict concentrated harms 
upon certain vulnerable economic sectors, such as less-educated workers 
who are localized in particular American manufacturing regions that 
face assertedly unfair overseas competition. This is an argument to 
which Senators and Representatives will pay attention, even while the 
President emphasizes diffuse trade-based benefits to. the rest of the 
nation.232 Perhaps most importantly, skeptics can look at the history of 
fast track and argue that there is room to structure the fast track 
deliberations such that fast track will neither give the President a blank 
230 For a strong account, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw: CAsES AND MATERIALS 5-
46 (1996). By the economic theory of comparative advantage, the previous facilitation of trade may 
deserve part of the credit for the United States's economic boom with low inflation of the past 
decade, and further facilitation of trade would help continue this. Moreover, the United States has 
run a very large trade deficit during that boom, creating world economic dependence on American 
trade, and agreements to continue facilitating that trade may avoid the world-class problem of its 
deceleration. 
231 Part of the objection comes simply from political and economic arguments on the United 
States's own business side not to go too far to burden the trade process with such issues. See supra 
note 222 and accompanying text. The other part of the objection comes from the hostile reaction 
of other countries, particularly the developing countries that fully predominate in the FTAA talks 
and that have a large role in another WTO round, which strongly oppose the United States 
excessively pushing these subjects. 
232 A balanced voting analysis of the reasons for approval of NAFTA and defeat of fast track 
renewal attributed that defeat to the fear of Representatives of loss of jobs in "districts with a high 
proportion of individuals with just a high school education" absent "better safeguard procedures 
and positive domestic adjustment devices .... " BALDWIN & MAGEE, supra note 215, at 42. 
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check regarding a given treaty implementation bill, nor involve such 
open-ended amending of agreements as to cause negotiating partners to 
walk away from talks. 
1. Power, Discourse, and Meaningful Symbolism: 
Lessons from Fast Track's Historf33 
The specific procedural arrangements for fast track had their origins 
in adverse congressional reaction to Johnson Administration trade 
negotiations.234 The Nixon Administration revival of trade agreement 
negotiating authority in 1974 came by the formulation through 
Executive-Congressional discussions of procedural terms for facilitated 
consideration offast track implementation bill approvaI.235 In 1979, the 
Carter Administration won a renewal to implement the GATT Tokyo 
Round and then first used fast track authority for the Tokyo Round 
implementation bill by informally using elaborate procedures deferring 
to Congress. Specifically, the House and Senate committees responsible 
for trade legislation held "nonmarkup" sessions on a draft 
implementation bill, as they would hold markup sessions for a regular 
bill, and composed their differences in a "nonconference" session as 
they would hold conference sessions for a regular bill. Then, Presiden t 
Carter submitted an implementing bill almost identical to what had 
come out of the nonmarkup and nonconference sessions.236 The 
1984237 and 1988 renewals further enhanced congressional procedural 
rights by implementing such measures as a "reverse fast track" 
procedure by which the two chambers, on the impetus of committee 
chairs or ranking members, could terminate the availability of the fast 
233 This section makes use of the fullest study of how fast track enhanced Congress' oversight 
role oftrade negotiations, without preventing successful outcomes, for the Canadian-United States 
Free Trade Agreement and for NAFTA. See o 'HALLORAN , supra note 214, at 139-75 (1994). 
234 In the late 1960s, President Johnson uiggered the lapsing of trade agreement negotiating 
authority by slighting the Senate's expressions of its procedural prerogatives. When the Senate gave 
non-binding indications of its concerns about the course of trade negotiating, the President went 
ahead anyway. See Carrier, supra note 24, at 699-700; Koh, Congressional Controls, supra note 24, at 
1199-1200. 
235 See Carrier, supra note 24, at 701-03. 
236 See id. at 706-07. 
237 In 1984, Congress renewed the fast track in anticipation of agreements with Israel and 
Canada, devising different procedures for those two counuies, and this time formalizing the 
procedures for committee action. See Koh, Trade Policy, supra note 6, at 148-49. At one point, the 
Senate Finance Committee threatened to invoke authority to derail the Canadian agreement, 
forcing presidential concessions. See Koh, Congressional Controls, supra note 24, at 1211-18. 
2001] How to Steal a Trillion 465 
track approval procedure. This procedure was exploited in the late 
stages of the Canadian agreement talks.238 The reverse fast track is like 
the derailing provision of the September 2001 proposal, but more 
capable of triggering a meaningful consultation with Congress. 
During NAFfAand GATT Uruguay Round talks, first President Bush 
in 1991 and then PresIdent Clinton in 1993, needed fast track 
extensions. The grant of each extension involved procedural 
concessions, including presidential commitments on environmental and 
labor issues, and a new subsection tailored solely to the Uruguay 
Round. 239 Since the lapse of fast track authority in 1994, the debate over 
renewal has often centered upon the extent to which the renewal will 
bring enforceable provisions about labor and environmental issues into 
international negotiations.240 
Overall, the historic working of fast track could be sorted out in 
categories of power, discourse, and symbolism, focusing on what they 
mean to the decisive middle group in Congress. This middle group, 
called the "mild agreement skeptics," has held the balance of power 
during many important, close votes. 241 Regarding the effect on power, a 
fast track mechanism without concessions to Congress relinquishes the 
Senate's supermajority requirement because it removes the need for 
sixty votes for cloture. It also, by constraining amendments, has 
additional effects discussed separately below. As to the structure of 
discourse, to the extent that the President's implementation bill receives 
a single up-or-down vote, fast track takes away many of skeptics' 
opportunities to voice their issues and to engage in give-and-take at 
meaningful committee hearings and meetings. Fast track also 
diminishes skeptics' opportunities in the abbreviated floor proceedings 
238 See Carrier, supra note 24, at 708-10; Koh, Trade Policy, supra note 6, at 151-52 (describing how 
the maritime industry sought a Senate resolution denying fast track treatment, leading to 
eliminating the maritime provisions from the agreement). 
239 See Carrier, supra note 24, at 711-14; Koh, Trade Policy, supra note 6, at 153-56. The actual 
implementing bills for the Uruguay Round included sophisticated provisions to finesse the sensitive 
issue of pre-emptive effect on state laws. SeeTiefer, Free Trade Agreements, supra note 6, at 63-72. 
240 See Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast Track, supra note 22, at 341-49; Gary G. Yerkey & Rossella 
Brevetti, eentTistDemocrats Unveil Plan for Winning Approval of New Trade Negotiating Aut/writy, 18 INT'L 
TRADE REp. (BNA) 841 (May 31, 2001). 
241 These are Members who generally tolerate free trade agreements enough that they might 
provide the needed votes in support, but also express concerns either about labor and 
environmental issues, or about adverse sectoral impacts, particularly on industries in their states or 
districts. These concerns can affect their votes. 
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and the accompanying discussions in the media and elsewhere.242 Thus, 
skeptics lose much of their opportunity to mak~ their cases, and virtually 
all of their opportunity to obtain satisfaction short of the often-remote 
possibility of killing the agreement in totO.243 Finally, fast track and its 
variations have meaningful symbolic effects,244 mediating substantive 
disputes by translating them into procedural balances and future 
opportunities for both sides.245 
Thus, history and analysis provide an answer to the issue of the effect 
of building congressional procedural rights into fast track renewals. The 
Executive Branch may protest that such procedural encumbrances 
either defer completion and implementation of agreements or lead to 
the dropping of whole subjects from them. Yet, each of the five 
242 Agreement supporters include well-<>rganized business groups that have sufficient combined 
funds to pay for advertising and lobbying. Such groups are thus comparatively advantaged vis-a-vis 
their less afI1uent opponents by the reduction in congressional and press forums. 
243 Commentators find that much or most of congressional deliberation occurs in, or 
accompanies, committee hearings and meetings. See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF 
REAsoN: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GoVERNMENT 157-60 (1994). 
244 Any form of authorization, however weighted down with deference to Congress, powerfully 
promotes the progress of trade agreement talks. This offers tangible prospects of an implemented 
agreement. A sequence like that from 1974 to 1994, in which Congress coupled extensions of 
authorization with assurances of congressional influence, allows both sides symbolically some share 
of victory. The multiple stages mean the Executive Branch, and agreement supporters, receive 
credit from the pro-agreement constituencies, particularly business with prospects of benefiting 
from international trade, as progress occurs toward ultimate agreement achievement and approval, 
and the making of substantive concessions and acceptance of procedural encumbrances may reduce 
this credit but not eliminate it. This is particularly visible for agreements such as NAFTA and the 
Uruguay Round, for which first the Bush Administration received credit for negotiating, and then 
the Clinton Administration received credit for obtaining their approval by Congress. BALDWIN & 
MAGEE, supra note 215, at 6-7. 
245 The record of struggles over trade policy that received congressional attention contains 
numerous examples of how larger disputes get resolved over time by such processes as yielding on 
particular issues, or sectoral effects. The NAFTA side agreements on labor and environmental 
issues, and the WTO's creation of a Committee on the Environment, represent concrete 
illustrations of issue yielding. See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: 
Democracy and the Law and Politics oJthe WTOs Treatment oJ Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARv. 
ENVTL. L. REv. I, 18 (2001) (noting the parallel origins of the WTO committee and the NAFTAside 
agreements). But see Marjorie Cohn, The World Trade Organization: Elevating Property Interests Above 
Human Rights, 29 GA.]. INT'L & COMPo L. 427, 430-31 (2001) (suggesting that the WTO committee 
on the environment has focused almost solely on avoiding environmental impediments to trade). 
Concessions like the 1980s exclusion of maritime industry inclusion in free trade agreements, and 
the past decade's slow progress on opening the United States to Mexican trucking, represent 
concrete illustrations of sectoral effects. SeeJames C. Benton, Transportation BiU Set to Clear As Bush 
Wins Key Provision Opening U.S. to Mexican Trucks, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 2846 (Dec. 1,2001) 
(Mexican trucking); Koh, Trade Policy, supra note 6, at 151-52 (examining treatment of maritime 
industry). 
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agreements approved pursuant to, or by arrangements involving, fast 
track-Tokyo Round, Israel, Canada, NAFTA, and Uruguay Round-
occurred after adjustments strengthening procedural rights. So, 
procedural arrangements provide a means to bridge the domestic divide 
without rendering impossible the bridging of the international one. 
2. Agreement-Specific Authorization and Its Principles 
A position regarding renewal of general fast track authority that lies 
between that of the strong proponents and that of the strong skeptics 
might envisage the authorization of fast track on different terms246 for 
different agreements. To some extent, this approach was followed in 
the past.247 Different trade talks raise different issues. For example, 
regional accords like the FTAA raise the kinds of concerns that arose 
over NAFTA and Mexican trucking.248 The authorization to negotiate a 
regional accord should rightly give special attention to enforceable labor 
and environmental issue provisions.249 
246 Agreement enthusiasts would prefer uniformly-broad long-term authorization for an array of 
agreements. Broad authorizations draw on the overall economic case for trade agreement 
negotiation and bring the whole process closer to the model of delegations to the Executive in 
recognition of the nature of negotiating with foreign countries. Conversely, intense agreement 
skeptics might prefer no authorization or short-term authorization for only noncontroversial 
agreements. That would bring the process closer to the model of treaty-making, where the 
President has no guarantee of ratification during the negotiations. The middle ground, of 
differentiated authorization, brings the process closer to the model of implementation bills standing 
on their own like regular proposed bills, in recognition of the legislative nature of domestic 
implementation lawmaking. 
247 As noted previously, the history of fast track offers such examples as the authorization 
distinctions of the fast track legislation in the mid-1980s between the Israel and Canada agreements, 
and in the early 1990s between the Uruguay Round and NAFTA agreements. See supra notes 213, 
237 and accompanying text. 
248 For example, regional integration agreements like NAFTA and the FTAA between the 
United States and developing countries have distinctive controversiality. This is partly because the 
economic gulf between the parties seems to threaten an undermining of environmental and labor 
standards of the developed partner-the United States-in a way that trade between the EU and the 
United States, which somewhat more readily reach some kind of comparable standards, does not. 
Also, a regional integration agreement that does not address sufficiently environmental and labor 
standards creates a greater sense oflost opportunity, because the defeat of environmental and labor 
causes concerns neighbor nations within the hemisphere. Environmental groups have experienced 
much disillusion since the approval of the NAFTA implementation bill in 1993, because they 
experience intensely the shortcomings of the hoped-for progress in the environmental standards of 
a neighboring country. On the other hand, business may see more opportunity from a regional 
trade agreement like the FTAA than in another WTO round. For background on FTAA, see Tiefer, 
"Alongside" the Fast Track, supra note 22, at 349-51. 
249 What is said in authorization legislation affects subsequent trade negotiation, both by 
influencing the extent of executive consultation with Congress and by affecting the ultimate 
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3. Revising the Implementation Bill, Especially by Way of Amendment 
The issue of the terms for consideration of a fast track 
implemen tation bill, and particularly whether amending can occur, has 
special interest in the analysis oflaws about lawmaking. In what can be 
called the form with no concessions at all, the trade fast track seemed 
perhaps the most restrictive enactment procedure imaginable in the 
Congress because it barred the offering of any amendments in either 
chamber to the implementing bill. As described above, the rise of the 
laws about lawmaking began with the enactment oflegislative vetoes that 
typically precluded amending the measure by which Congress nullified a 
presidential or agency action.250 In fact, all forms of fast track retain in 
some way a rule against amendments that would alter the previously 
negotiated agreement. This brings up the issue of whether legislative 
right to amend an implementation bill for a foreign agreement is 
fundamental, which is a question of real interest to theorists of 
parliamentary law. 
In the two centuries since the Framers wrote the Constitution,251 the 
Senate and House have taken somewhat different courses. The Senate 
has jealously protected its amending procedures in general, and, in 
particular, has not treated the approval of treaties negotiated with 
foreign countries as a process incompatible with amending by 
reservation. 252 While this might seem to disable treaty ratification, 
consideration of the implementation bill. Part of the reason the cabinet-level Office of United 
States Trade Representative was created and tended to be filled by appointees who build 
congressional confidence-such as President Bush's choice, Robert Zoellick-was the need for an 
official with trade negotiating responsibilities who was institutionally and personally committed to 
congressional consultation. See Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast Track, supra note 22, at 339-40. 
250 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 969 (1983) (White,]., dissenting). 
251 By the Framers' time, amending was a natural, though not inevitable, part of determining 
the legislative will on subjects in general. When the Framers provided in the Origination Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. I, that when the House could originate bills to raise revenues, "the Senate 
may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills," they reflected the practical 
understanding of the Framers as legislators. This also was being articulated in the works of the great 
legislative procedural thinkers of the era, notably ThomasJefferson in the United States andJeremy 
Bentham in England. On the other hand, the Framers could imagine procedures making matters 
selectively unamendable to avoid disabling the legislative process, as Congress still can; notably, this 
includes conference committee reports, which were not then, and are not now, generally 
amendable. 
252 When Presidents submitted treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent, the Senate 
always considered itself to have the power to condition its ratification upon amendments or 
reservations. Naturally, the other country had the option, if it found such reservations 
unacceptable, to deem the treaty unratified. In history's most famous example, the Treaty of 
Versailles following World War I would have brought the United States into the League of Nations. 
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Presidents have persuaded the Senate to ratify many treaties 
nonetheless,253 although some have gone unratified.254 In contrast to 
the Senate, the House has machinery for regularly channeling or 
limiting floor amendments. When the trade fast track precludes any 
amendments, it constrains255 the House's consideration even beyond the 
constraint normally faced under the House's standard procedures, and 
in doing so, arguably distorts the body's preferences. 256 
There are several possible concessions one could make in the 
direction of congressional skeptics' preferences on the subject of 
amending trade agreements; these possibilities are adumbrated in the 
The treaty's opponent, Senator Lodge, knew he did not have the votes to defeat it outright. 
However, he had the freedom to offer reservations, and once the Senate began approving these, 
President Wilson stubbornly refused to accept Senator Lodge's handiwork. Therefore, the Treaty 
went unratified. This culminated the era in which the Senate became known, for this reason among 
others, as the graveyard of treaties. See CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 616-21. 
253 This includes even such extremely controversial treaties as the Panama Canal Treaty. The 
Senate will add just the reservations to which the other country will not balk. 
254 The most recent example is the Kyoto Treaty on global warming countermeasures. Cloture 
could be used somewhat to constrain treaty amending. See FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, 
RIDDICK'S SENATE PROCEDURE 1296 (1992) (section entitled "Cloture Rule, Applicable to Treaty"). 
While available, however, cloture has generally not been so used. Cloture would not assist much on a 
controversial treaty because the treaty requires a two-thirds vote for ratification. Sixty Senators could 
use cloture to cut off debate and restrict the offering of nongermane amendments, but, by doing so, 
if they alienated the other forty senators, then by a final vote of60 in favor and 40 against, the treaty 
would fail. The necessary last contingent of Senate votes to reach the magic two-thirds must be 
wooed, if necessary by incorporating their reservations. 
255 For a particular bill the House can adopt a closed rule, which today tends to limit the 
minority party to testing a bill by offering its own single preferred germane alteration or alternative. 
Ironically, the most important early use of the closed rule was for the bills to increase tariff barriers, 
the opposite of the trade fast track's use today to lower trade barriers. See CONGRESSIONAL 
PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 292 n.89. However, even a closed rule has typically allowed the 
minority the prerogative to offer a motion to recommit with instructions, constrained by the 
requirement that what the minority offers be germane. When the Republican Party became the 
House majority in 1995, it expressed its distaste for the occasions it had been denied this by 
enshrining the right to that motion in a revised House Rule. Although the change prevents the 
Rules Committee from taking away the minority'S right, the germaneness rule still remains a 
constraint. In a recent attention-getting example, after the House impeached President Clinton on 
a near party-line vote, the Chair held that germaneness precluded the Democrats from offering, as 
an alternative, to censure him. SeeCONSTITUTION,]EFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE 
OF REpRESENTATIVES, supra note 64, at §857 (1995 revision in House Rule XIII(6)(c)(2) as to 
recommittal instructions) and §933 (nongermaneness of 1998 censure amendment). 
256 Legal and political theorists have recognized how the complete preclusion of alternatives 
distorts the body's preferences. See Saul Levrnore, Parliamentary Law, Majarily Decision Making. and the 
Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REv. 971, 988 (1989) (applying Arrow's Theorem). For a sophisticated 
treatment of whether having only two alternatives is democratic, see WILLIAM RIKER, LIBERALISM 
AGAINST POPULISM 66 (1982). 
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history of fast track legislation. One consists of arrangements that 
effectively let the congressional committees, specifically House Ways and 
Means and Senate Finance, influence strongly the content of the 
implementation bill submitted by the President.257 Moreover, as a new 
point of interest from 2001 on, the fast track authorization bill can 
expand the subjects for inclusion in the implementation bill, thereby 
creating a substantive field for amendments. 258 Implementation bills 
could include subjects appealing to mild agreement skeptics without 
breaching or requiring renegotiation of the agreement. Prime examples 
of such implementation bills include reforms of the United States's own 
sometimes inadequate unilateral policies on environmental and labor 
matters. Such an improvement of policy not only would be less 
confrontational to international negotiating partners than tough 
insistence or renegotiation, but also would often advance the goals of 
international environmental and labor policy as well or better than if 
terms were added to the agreements. 259 Congress's action in 2000 
regarding the agreement on China's accession to the WTO illustrates 
257 The fast track authorization legislation can provide for an interval before submission of the 
implementation bill, can formalize the procedure for the nonmarkups and nonconferences, and 
can police these by "reverse fast track," i.e., derailing, in the absence of compliance. SeeEdmund W. 
Sim, Derailing the Fast Track Jar International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA.]. INT'LL. 471 (1990). 
258 The technical issue consists of how a right of the House minority party to amend would be 
defined. Most generously, it would derive not only from the scope of the agreement and the 
Administration's initial draft implementation bill, but also from something broader, perhaps the fast 
track renewal law. The right might be exercised as part of the committee nonmarkups, and the 
minority's right to recommit might expand to fast track. 
259 Indeed, academics have pointed out that in some ways, such an improvement in unilateral 
policies on environmental and labor matters makes the most sense when one considers how to 
approve and to implement international trade agreements while addressing important issues. A 
previous article discussed how the implementation bills for NAFfA and the Uruguay Round subtly 
resolved the tension between foreign agreements, and American federalism, by what was explained 
as "weak" preemption. Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements, supra note 214, at 63-72. One recent article 
discussed how the United States could employ extraterritorial environmental enforcement against 
companies with sufficient United States linkage; this might be considered for enactment along with 
an implementation bill, without the bill falling afoul of trade agreements. Garvey, supra note 23. 
Another recent article discussed the relevance of the United States's own continuing deficiency in 
commitment to the international labor rights regime, such as its failure to subscribe to two of the 
four core rights in International Labor Organization conventions; some approaches bringing the 
United States into the international labor rights regime might be shaped without remotely falling 
afoul of trade agreements. Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact oj U.S. Domestic Policies 
on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages Jor the WTOs Future, 24 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 608 (2000). 
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this approach,260 as the implementation bill in that instance dealt with 
the human rights issue without amending the agreement's terms.261 
Generalizing about fast track renewal thus parallels tax cut 
reconciliation reform. A law about lawmaking should facilitate 
lawmaking about controversial matters by limiting deliberation only 
when two criteria are met. First, the limitations on deliberation must 
serve consensus goals, such as deficit or debt control or trade agreement 
implementation with some consideration of environmental and labor 
concerns. Second, the limitations must not completely frustrate either 
political party, or the executive or legislature, in its pursuit of consensus 
goals. Congress can legitimately insist upon procedures that reserve any 
procedural facilitation for particular types of consensus bills, such as 
deficit control and authorized trade agreements. Such procedures 
should not be used to facilitate non-consensus tax cutting or giving the 
President a blank check to push through domestic implementing 
legislation that does not adequately address labor and environmental 
concerns. 
v. THE ERGONOMICS RULE'S DISAPPROVAL IN 2001: 
USES OF SPECIAL LAWMAKING MECHANISMS 
In contrast to the wide-scale budget and trade lawmaking systems, a 
number of special lawmaking mechanisms deal with relatively narrow 
issues. One of the special mechanisms, namely, the Congressional 
Review Act (CRA) , allowed the lightning-fast disapproval of the 
ergonomics rule in March 2001. While some oversight mechanisms 
involve congressional fora for discourse, this particular law about 
lawmaking facilitated the triumph of self-interested lobbying by 
circumventing the usual channels of discourse. The law was used by 
business lobbies in a way at odds with the ordinary congressional 
oversight mechanisms that depend on hearings, reports, and media 
attention. In contrast, a different special lawmaking mechanism that in 
the 1990s had much significance and was even at issue in a Supreme 
Court case, the military base closing law, shows the publicly beneficial 
uses of such mechanisms. As an exercise in generalizing, this part closes 
260 This paragraph is based on the discussion in Tiefer, Sino 301, supra note 215. 
261 The bill created a United States watchdog commission on human rights in China, and 
equipped it to press the issue. U .S.-China Relations Act of2000, Title II of Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114 
Stat. 880 (2000). 
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with the discussion of a special lawmaking mechanism about revising 
campaign finance law after a possible partial Supreme Court 
invalidation. 
A. The Ergonomics Rule's Disapproval in 2001 
1. The eRA as Special Lawmaking Mechanism 
In the 1994 election, House Republicans committed themselves to a 
Contract with America that included general opposition to regulation.262 
Their attempts in 1995-96 to enact strong review mechanisms of health, 
safety, and environmental regulations ran into an effective Senate 
filibuster with firm public support.263 Only a modest program was 
enacted in Title II of the Contract with America Advancement Act of 
1996.264 In pertinent part, the Congressional Review Act (CRA)265 
provided those opposed to regulation a procedure for disapproving a 
newly promulgated major rule. 266 
Pursuant to the CRA, a joint resolution of disapproval may be 
introduced in the House and Senate, which then refer it to the 
committees ofjurisdiction.267 In the Senate,268 if the committee has not 
acted within twenty days, a written petition filed by thirty Senators 
discharges the committee.269 Once a motion to proceed brings the 
resolution from the Senate calendar to the floor,270 debate is limited to 
ten hours, thereby precluding a filibuster and avoiding the need to 
obtain the sixty votes required for cloture.271 Moreover, when Congress 
262 For these origins of the CRA, see James T. O'Reilly, EPA Rulemaking After the J04th Congress: 
Deathfrom Four Near-Fatal Wounds?, 3 ENVTL. LAw. 1,3 (1996). 
263 See id. See also Sunstein, supra note 25 at 277-82, 284. 
264 Pub. L. No. 104-121 §§ 801-08, 110 Stat. 847, 868-74 (1996). 
265 5 U.S.c. § 801 (2000). 
266 A "major rule" is defined as any rule likely to have an effect of $100 million or more on the 
economy, to increase costs or process for consumers, industries, or state and local governments, or 
to have significant adverse effects on the economy. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (A)-(C) (2000). 
267 5 U.S.C. § 802(a), (b) (2000). 
268 There is no particular procedure prescribed for the House. That provides a subtle way for 
the House Republican leadership, which controls House floor procedure, to keep power in its own 
hands. See Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 1063. 
269 5 U.S.c. § 802(c) (2000). 
270 From the calendar, the Senate can take up the resolution on a motion to proceed. 5 U .S.C. 
§ 802(d)(1) (2000). This is another subtle device, forthe motion to proceed is a prerogative of the 
Senate majority, again keeping the power in party leadership's hands. 
271 5 U.S.C. § 802(d)(2) (2000). 
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disapproves a rule, the CRA specifies that the agency cannot again act 
on the same subject.272 
Looking at the CRA's machinery as a congressional procedure, it 
contrasts interestingly with ordinary oversight mechanisms.273 Congress 
oversees regulatory actions mostly through committee proceedings, such 
as hearings, reports, and legislative proposals that are crafted to be voted 
out of committee. 274 The CRA creates a mechanism that can depend on 
the majority party leadership in each chamber, not the committee; that 
does not require hearings, reports, or crafted legislation; and, that 
surmounts the barrier of the Senate filibuster. 275 However, even the 
CRA has the weakness that after the two chambers adopt a resolution of 
disapproval, the President can veto it,276 which has created doubt that 
the CRA would ever see serious use. Before 2001, the CRA was invoked 
tentatively,277 but no agency regulation was ever formally disapproved 
pursuant to CRA procedures. 
That was until the ergonomics rule. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) propounds workplace safety and health 
standards pursuant to a 1970 statute.278 Mter the first Bush 
Administration directed OSHA to act upon the problem of cumulative 
trauma and musculoskeletal disorders (MSD) caused by repetitive 
272 This aspect was characterized by the chair of the American Bar Association Section on 
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice as a "blunderbuss approach" that was "too severe." 
Congressional Review Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. 
on theJudiciary, 104th Congo 134 (1997) (testimony of Prof. Peter L. Strauss, section chair). 
273 For a largely favorable review of the CRA's potential, see id. at 144 (testimony of Professor 
Richard]. Pierce,Jr.). 
274 See Charles Tiefer, Congressional Ouersight of the Clinton Administration and Congressional 
Procedure, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 199 (1998). 
275 See supra notes 268, 270-71. 
276 See Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 1063. 
277 In the years after the CRA's enactment, in one instance, a disapproval resolution's sponsor 
succeeded in effecting a compromise by which OSHA provided compliance assistance for the rule. 
A disapproval resolution was introduced regarding an Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration (OSHA) rule on exposure limits for methylene chloride, a paint stripper used in 
industry. [d. at 1058. In another instance, strong support for a disapproval resolution caused an 
agency to suspend a rule indefinitely. The Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) put forth a 
rule requiring home health agencies to obtain surety bonds. Once the disapproval resolution 
garnered fifty-two Senate sponsors, the agency suspended the rule. [d. at 1059; ESKRIDGE, JR., 
FRICKEY & GARRETI, supra note 9, at 492. 
278 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1994). See Randy Rabinowitz & Mark M. Hager, Designing Health and 
Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada, 33 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 373, 374-97 
(2000). 
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workplace tasks, OSHA spent a decade in study, punctuated by calls 
from industry and, from 1995 on, the congressional majority party to 
stop its investigation.279 On November 14, 2000, OSHA promulgated 
the final rule for an Ergonomics Program Standard to limit injury 
exposure for about 27 million workers. 28o OSHA estimated the standard 
would cost employers $4.2 billion annually and save them $9 billion a 
year in lost productivity, though industry estimates of costs were 
higher.281 In 2000, the ergonomics rule had already received 
congressional majority leadership attention, and working to overturn it 
was one of the main reasons Congress reconvened after the election for 
a lame-duck session. Rule-opponents can argue that the timing allowed 
for a period of some months for congressional and public 
deliberation.282 
In 2001, the congressional majority leadership, working closely with 
business lobbyists, ran an extraordinary campaign against the rule. 283 
The business opponents organized a powerful but initially quiet 
lobbying campaign. The campaign helped to solidify congressional 
support for disapproval (particularly in the Senate) in February 2001, 
without even enough public discussion for the rule supporters to learn 
279 See James C. Benton, Washington S Repetitive Stress Over Ergonomics Rules, 58 CONGo Q. WKLY. 
REp. 401 (Feb. 26, 2000). 
280 See id. at 402; Ergonomics Program, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 68261 (Nov. 14, 2000) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910). 
281 See Benton, supra note 279, at 401. The standard principally required employers to supply 
employees with basic information, to investigate employee reports ofMSDs, and if its jobs produce 
multiple MSDs not susceptible to a "quick fix," to implement an ergonomics program involving 
hazard analysis and control, training, relieving if\iured workers, and record-keeping. See Edwin C. 
Foulke,Jr., & Robert M. Wood, An Introduction to the New OSHA Ergonomics Program Standard, 12 S.C. 
LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 26-28. 
282 Prior to adjourning for the election, House Republicans had almost compromised with 
President Clinton about an appropriation rider to suspend the rule until the next presidency, before 
deferring the issue for the post-election session. SeeJames C. Benton, Bipartisan DealFal1s Through on 
OSHA Ergonomics Rules, 58 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 2589 (Nov. 4,2000). In any event, after Governor 
Bush's victory, congressional Republicans quietly decided not to make defeating the rule his 
problem. They dropped all references to the proposed ergonomics measure from the final 
appropriations bill. See Daniel J. Parks, Omnibus Spending Deal Clears As While House Settles for Less, 58 
CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 2857, 2859 (Dec. 16,2000). 
283 It ignored a January study by the National Academy of Sciences that Congress had 
specifically requested, which provided strong scientific support for the rule. The NAS study of 
ergonomics if\iuries "suggested that a million American workers are hurt on the job annually at a 
cost to American industry to $ 54 billion in lost wages, decreased productivity and medical benefits." 
Talk of the Nation: Workplace Rules and Ergonomics (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 7, 2001). 
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that the issue would come up soon, rather than in May, as expected.284 
The backbone of the campaign in Congress was Senate Assistant 
Majority Leader Don Nickles, and not committee-level Members. 285 
Once the Senate leadership was ready, Senator Nickles bypassed the 
Senate Labor Committee with a disapproval resolution having the 
requisite signatures for discharge on March 1, and brought it to a 
lightning fast 56-44 victory on the Senate floor on March 6, followed by a 
House floor victory the next day.286 
There is a large literature, primarily in political science287 but also in 
law,288 about congressional oversight of agency action, but it addresses 
congressional oversight in the context of the ordinary enactment 
process that occurs without a law that facilitates lawmaking. In contrast, 
the CRA is a law about lawmaking that made possible an extraordinary 
event. The disapproval effort took a statutorily-eased route289 in 
discharging the matter from the Senate Labor Committee, cutting short 
the committee's normal-though not universal290-role of conducting 
284 See Deirdre Davidson & Tatiana Boncompagni. The SwijlDemise of OSHA Rules. LEGAL TIMES. 
Mar. 12.2001. at 1. 13. 14. 
285 [d. at 13. «'Nickles was an animal on this,' says David Rehr. president of the National Beer 
Wholesalers Association." [d. 
286 147 CONGo REC. S1887-88 (dailyed. Mar. 6. 2001); 147CONG. REc. H707-D8 (dailyed. Mar. 7. 
2001). 
287 See. e.g .• JOEL D. ABERBACH. KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT (1990); Balla. supra note 25; Kathleen Bawn. Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: 
Statutory Constraints. Ouersight. and the Committee System. 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101 (1997); Arthur 
Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins. Learningfrom Ouersight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 96 (1994). 
288 See. e.g .• Jonathan R. Macey. Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Ouer 
Administrative Agencies. 80 GEO. LJ. 671 (1992); Matthew D. McCubbins. Roget G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast. Structure and Process. Politics and Policy: AdministrativeArrangements and the Political Control of 
Agencies. 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989); Charles Tiefer. Congressional Ouersigh~ supra note 274. 
289 The fact that a majority of Senators ultimately voted for the disapproval resolution should 
not lead to minimizing the significance of the CRA mechanism for a thirty-signature discharge 
petition. Because of norms of reciprocal respect about committees. there is ordinarily some 
reluctance in both chambers to discharge a committee. This deferential position is no longer the 
norm after discharge occurs when the issue is simply whether to vote for or against a resolution. So. 
the CRA eases the route of the disapproval resolution by requiring only thirty strongly determined. 
nondeferential Senators to discharge it onto the Senate floor. and by then requiring only ftfty-one 
mildly approving Senators to pass it. 
290 Senate floor procedure does provide ways for a floor vote to occur without the oversight 
committee preliminarily reporting it. In fact. the most common way. by an appropriation limitation 
amendment. was used as to the ergonomics rule itself at the end of2000. SeeTamara Loomis. OSHA 
About to Finalize Workplace Regulations. N.Y.LJ .• Nov. 2. 2000. at 5. Another way would be a 
non germane amendment on an unrelated bill. CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE. supra note 2. at 584-
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hearings and considering legislative proposals on the matter. 291 Also, 
the disapproval effort did not face the requirement of sixty votes for 
cloture, which would have impeded a mostly party-line effort that 
mustered only fifty-six Senate votes for passage. 
Effectively, the disapproval effort bypassed the normal discourse 
system for congressional action,292 although, admittedly, the ergonomics 
rule had received some congressional and public attention in previous 
years.293 Ordinarily, the OSHA rule would be given a presumption in its 
favor due to OSHA's accumulated scientific and regulatory 
experience.294 The CRA disapproval route did not require committee 
hearings, meetings, or reports to overcome that presumption.295 
A particularly striking feature of resort to the CRA remains its 
disabling of the agency from promulgating another rule on the same 
subject. This amounts to a partial repeal of the agency's authorizing 
statute, although the Labor Secretary suggested she would still consider 
doing something. As the ergonomics rule exemplifies, a major rule 
93. Both appropriations limitation amendments and nongerrnane amendments are debatable, and 
members of a bypassed committee could thus filibuster a resort to such methods. 
291 Bypassing the normal committee-based agenda control system that way is rare. One of the 
political science models of legislative action for overruling agencies explicitly incorporates the 
assumption that the oversight committee is a "monopoly gatekeeper." Thomas H. Hammond & 
Jack H. Knott, VWzo Controls the Bureaucracy? Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal 
Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 119, 129 (1996). 
292 As to that system, see Hugo Hopenhayn & Susanne Lohmann, Fire-Alarm Signals and the 
Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies, 12J.L. ECON. & ORG. 196, 198 (1996). 
293 There had been a limited opportunity for congressional committee consideration of the 
ergonomics rule the previous year. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Regulatory Reform andPaperwurk 
Reduction of the House Comm. On Small Business, 106th Congo (2000). For a chronology of the prior 
attention to the rule, see Benton, supra note 282. This was not a lot of congressional discourse for 
disapproving so major a rule. 
294 The OSHA regulations were developed by safety and health professionals who worked on 
the rule starting with the Bush Administration a decade earlier, partly because of the accumulated 
evidence from the National Academy of Sciences, and partly from OSHA's record that the rule 
makes sense for 27 million potential victims. See Benton, supra note 282; NATIONALACADEMYOF 
SCIENCES, WORK-RElATED MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1998), 
available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309063272/htrnl/index.htrnl. 
295 Quite the opposite. The use ofleadership-run procedures precluded supporters of the rule 
from effectively bringing their case to the attention of the public. Instead, the speedy disapproval 
effort bypassed discourse channels to succeed by the simple weight of the coordinated lobbying 
muscle of the potential affected businesses. During the periodjust before the vote, "[s] everal trade 
associations had previously set D.C. visits for members. Ergonomics was at the top of every 
association's priority list .... The National Coalition on Ergonomics ... hooked up members with 
representatives of home-state businesses." Davidson & Boncompagni, supra note 284, at 14. 
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responds to a major need, and a congressional vote to disapprove the 
rule does not make the need underlying the agency's authorizing statute 
go away. There is a stark contrast between how the CRA works, and how 
its nearest parallel works, namely, an appropriation limitation rider 
telling an agency it cannot proceed for a year. When Congress desires 
to adopt, by floor votes without committee deliberations,296 a strong but 
limited message to the agency, a year's moratorium sends that message 
in power, discourse, and symbolic terms.297 The CRA's provision 
precluding the agency from adopting another rule on that subject goes 
far beyond that. 
It remains to be seen how the disapproval of the ergonomics rule will 
affect future invocation of the CRA. One possibility is that the CRA will 
rarely be used again, because ordinarily an administration will only 
promulgate rules that the President supports,298 and if the House and 
Senate adopt a disapproval resolution, the President could veto that 
resolution.299 That did not happen in 2001 because of the unique 
sequence of events.300 
296 To accord with congressional rules, such a rider applies only within the boundaries of its 
underlying appropriation bill, that is, it applies only for a single year. An agency with a major new 
rule that brings down the wrath of Congress may well face a year's moratorium in its effort. 
Congress is further empowered by the ability to renew the measure a year later on the successor 
appropriation. 
297 The agency, in consultation with the supporters of the rule, has a year to reconsider, 
compromise, surrender, just wait out the storm, or win support to go ahead either from Congress or 
from the President (who can bargain with Congress). See CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE, supra note 2, 
at 977·94 (discussing the working of diverse appropriation limitations). Such choices, and the 
accompanying processes, stimulate the interaction of reason and politics. 
298 See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration,1l4HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2246 (2001) (describing 
presidential control over rulemaking). 
299 On the other hand, as 2001 went on, other rules promulgated at the end of the Clinton 
Administration survived. Rebecca Adams, GOP, Business Rewrite the Regulatory Playbook, 59 CONGo Q. 
WKLY. REp. 990, 995 (May 5, 2001) (discussing "decisions to uphold Clinton rules restricting 
wetlands development and ... [regarding] lead emissions"); Adriel Bettelheim, Patient Privacy 
Regulations Green-Lighted, 59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 846 (April 14, 2001). That the ergonomics rule 
did not survive, illustrated a number of tactical advantages from invoking a law about lawmaking. 
The same or different advantages might reawaken the CRA again. 
300 This was a rule promulgated at the very end of President Clinton's term. It thus was 
promulgated when there was a new President who was willing to sign the disapproval resolution, yet 
would prefer not to undertake suspending and revoking the rule as an internal administrative 
project. See ESKRIDGE,JR., FRICKEY, & GARRETI', supra note 9, at 492. On the other hand, Presidents 
weigh many factors in exercising the veto. A President who might hesitate in the future to take sole 
responsibility for killing a politically popular rule through the veto might yet sign a disapproval 
resolution for which the rule's opponents in Congress take the main responsibility. 
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B. A Contrasting Special Lawmaking Mechanism: Base-Closing and Dalton 
v. Specter 
In contrast to the detrimental uses of lawmaking mechanisms 
described above, a different special lawmaking mechanism that in the 
1990s was highly significant and even the subject of a Supreme Court 
case, the military base closing law, demonstrates the beneficial uses of 
such mechanisms.30l Moreover, the military base closing law took on 
particular importance when Congress agreed upon a renewed round of 
closings, to begin in 2005, pursuant to that law.302 
As the Cold War drew to an end in the late 1980s, obsolete military 
bases wasted billions of dollars.303 Mter major successful enactment 
struggles, Congress enacted the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 
1988,304 followed by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 
1990.305 Each set up base closing commissions, which would produce 
proposals for closing bases. Mter consideration by the Secretary of 
Defense and/ or the President, these proposal packages would go before 
the House and the Senate for possible disapproval as a whole. Pursuant 
to these laws, four base closing commissions, in 1989, 1991, 1993, and 
1995, produced base closing packages, none of which was ultimately 
disapproved by Congress.306 The procedural mechanism for a 
congressional disapproval resolution307 resembles that of the CRA.30B 
301 For a useful overview of the military base closing system, see Hanlon, supra note 27. 
302 See Pat Towell, Congress Compromises on Base Closings, Delaying Pain--and Savings--Several Years, 
59 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 2990 (Dec. 15, 2001). 
303 Dick Armey, Base Maneuvers, POL'YREv., Winter 1988, at 70. 
304 Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note). Ordinary delegation 
methods for having the Secretary of Defense propose to close the bases failed. Congress enacted 
procedures and substantive criteria effectuating resistance to base closings. 10 U.S.C. § 2687; Mayer, 
Base Closures: Law and Politics, 8 ARMED FORCES & SOC. 463, 465-69 (1982). 
305 Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808 (codified at 10 U.S.C.§ 2687). 
306 See HiU Again Votes to Close Military Bases, 49 CONGo Q. ALMANAC 465 (1993). 
307 It provides little time or opportunity for committee hearings, meetings, or reports, or for 
media attention to opponents of disapproval. For both, the supporters of the proposal rely on 
respect for the consideration given to it by its originating bodies-OSHA or the military base closing 
commissions-neither of which are bastions of political strength. 
30B The 1990 base closure statute provided that both chambers of Congress must pass a 
disapproval resolution within forty-five days of the President's approval of a commission's 
recommendations to prevent its becoming final. PUB. L. No. 101-510, § 2904(b), 104 Stat. 1813 
(1990). Disapproval resolutions, once introduced, would be referred to the armed services 
committees and then to the floor within twenty days of the President's approval. PUB. L. No. 101-
510, § 2908(b}, (c) 104 Stat. 1817 (1990). Mter a three-<lay layover, the resolution could be 
considered, with debate limited to two hours. PUB. L. No. 101-510, § 2908(d), 104 Stat. 1817 (1990). 
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The base closing mechanism was discussed in the interesting 
Supreme Court opinion, Dalton v. Specter,309 which considered but 
rejected a challenge to the 1991 base closing round. 310 A particularly 
illuminating concurring opinion by Justice Souter,joined by three other 
justices, explained how Congress saw the overwhelming problem for a 
military base closing legislative package as opponents' ability to undo 
particular base closings, a maneuver called "cherry-picking."311 The 
confining focus of the resolution of disapproval suppressed this 
maneuver, forcing the debate to concern the base closing package as a 
whole, thereby allowing the budgetary sense of the package as a whole to 
carry the day if meritorious. In contrast, the confining aspects of the 
CRA's disapproval mechanism did not suppress, but rather amplified, 
the lobbying and partisan maneuver to undo the ergonomics 
standard.312 The architects of such a system must have confidence that 
facilitated actions seek goals with strong intrinsic merit, and, they should 
have reason to expect a disapproval mechanism will not be used by the 
309 511 u.s. 462 (1994). 
310 The opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Rehnquist takes an institutional approach to the 
problem-focusing on the inability of the courts to review discretionary decisions of the President. 
This had less to do with the specific intent of this statute than with its proponents' broader views of 
the relation of the President's discretion to the processes oflaw. For discussion, see Lany Alexander 
& Evan Tsen Lee, Is There Such a Thing as Extraconstitutionality?: ThePu:alingCase oJDalton v. Specter, 
27 ARIz. ST. LJ. 845 (1995);John Matthew Fisher, Casenote, Dalton v. Specter: The Supreme Court 
Precludes Judicial Review of Decisions Made Pursuant to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 
21 OHIO N.U. L. REv.1257 (1995). 
311 Justice Souter's opinion explains: 
The point that judicial review was probably not intended emerges again upon 
considering the linchpin of this unusual statutory scheme, which is its 
all-or-nothing feature. The President and Congress must accept or reject the 
biennial base·dosing recommendations as a single package. See §§ 
2903(e)(2), (e)(3), (e)( 4) (as to the President); §§ 2908 (a)(2) and (d)(2) (as 
to Congress). Neither the President nor Congress may add a base to the list or 
"cherry pick" one from it. This mandate for prompt acceptance or rejection of 
the entire package of base closings can only represent a considered allocation 
of authority between the Executive and Legislative Branches to enable each to 
reach important, but politically difficult, objectives. 
511 U.S. at 481. 
312 The ergonomics-<iisapproval maneuver-using the CRA to undo a regulatory health, safety 
or environmental rule-consists of a swift, concentrated lobbying campaign by interests powerful 
enough on a national scale to reach a majority of the House and Senate. The CRA's displacing of 
the committee discourse system and the Senate's cloture requirements enabled this concentrated 
lobbying campaign to succeed before public support for a rule potentially aiding 27 million 
employees could mobilize. By the CRA mechanism, party leaderships filled the vacuum created by 
displacing the normal lawmaking system and worked with lobbying networks on a powerful push for 
disapproval. 
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potent combination of benefited-interest lobbies and a single party. 
Base closing fit both these criteria. 
C. Campaign Finance Reform After a Partial Supreme Court Overturn 
The special review mechanisms discussed above provide a basis for 
analyzing the use of such a mechanism for a particularly arresting 
problem in legislativejudicial interaction. Congress at times must enact 
statutory reform in a context. This phenomenon is exemplified by 
campaign finance reform, which is fraught with potential for 
constitutional challenges to particular provisions. Traditionally, 
Congress has simply taken its chances with what will be left after the 
Supreme Court finishes, trusting its own processes for enacting any 
necessary responses to thejudicial outcome.313 Leaving the response to 
the Court's rulings to chance and to later free-standing enactments 
poses risks.314 Above all, the veto gates against enactment that the initial 
enactment surmounted, such as the Senate filibuster or disagreements 
between party leaderships in the two chambers, may not be surmounted 
by a post-Court-decision revision right away315 or on other than watered-
down terms.316 
313 Most on point, after the Court invalidated the first version of the Federal Election 
Commission in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), Congress had to enact a change to a system for 
appointing the commissioners constitutionally, which it did. After Chadha, for example, Congress 
had to make a number of changes in statutes, replacing invalidated legislative veto provisions with 
valid legislating mechanisms. After the Court invalidated the first version of the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings mechanism in Bowshl!rv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1976), Congress had to enact a change from 
dependence upon the Comptroller General to dependence upon the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget. See LoUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFUCTS BETWEEN CONGRFSSAND 
THE PRESIDENT 31 (4th ed. 1997). 
314 The risks of invalidation mean, at the time of the initial enacting Congress, a prospect that 
may induce caution about enacting a strong statute that, without timely or adequate post-Court-
decision revision, would operate in an unbalanced form. 
315 For example, after Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), Congress did not act to modify the one-
House veto of spending deferrals in the Impoundment Control Act, but the D.C. Circuit held that 
the pre-Chadha deferral authority was no longer available to the President. See City of New Haven v. 
United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). To this day, Congress has still not done anything to 
restore the mechanism, unless the failing effort to enact some sort of line item veto measure is 
considered an attempt at restoration. 
316 For example, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (20oo) , the Court struck down the 
federal private cause of action in the Violence Against Women Act. See genl!rally Charles Tiefer, AjIo 
Morrison, Can Congress Preserve EnvironmentalLaws from Comml!rce Clause Challenge?, 30 ENVrL. L. REP. 
10888 (2000). Congress passed some mild funding provisions, but did not seek to enact a strong 
substitute statute, such as an incentive system to bolster women's rights to sue in state courts. 
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A concrete example from the campaign finance reform efforts of 
2001-02 illustrates the possibilities of a law about lawmaking to address 
the problem of preserving constitutionally borderline legislative efforts. 
Specifically, in March 2001, the Senate passed the McCain-Feingold 
campaign finance reform bill, which contained several limits on 
campaign expenditures, and attempted to draw the fine line between 
unregulated issue advertising and regulated electioneering 
expenditure.317 As reported to the Senate, the bill, in one of its 
strongest aspects, drew the line by a sixty-day blackout rule. 318 Although 
the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Colorado Republican319 showed a 5-4 
majority of the Court to have a bit more sympathy to campaign finance 
regulation than in the past, it still cannot be known whether the Court 
would uphold this line as constitutionaP20 Interestingly, the Senate 
thought the issue so worrisome that, by a vote of 82-17, it adopted an 
alternative back-up definition to apply in the event that the Court struck 
down the first definition. 321 Another provision in the bill also poses this 
issue, the so-called "millionaire's amendment."322 This sequence 
317 See generally Briffault, supra note 29 (discussing the constitutional problem of drawing a line 
between issue advocacy and campaign financing). 
318 An advertisement referring to a candidate within 60 days of a general election counted as a 
regulated "electioneering communication" rather than mere unregulated issue advertising. S.27, 
107th Congo § 201 (2001). The definition is used as part of a ban on corporate and union soft 
money. The blackout period is also for 30 days before a primary. 
319 FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001). 
320 It would make an interesting article, but far beyond what can be done here, to discuss this 
question itself. Briefly, Colorado Republican upheld limits on party coordinated expenditures. See id. 
The five:Justice majority expressed its willingness to find "a serious threat of abuse from the 
unlimited coordinated party spending." Id. at 2366. To uphold a blackout rule for independent 
expenditures involves some of the same willingness, but a good deal more of it, than was required 
for coordinated party expenditures. Further discussion here about just how likely a fall-back 
position is to be invoked is unnecessary to the analysis here of how such a fall-back would work. 
321 See 147 CONGo REc. S3122 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2001) (approving amendment offered by Sen. 
Specter). 
322 See Elizabeth A. Palmer, Vigorous Court Challenges Ahead Despite Non-Sl!Uerability's Defea~ 59 
CONGo Q. WKLY. REP. 701 (2001). The amendment would allow those running against rich self-
financed candidates to receive larger contributions from individuals, invalidation of which would 
leave non-rich candidate Davids in even worse shape than they are now to take on self-financed 
millionaire candidate Goliaths. That the Senate adopted an amendment with a back-up definition 
showed both the needs and vulnerabilities off all-backs, and the limits of what can be done without a 
lawmaking. Without knowing what the Court will say, the back-up definition necessarily does not 
take advantage of the precise tolerances of the Court. Furthennore, it only backs up the risk of 
invalidation of a single definition provision, not the more complex risk of invalidation of a 
mechanism-the millionaire's amendment-which could not be backed up simply by an alternative 
definition, but would need a more complex revision. 
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illustrates the Senate's extraordinary need323 to anticipate, and to 
prepare for, the possibility of a partial overturning of legislation by the 
Supreme Court.324 As the Congress enacted, in 2002, its campaign 
finance bill, and the cases commenced to challenge its constitutionality, 
the prospect of such a Supreme Court case loomed even larger.325 
A lawmaking mechanism could work in several ways, drawing on the 
models of the CRA, the base closing law, and others. The mechanism 
could provide that a conference committee326 shall reconvene after a 
Court decision invalidating provisions of the bill, and report revising 
provisions327 to replace the invalidated ones.328 That conference 
323 When proponents of such a bill imagine having to enact a revising statute after such a Court 
decision, they may worry that the congressional veto gates that fended off campaign finance reform 
legislation for decades, would either prevent, slow down, or water down a revising enactment In the 
course of initial enactment, these prospects may induce caution lest the result be an unbalanced 
statute. 
324 Other provisions might also be challenged, although the contemporary commentary about 
the Senate debate deemed this particular point U[p]erhaps the most serious challenge." Palmer, 
supra note 322. U [T] he questions surrounding the constitutionality of parts of McCain-Feingold" 
figured significantly in the defeat of "an amendment to add a non-severability clause." Id. 
325 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat 81; see David 
Nather, Diverse Three-Judge Panel WiU Hear Challenge to Campaign Finance Law, 60 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 
1144 (May 4,2002) (describing challenges to the new law in district court). 
326 This supposes that the final version of the campaign finance reform bill emerged from a 
conference committee with a particular membership, with Senators like McCain and Feingold 
prominent, with the same or similar committee to be reconvened after a partial invalidation. This is 
modeled on the Trade Act's nonconference mechanism for having the trade agreement 
implementation bill be prepared for fast track treatment by the House and Senate committees. 
An enactment mechanism might well provide for a decent interval of time after the Court 
decision and require open hearings, meetings, and a report with specified content, as a way of 
furthering the discourse-in contrast to what happened pursuant to the CRA for the ergonomics 
rule. 
327 This kind of mechanism serves a special function when the revising legislation might require 
going to lengths that seem sensible only after the Court has knocked down easier ones. For 
example, opponents of campaign finance reform are very reluctant to support any kind of public 
financing system, direct or indirect. Writing such a system into the law in advance of action by the 
Court increases the opposition and undermines the strength of the case for enacting the law. In 
contrast, suppose the Court strikes down the millionaire's amendment. If the conference 
committee considers a revising statute focused solely on what to do in the narrow situation for which 
the millionaire's amendment was the intended cure, itcan consider tailoring some kind of indirect 
fallback public financing system for that particular problem, without undermining the case that 
justified the whole rest of the law. The campaign finance system for presidential races already 
worked in 2000 with the winning candidate, Governor Bush, not wanting the limits that went with 
public financing while other candidates in the primaries and the general election accepted those 
limits. While Congress does not want to copy that system for all the House and Senate races, it 
might see the need to do it just for challengers of self-financed millionaires if and when the Court 
rules in a way that eliminates alternatives. 
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committee report, and perhaps limited substitutes, could receive 
consideration pursuant to procedures assuring a swift up-or-down vote 
in both chambers.329 Campaign finance reform poses the need to create 
discourse channels in which reform proponents can tap the diffuse but 
broad public desire for reform aided by the media - the model followed 
during the base-closing controversy. This would likely bring a more 
socially desirable resolution than if the issue were resolved by some 
combination of party leaders and lobbyists, as happened during the 
debate, or lack thereof, over ergonomics. 
VI. CONCLUSION: lAWMAKING lAws, AND 
THE BALANCE OF POWER AND REAsON 
Based on the analysis in this article, the year 2001 revealed both the 
great impact of laws about making laws and some contemporary 
concerns about this impact. Absent the ability to use such laws, 
controversial tax cut legislation could go through the Senate only on a 
consensus basis. Reconciliation allowed the controversial EGTRRA, 
easily the largest fiscal law in the past eight years and arguably the largest 
in the past twenty, to pass on one party's terms. The lightning-fast 
disapproval of the ergonomics rule pursuant to the procedures of the 
CRA involved, again, narrow party-line action, but on a much smaller 
scale. 
The results arguably raised serious concerns on several levels. 
EGTRRA's enactment did not occur pursuant to what the Budget Act 
intended as the consensus goal for reconciliation or what Congress had 
previously enacted by reconciliation, namely, deficit reduction. And, the 
results are poor in comparison with what Congress may have enacted on 
a normal or consensus Senate basis. Without reconciliation, the bill 
328 Substitutes for the conference committee report, if either the committee cannot reach 
agreement or a sufficiently large group in either chamber prefers an alternative, could be made in 
order by a petition with sufficient signatures. See5 U.S.C. § 802(c) (2000) (thirtysignaLUre discharge 
petition for CRA), discussed in text accompanying supra note 269. 
329 As always, there is the risk of presidential veto. The risk may be deemed manageable if the 
President is consulted during the initial enactment and makes acceptable pledges. If for some 
reason the risk is not deemed manageable, back-up alternatives can be specified in the bill that goes 
into effect if no revising legislation is approved. A President who vetoed revising legislation would 
not only suffer opprobrium for obstructionism but would do so for the dubious satisfaction of 
putting those back-up provisions into effect. Especially considering that the committee writing the 
revising legislation would consult with the President in developing it, a veto would not be likely in 
such circumstances. 
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would have needed to assemble a sixty-vote coalition for cloture or to 
have attained a level of consensus needed to avoid a Senate filibuster. 
Instead, by a facilitating procedure, the initial pre-conference Senate 
floor proceeding reduced tax revenues perhaps several hundred billion 
dollars past the consensus point. Then, the stacked and expedited two-
day conference committee and the extraordinarily truncated post-
conference consideration by themselves added another ten percent on 
top of what a bare majority of the Senate had been willing to accept. 
This was accomplished by using a bogus device that takes ten years' 
worth of cuts in nine years. The distribution and type of cuts also veered 
far from what a consensus would sustain, concentrating them much 
more intensely upon the top brackets and producing a regional skewing. 
The reconciliation procedure fundamentally frustrated the Senate's 
function of slowing down temporary bare majorities bent upon 
con troversially advancing the interests of one set of states at the expense 
of another. 
Looking more broadly, the scale and speed with which the use oflaws 
about making laws could payoff interest groups by a process less 
deliberative than regular lawmaking330 raised issues about how laws 
facilitate lawmaking. Such laws seemedjustifiable because they worked, 
after all, by allowing majority will to triumph over gridlock in areas 
selected for the special favorable value of action. However, with 
reconciliation, a determined party can cross the intended boundary 
lines and enact the opposite of the consensus goal. A mechanism 
intended for pulling the Treasury out of the red could facilitate the 
opposite, pushing the Treasury toward the red. In that light, the 
seeming propriety of majority will's triumphing over gridlock becomes 
something quite different, the kind of action for which mechanisms of 
deliberation and procedural restraint are intended. The effort by laws 
about lawmaking to facilitate difficult movement in a positive direction 
can turn into the busting of holes in the only bulwarks for sound 
legislating. As to the CRA, of the various purposes spelled out by 
Congress, none specifically consisted of helping interest group lobbies 
330 To be sure, in the Senate's consideration of the budget resolution, and its initial passage of 
the tax biIl, there had been hearings, floor speeches, and large numbers of amendments offered 
and voted upon. It is comparatively easy to say that reconciliation changes power relations by 
allowing the equivalent of cloture by 51 votes, while it is hard to make so definite a case about how 
reconciliation decreases-rather than merely transforms-pre-conference discourse and 
deliberation. Conference and post-conference discourse did clearly suffer. 
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gain leverage effectively to repeal, in part, agency efforts to grapple with 
major problems. 
Recalling the trio of power, structure of deliberation, and meaningful 
symbolism, concerns about each of these were raised in 2001. 
Reconciliation produced an extraordinary truncation of the structure of 
deliberation in which the Senate had virtually no post-conference 
opportunity to deliberate over multi-hundred-billion-dollar decisions. 
As to the disapproval of the ergonomics rule, what made that a triumph 
for disapproval proponents consisted precisely of the avoidance of a 
structure of deliberation characterized by hearings, committee meetings, 
markups, reports, and floor debate, with options of compromise. 
Lobbying and a harsh, rigid outcome took the place of that entire 
structure of deliberation. Finally, the laws about making laws should 
provide the symbolic link between specific broadly shared objectives and 
their ultimate realization. Instead, they provided the link between the 
controversial tax-cutting agenda matured in the late 1990s and the 
enactment of EGTRRA in 2001, and between the 1996 CRA and the 
rendering of ergonomics potentially unregulable. Neither of these 
developments could be considered, in any way, the realization of a 
consensus goal. 
For all that, this article has not advocated repeal of the Budget Act or 
the CRA, and it has opposed a flat refusal to reauthorize the trade fast 
track. In fact, with regard to the trade fast track, it has offered qualified 
support. Mter the September 2001 terrorist attack, the need was clearer 
than ever to find a compromise formula for renewing the fast track 
mechanism that has been an engine for world trade negotiation. On 
several grounds, even with the concerns of 2001 in mind, the answers 
consist of a reformed and more nuanced resort to laws about 
lawmaking, not their wholesale rejection. First, although 2001 displayed 
the power of laws about lawmaking beyond what had been seen before, 
these laws do have a much longer track record than just that one year, 
and over a span of years they have accomplished much, including much 
good. It took almost two decades for the country to extract itself from 
the deficit hole dug in the 1980s, in significant part by resorting 
repeatedly to the Budget Act's deficit-control reconciliation, such as in 
President Bush's BEA of 1990 and President Clinton's program in 1993. 
The trade fast track has facilitated the implementation of the Kennedy 
Round, deals with Israel and Canada, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round. 
Controversial as some individual steps may have been, the record as a 
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whole reflects a record of favorably-viewed enactments.331 In this, laws 
about lawmaking resemble the principal mechanism they supplement, 
that of delegation. Multi-stage approaches to solving problems go too 
far or not far enough at particular times. But, on many subjects, there is 
no alternative to multi-stage approaches. So, the question becomes, not 
whether, but when and how, to arrange these. 
Second, other observers might legitimately offer a less dour view of 
2001. The view taken in this article has accepted, as an appropriate 
baseline of congressional activity, the Senate's practice of typically 
requiring controversial measures either to move on a consensus basis or 
to obtain sixty votes for cloture. Some debate whether the Senate's 
procedure for defeating legislation amounts to an unfortunate formula 
for gridlock that has produced more bad than good.332 Some would 
argue that, especially in fiscal matters, bare partisan majorities ought to 
be able to act without Senate minority consensus, regardless of whether 
this increases national debt wholesale, because the party that does so 
can be held publicly accountable. Some have analyzed congressional 
budget procedure on a more elaborate basis than undertaken in this 
article, studying, inter alia, its subtler dynamics and informational 
mechanisms, such as the system of offsets in PAYGO.333 And, some 
migh t view the laws about lawmaking as just one part of the large picture 
of "unorthodox lawmaking"33'Lthe contemporary pattern in which bill 
passage depends upon complex, often party leadership-shaped processes 
more complex than the traditional committee-dependent, often open-
floor-amendment, non-filibustered, less complex processes that were 
more prevalen t before the 1970s. All these limitations suggest taking the 
observations presented here as quite preliminary and limited. From one 
of these other viewpoints, some might just rate EGTRRA's process as 
more or less par for the course. 
Third, even this article has suggested that reforms and new 
approaches may produce a record oflaws about lawmaking better than 
what transpired in 2001. Just as rulemaking delegations can evolve over 
time, with fixes on substantive, procedural, or overall-coordination 
331 The exception is the eRA, which had never produced an enacted disapproval resolution 
before 2001. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
332 Compare BINDER & SMITH, supra note 38 (finding little to praise in the filibuster) with Fisk & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 3 (taking a balanced view, and focusing criticism upon the relatively 
narrow issue of the rule that purports to bar the Senate from periodically changing its cloture rule). 
333 Garrett, Tax Legislative Process, supra note 10. 
334 SINClAIR, supra note 1. 
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levels, so too these lawmaking mechanisms can evolve over time. 
Congress has obeyed the improvements in budget reconciliation after 
the excesses of 1981, notably the Byrd Rule. It also made improvements 
in the budget process in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which 
helped get ready for the big step forward in 1993 and, via PAYGO, 
helped preserve for the following decade the gains made both in 1990 
and in 1993. The trade fast track started with some sophistication in 
1974, advanced in 1979, and advanced further in 1988. Since reforms 
can work, the problems of 2001 should serve, not as a reason for giving 
up, but as a summons to do better. 
Finally, as this article has pointed out, the country has other 
problems in which current or potential impasses suggest a law about 
lawmaking. This article has used the example of provisions in campaign 
finance legislation possibly facing partial Supreme Court invalidation. 
Any number of other examples could occur. The Supreme Court's 
Chadha and City of New York decisions have greatly confined the possible 
approaches available to the political branches that are either 
unconstitutional or blank-check delegation. That plenitude of problems 
and shortage of alternatives again reminds why the approach of laws 
about lawmaking cannot be foregone. 
Creating and reforming even a portion of a lawmaking system 
involves wrestling with the primal elements of the formation of law, the 
interplay of power and reason. The Constitution works too well, 
fortunately, for each generation to be obliged to experience again the 
wide-open opportunity and challenge of the Framers as they initially 
designed an entire system of government. But, in certain select 
contexts, each generation still does experience its own version of that 
opportunity, and given the vastly larger scale of the government's 
operations today than two centuries ago, even that version amounts to a 
great challenge. To solve problems, political processes must work their 
will, being neither wildly uncontrolled so that bare and temporary 
partisan majorities can do too much, nor so frustrated and stalemated as 
to render the majority sentiment of the public enfeebled and helpless. 
To solve problems, reason must speak in the counsels of government, 
yet no single mechanism alone, however tuned, assuredly picks up that 
voice. In this generation, the laws about lawmaking provide one of the 
main devices to bring power, with reason, to bear upon the nation's 
problems. Let the uses of those laws in 2001 spur hopeful consideration 
of the best ways forward. 
